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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over the last decades, the German labour market has witnessed a significant increase 
in wage inequality. The ratio of the 9th and the 1st decile of the wage distribution 
(D9/D1), i.e., the ratio of the wages of the 10 % best-paid workers to those of the 
10 % least-paid workers, increased in Germany by about 14 % between 1984 and 
2008, with the largest part of this increase taking place after the year 2000 (OECD, 
2011: p. 87).1 In their influential paper, Dustmann et al. (2009) have shown that the 
widening of the German wage distribution at the top has been driven particularly by 
technological change, while the rise in lower-tail inequality can be better explained 
by supply shocks and the sharp decline in unionization.2 Without the decline in 
unionization, low-wage workers in particular would have had a significantly 
higher wage growth (Dustmann et al., 2009). The increasing wage inequality has 
been paralleled by a significantly growing low-wage sector (Mason and Salverda, 
2010), with more than one-fifth of the German workers receiving a wage below the 
commonly accepted low-wage threshold of two-thirds of the median wage in 2010; 
in European comparison, this figure is relatively high (Bezzina, 2012).3
Due to its social implications, the growth of the low-wage sector has attracted 
a considerable amount of interest among researchers and politicians. For several 
years now, low pay has played an important role in academic and policy debates 
on living standards, rising costs of welfare programs, and employment rates. 
Thereby, the low-wage sector is mainly viewed from two different perspectives. 
One perspective is stressing that low pay is often linked to in-work poverty 
and therefore the incidence of low-wage work needs to be reduced. Often, the 
establishment of a minimum wage is advocated as a proper means for achieving 
this goal (see, e.g., Kalina and Weinkopf, 2012). Another perspective is arguing 
that low-wage jobs can serve as an important means to provide work for low-
1 The widening of the wage distribution has been identified to be one of the key drivers of the increase in overall 
income inequality over the last decades which took place not only in Germany and other traditionally low-
inequality countries such as Sweden or Denmark, but in the large majority of OECD countries as well (see, e.g., 
OECD, 2011).
2 See Schnabel (2013) for a recent overview on trends in unionization and its determinants in Germany and other 
advanced countries.
3 In this dissertation, the threshold of 2/3 of the median wage is used to define the low-wage sector. This threshold is 
used by the large majority of current studies on low pay and has also been adopted by the European Commission and 
the OECD. This threshold facilitates international comparisons and the analysis of developments over time (Lucifora 
and Salverda, 2009). However, note that there exist different possible measures of low pay which are applying either 
an absolute or a relative level of wages as a threshold. While the process of defining a low-wage threshold can be 
regarded as somewhat arbitrary (McKnight, 1998), Eichhorst et al. (2005) have shown that the development and the 
structure of the German low-wage sector can be considered as robust towards the choice of a certain threshold. See 
Sloane and Theodossiou (1998) for an in-depth discussion of methological issues in the measurement of low pay.
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skilled individuals and for reintegrating long-term unemployed individuals into 
the labour market (see, e.g., Sinn et al., 2007). While the former perspective 
implies that low-wage workers are permanently low-paid, the latter perspective 
implies that at least for a part of the low-wage workers low-paid jobs can serve 
as stepping stones to higher-paid jobs (Schank et al., 2009).
The different views on the low-wage sector point to the high relevance which 
the mobility of individual workers plays in the context of low pay. As noted by 
Mason and Salverda (2010: p. 48), there are three possible employment paths which 
low-wage workers can follow over time. First, these workers may get stuck in low 
pay and remain low-paid for a longer period of time; some workers may even stay 
low-paid for their whole working life. Second, low-wage workers may be caught in 
a “low-pay no-pay cycle”, i.e., they may be continuously cycling between low pay 
and unemployment or inactivity. Third, low-wage employment may act as a stepping 
stone, thereby enabling low-wage workers to move up to higher-paid employment. 
If the latter would be what is usually observed, i.e., if most low-wage workers would 
move up to higher-paid employment after a limited period of time, low-wage work 
would not be a significant social problem. However, this is not the case: a significant 
number of workers can be observed following all three employment paths which 
have been sketched above. Therefore, it is important to analyze the mobility of low-
wage workers in detail and to investigate how individual, job and establishment 
characteristics influence the probability of workers taking a specific mobility path 
(Mason and Salverda, 2010: p. 48). Evidence from such analyses may provide starting 
points for increasing the upward wage mobility of low-wage workers.
By now, a considerable literature has developed investigating various aspects 
of the wage growth and the wage mobility of low-wage workers in Germany and 
other countries. Inter alia, this literature has found that the upward wage mobility 
of low-wage workers is modest, with less than one-fifth of the full-time employed 
low-wage workers in Germany moving up to higher-paid employment. In addition, 
the chances of leaving low pay differ between subgroups of workers and are also 
different in particular types of establishments. A major part of this dissertation is 
contributing to this literature by analyzing several research questions which have 
not been investigated previously. Are low-wage workers able to stay in higher-
paid employment after moving up? Are there typical characteristics of wage 
growth firms for low-wage workers? How important are non-cognitive skills for 
transitions from low pay to higher pay? I aim to answer these research questions 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this dissertation by using administrative linked employer-
employee data and household survey data.4 
4 The study underlying chapter 4 is based on joint work with a co-author.
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As mentioned earlier, the decline in unionism has been identified as being one of 
the drivers of the increase in wage inequality at the bottom of the German wage 
distribution over the last decades (Dustmann et al., 2009). Particularly at the lower 
end of the wage distribution, unions seem to compress the German wage structure 
(see, e.g., Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2005; Gerlach and Stephan, 2006; Dustmann 
and Schönberg, 2009). Although the impact of unions on wages is therefore not 
the same at different points of the wage distribution, the examination of the 
magnitude of the average wage gap between covered and uncovered workers can 
provide basic information about the effect of unions on wages. However, while 
both union density and collective bargaining coverage decreased significantly over 
the last decade (see, e.g., Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Addison et al., 2007; Bispinck 
et al., 2010), most recent studies on the union-nonunion wage differential in 
Germany pertain to the 1990s or the early 2000s.5 Therefore, a smaller part of this 
dissertation contributes to this literature by presenting an updated estimate of the 
union wage premium, i.e., an estimate of the union wage premium for the years 
2008–2010. Using linked employer-employee data, in chapter 5 I thereby provide 
a first step for the further research on the impact of the decline in unionization 
on wages in Germany.6
1.2 Organization of the dissertation
This dissertation is based on four studies, which are described in this section. 
Each of these studies is intended to be a stand-alone analysis. While the studies 
underlying chapter 2 and chapter 3 are single authored, chapter 4 and chapter 5 
are based on studies which have been co-authored. Therefore, the latter two 
chapters are written in the first-person plural perspective. All studies have been 
published as discussion papers and have been or will be submitted to peer-
reviewed international journals.
1.2.1  Escaping the low-wage sector? Wage growth and career patterns of 
German low-wage workers7
The research in this chapter is motivated by the fact that most previous studies on 
the wage mobility of low-wage workers have focused only on transitions between 
low pay and other employment states, such as higher-pay employment or non-
5 See, e.g., Fitzenberger et al. (2013); Gürtzgen (2012). 
6 Chapter 5 is based on joint work with three co-authors.
7 This chapter is based on Stephani (2012).
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employment. From their results, one cannot infer whether the amount of wage 
growth of low-wage workers is high or low. In addition, it is not clear whether or 
not low-wage workers are able to stay in higher-paid employment after moving 
up. Furthermore, it is also not clear whether the firm-level variables which are 
usually included in studies on low-wage mobility do capture the full range of 
firm-level heterogeneity which is impacting on the wage mobility of low-wage 
workers. I approach these research gaps by using administrative linked employer-
employee data and by applying different multivariate models which take into 
account endogenous sample selection. By using a sample of workers who were 
low-paid in two consecutive years, I focus on those workers who were low-paid 
for a considerable period of time. This approach distinguishes the study from the 
large majority of the studies on low-pay mobility, as the latter usually focus on 
low-wage workers who have been low-paid in one single year.8
1.2.2  Does it matter where you work? Employer characteristics and the wage 
growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers9
Employers play an important role for the wage growth and the wage mobility of 
low-wage workers (see, e.g., Andersson et al., 2005). While this finding has been 
corroborated by several previous studies, due to a lack of data the impact of a 
number of potential employer-level determinants of individual wage growth has 
not been investigated to date. In addition, it is not clear whether the wage growth 
of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers is influenced by the same set of 
establishment characteristics. The research in chapter 3 adds to the literature by 
analyzing the impact of a number of potential employer-level determinants on the 
wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers which have not been 
investigated previously. Inter alia, I investigate the impact of the coverage by a 
collective agreement, the share of fixed-term co-workers, and the establishment 
age. For the analysis in this chapter, I use a rich linked employer-employee dataset 
and I apply endogenous switching regression models. By using this econometric 
method, I am able to analyze the wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-
wage workers simultaneously and to control for the endogenous selection of 
workers into the state of being a low-wage worker or a higher-wage worker.
8 Note that the analyses in the other chapters of this dissertation are not focusing exclusively on low-wage workers. 
Instead, they are incorporating higher-wage workers as well. In order to keep low-wage workers and higher-
wage comparable to each other and to avoid inconsistency, in these chapters I do not impose the restriction that 
individuals need to be low-paid in two consecutive years in order to be classified as low-wage workers.
9 This chapter is based on Stephani (2013).
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1.2.3  Locus of Control and low-wage mobility
Over the last decade, the case for the use of non-cognitive skills in economic 
analyses has become stronger. An increasing literature has developed analysing 
the importance of non-cognitive skills for economic and social outcomes (see, e.g., 
Heckman et al., 2006). In chapter 4, I contribute to this literature by investigating 
how the individual probability of West German men10 moving from low pay to 
higher pay is influenced by their individual score of Locus of Control, i.e., by the 
extent to which an individual believes that he has control over his life.11 By doing 
so, I also control for possible correlations with other non-cognitive skills such as 
the Big Five and reciprocity. In contrast to the previous chapters, this chapter is 
based on data from a large household panel survey12 and applies dynamic 
multinomial logit models with random effects.
1.2.4  Union decline and the coverage wage gap in Germany
The continuing decline in union density and collective bargaining coverage has 
been identified to be one of the drivers of the increase in wage inequality at the 
bottom of the German wage distribution over the last decades (Dustmann et al., 
2009). However, the literature dealing with the impact of unions on wages is 
lacking recent information on the average difference between the wages of those 
workers who are covered by a collective agreement and the wages of those workers 
who are not covered by a collective agreement. Therefore, in chapter 5 I use rich 
linked employer-employee data and different fixed-effects models to provide an 
updated estimate of the union wage premium.13 I analyze two establishment sub-
samples which include collective bargaining joiners and never members on the 
one hand and collective bargaining leavers and always members on the other 
hand; each of these sub-samples includes only worker job stayers. Although a 
possible difference in average wages between covered workers and uncovered 
workers does not inform about the distribution of wages, it provides a critical first 
step for the further research on the consequences of the decline in unionism on 
wages by showing whether or not the union wage premium still exists.
10 Due to the heterogeneous employment trajectories of women which may interact with their non-cognitive skills, I 
do not include both sexes in the analysis. Furthermore, due to data limitations the analysis in this chapter pertains 
to West Germany. In contrast, the analyses in the other chapters of this dissertation include both men and women 
and cover West Germany and East Germany.
11 The study underlying this chapter has been co-authored with Daniel D. Schnitzlein (see Schnitzlein and Stephani, 2013).
12 The analyses in this chapter include both full-time workers and part-time workers. Due to data limitations, the 
analyses in the other chapters of this dissertation are covering full-time employed workers only.
13 This chapter is based on joint work with John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira and Lutz Bellmann (see Addison et al., 
2012a).
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2  Escaping the low-wage sector? Wage growth  
and career patterns of German low-wage workers
2.1 Introduction
In 2006, about 17 % of full-time employees in the EU-27 countries received a 
wage below the threshold of 2/3 of the median wage, which usually demarcates 
the low-wage sector. Germany had a higher-than-average proportion of low-wage 
workers (19.6 %) among its workforce (Casali and Alvarez Gonzalez, 2010). Over 
the last decade, the low-wage sector in Germany has been growing, and in 2009 
it accounted for 22 % of all German workers (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010).
As a consequence, the low-wage sector has attracted increased attention from 
researchers and policy-makers over the last years, and a number of international 
studies on various aspects of low-wage work and the mobility of these workers 
have been published. Many of these studies have analysed the probability 
of workers escaping low pay by crossing a certain relative or fixed low-wage 
threshold. Inter alia, they have found that male, younger and higher-skilled low-
wage workers have better chances to escape low wages. In addition, various 
establishment characteristics such as firm size or the share of low-wage workers 
in the establishment are relevant in this context.14
Despite this number of previous studies, several important research gaps 
still remain. For example, empirical evidence on the amount of wage growth of 
individual low-wage workers is scarce, especially for Germany. However, this 
should be regarded as an important piece of information relating to the wage 
mobility of these workers: A low extent of individual wage growth in the low-
wage sector or a high persistence of (very) low wages for certain individuals might 
call for labour market policies that will assist these workers. Additionally, it would 
also be interesting to know whether the wage mobility of relatively well-paid 
low-wage workers differs from the mobility of the worst-paid workers in the 
low-wage sector, for example, as a result of labour market segmentation. Finally, 
significant inter-firm differences regarding the extent of the wage growth of low-
wage workers might point to the existence of firms who choose a “high road” 
strategy that also involves better prospects and career opportunities for low-wage 
workers.15
14 For Germany, see for example Schank et al. (2009); Mosthaf et al. (2011); Knabe and Plum (2013). See section 3.2 of 
this dissertation for a more detailed review of studies on the wage mobility of low-wage workers in Germany and 
other countries.
15 See Pyke and Sengenberger (1992) for an early discussion of possible “high road” and “low road” strategies of firms.
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Another research gap concerns the in-depth analysis of the career patterns of 
low-wage workers. For example, we do not know whether these individuals are 
able to stay in higher-paid employment after having escaped the low-wage sector 
or not. Because downward mobility from the higher-wage sector also exists, it 
would be interesting to see whether the upward mobility of low-wage workers is 
only a transitory experience or whether it results in longer-lasting employment in 
higher-paid jobs. Furthermore, taking such a multi-period perspective by looking 
at the careers of low-wage workers after upward movement could broaden our 
understanding of low-wage careers. For example, it would be interesting to see 
how firm characteristics affect the probability of longer-lasting upward wage 
mobility of low-wage workers.
In this chapter, I address both of the research gaps discussed above by using 
administrative linked employer-employee data and multivariate models which take 
into account endogenous sample selection. First, I show that there exists a substantial 
extent of upward and downward wage mobility within the low-wage sector which 
has been overlooked to date. In addition, I find that the firm heterogeneity which is 
not captured by the firm variables analysed by previous studies is important for the 
upward mobility of low-wage workers. Second, I find that the upward wage mobility 
of low-wage workers leads to longer-lasting higher wage levels for a significant part 
of these workers. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 
discusses the theoretical background and presents hypotheses; section 2.3 gives 
information on the data used; section 2.4 presents the descriptive evidence; 
section 2.5 discusses the multivariate results; and section 2.6 concludes the work.
2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
According to human capital theory and search theory, the main determinants 
of individual wage growth are the accumulation of general and firm-specific 
human capital and job searching (i.e., switching to a better-paid job) (e.g., 
Schönberg, 2007). As a consequence, wages are predicted to grow with labour 
market experience and tenure, at a decreasing rate (Topel, 1991). In line with 
this theoretical argument, I expect a positive relationship with a decreasing rate 
between labour market experience and tenure on the one hand and wage growth 
(and career stability) of low-wage workers on the other hand.16
16 In this context, it has often been stated that age together with years of schooling can be used as a proxy for labour 
market experience; therefore, in order to avoid multicollinearity, one should refrain from including age, years of 
schooling and labour market experience together in an earnings regression. However, in the case of low-wage 
workers this rule might not be appropriate: due to the high unemployment risk of low-wage workers, their age and 
years of schooling might not serve as a good measure for their labour market experience. For more information 
about the unemployment risk of low-wage workers, see de Lathouwer and Marx (2005) or Eriksson (1998).
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In addition, human capital theory and search theory suggest comparatively 
lower wage growth for women, foreigners, elderly or lower educated individuals 
and workers belonging to low-skilled occupational groups.17 The reasons for 
this are varied: for example, they might be rooted in gender differences in job 
preferences or a higher probability of work interruptions (for women), lower 
growth of individual productivity or a higher unemployment risk. For foreign 
workers, certain labour market barriers such as the lack of language skills may 
have a negative impact on wage growth. In addition, (statistical) discrimination 
may also hamper the future careers of women and foreign workers. In line with 
these theoretical considerations, I expect that low-wage workers who belong to 
these demographic groups experience a comparatively lower level of individual 
real wage growth and less often stay in higher-paid employment after having 
escaped the low-wage sector.
Furthermore, relatively well-paid jobs in the low-wage sector might coincide 
with more opportunities to accumulate general and firm-specific human capital 
than the worst-paid jobs. Therefore, they may constitute a better signal to other 
potential employers, while the opposite might be true for the worst-paid jobs in 
the low-wage sector. For example, a relatively well-paid waitress working in an 
exclusive restaurant might benefit from her workplace’s operating experience and 
reputation, while this might be less true for a waitress in a snack bar. This would 
imply that the higher the current wage of a low-wage worker, the higher her 
chances for future wage growth and remaining in higher-paid employment after 
having escaped the low-wage sector.
However, a contrary effect can be expected following search theory. Because 
the probability that a new wage offer will exceed the current wage of an individual 
declines with the level of her current wage, workers in higher wage quantiles are 
assumed to exhibit lower wage growth than workers in lower wage quantiles (e.g., 
Fitzenberger and Garloff, 2007). One could expect a similar relationship when 
investigating only the wage growth of low-wage workers: on average, relatively 
well-paid low-wage workers should then experience a comparatively lower wage 
growth than relatively poorly-paid low-wage workers. As becomes clear from the 
two different lines of argument, the relationship between the wage level of a low-
wage worker and her further career is not clear ex ante.
Turning to establishment characteristics, one factor that potentially influences 
the wage growth and career advancement of low-wage workers is firm size. First, 
firm size can be considered as a good proxy for the existence of an internal labour 
market in the firm. An internal labour market increases the chances for individuals 
17 See, e.g., the in-depth treatment of these two theories in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), chapters 2 and 3.
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to move up in the firm (e.g., Gürtzgen and Heinze, 2010; Siebert and Addison, 
1991). Therefore, in large firms low-wage workers may have a higher probability 
of wage growth and career advancement. Second, compared to small firms, large 
firms in Germany more often provide on-the-job training (Gerner and Stegmaier, 
2009). Besides increasing upward mobility within the firm, on-the-job training 
might also provide employees with general human capital that (at least in part) 
is transferable to other employers. When changing firms, this transferable human 
capital could then help a low-wage worker to obtain a higher wage at her new job. 
Overall, this implies that firm size is positively associated with the wage growth 
and the career prospects of low-wage workers, irrespective of whether they stay 
with the firm or change employers. 
The composition of the workforce in the firm might also be relevant for the 
wage growth and the career prospects of low-wage workers. For example, a 
high percentage of highly qualified workers may characterise a firm where the 
accumulation of general and firm-specific human capital is easier, for example, 
due to knowledge spill-overs or on-the-job training. Furthermore, working for a 
firm with a high percentage of women or foreign workers could be detrimental 
for the wage growth and career advancement of low-wage workers. For example, 
workplace segregation or low-cost strategies in these firms may imply lower 
wage growth and fewer possibilities for human capital accumulation (Mosthaf 
et al., 2011). A high share of older workers might characterise a firm in which 
moving up is more difficult, for example, due to less flexible internal structures 
(Nienhüser, 1998).
Furthermore, labour market segmentation may also hamper the wage growth 
and the career prospects of low-wage workers. In this context, Grün et al. (2011) 
point out that one might be able to identify firms that offer relatively poor 
promotion prospects for low-wage workers by looking at the average wage level 
in the firm. On average, firms that offer relatively poor promotion prospects may 
also have a lower wage level than firms that offer better promotion prospects. 
The reason for this could be that a firm that chooses a “high road” strategy, which 
also involves a higher prevalence of internal labour markets or on-the job training, 
may also be characterised by a comparatively higher wage level in the firm. On the 
one hand, such a “high road” strategy might have a positive effect on the careers 
of workers who stay with the firm (i.e., stayers), as the internal labour market 
may offer various career opportunities for them. On the other hand, workers who 
change their employer (i.e., movers) may benefit from the transferable part of the 
human capital that they accumulated with the previous (“high road”) employer 
and his reputation, both in terms of wage growth and future career prospects. 
Therefore, I expect the median wage level in a firm to be positively related to the 
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wage growth of low-wage workers and their probability of staying in higher-paid 
employment after an upward move.18
Finally, several other factors may be relevant for the wage growth and the 
careers of low-wage workers and therefore should be controlled for, although 
it is difficult to formulate clear-cut hypotheses about their effects. First, due to 
the high amount of heterogeneity between different industry sectors, one should 
control for industry affiliation. Second, due to the differing economic situations 
and relevance of institutions in East and West Germany (for instance regarding 
collective bargaining), it is also important to control for the location of the firm. 
Third, it would be interesting to see whether changing firms is associated with 
increased wage growth and better future career prospects of low-wage workers, 
as suggested by Andersson et al. (2005); however, some of these (voluntary) 
changes may of course be endogenous.
2.3 The data
I use a representative 2 % random sample from the Integrated Employment 
Biographies (IEB) of the German Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg 
(IAB) for the years 2001, 2004 and 2006 that has been augmented by the inclusion 
of employer information from the Establishment History Panel (BHP). The IEB 
contain information about all German employees who are liable to social security, 
benefit recipients, as well as individuals who are searching for employment, 
unemployed individuals and participants in measures of active labour market 
policy. For more information on a sample of the IEB which is available for scientific 
purposes, see Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) as well as Oberschachtsiek et al. 
(2009). In contrast, the BHP is an establishment dataset composed of yearly cross 
sections for both East and West Germany. Each cross section of the BHP contains 
information on all German establishments that are covered by the Employee and 
Benefit Recipient History (BLH) on 30 June in that year (see Spengler, 2008). A 
representative 2 % sample of the IEB, as well as different versions of the BHP, 
is available to researchers at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German 
Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
in Nuremberg.
By combining these two datasets, I create a linked employer-employee 
dataset that enables me to investigate the impact of both individual and firm 
characteristics on the wage growth and the career patterns of full-time low-wage 
18 The average is more sensitive to extreme values than the median. In order to avoid bias, in this study, the median 
wage is used to describe the wage level in the firm.
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workers in Germany between three points in time: on 30 June in 2001, 2004 and 
2006. I use the commonly accepted low-wage threshold of 2/3 of the median 
daily gross wage of full-time employees, which has been computed separately for 
East and West Germany. In 2001, the low-wage threshold corresponded to a real 
daily wage of 44.4 € (60.2 €) in East (West) Germany; until 2006, its value fell 
to 43.5 € (59.4 €), reflecting the decrease of real wages in Germany at the start 
of the new millennium (see, e.g., Brenke, 2009, for details on the development of 
real wages in Germany).19 The restriction to full-time employed workers is due to 
technical reasons: as precise information on working hours is not available in this 
dataset, the accurate categorisation of part-time workers into low-paid or higher-
paid individuals is not possible. However, this restriction also avoids potential 
biases that might arise from the fact that some part-time workers have voluntarily 
chosen part-time work, such as individuals engaged in childcare or elderly care.
To focus on the core groups of the labour market, I limit the sample to the 
full-time employed workers aged 15 to 58 years (in 2001), and I exclude trainees, 
working students and retired individuals. Because the data at hand only contain 
information for 30 June of a given year, I further restrict the analysis to workers 
who were low-paid while being full-time employed in both starting years 2000 
and 2001. By doing so, I ensure that the sample does not contain individuals who 
received a low wage once and for a short time; for example, this might be the case 
if a previously higher-paid worker temporarily has to take up a low-paid job after 
being laid off. For workers who have more than one job, I only use information about 
their main job, i.e., the employment relationship with the maximum daily wage.
Stemming from the social security records (i.e., administrative sources), both 
the IEB and the BHP can be regarded as highly reliable. For example, one can expect 
the wage information in this data to have been measured with utmost accuracy 
by the authorities since this information is decisive for a worker’s entitlement to 
social security benefits. Nevertheless, I exclude full-time employed workers with 
implausibly low wages from the analysis as well as individuals working in a high-
skilled job while earning a wage below the low-wage threshold in both starting 
years 2000 and 2001.20 Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the sample. To 
facilitate readability of the text, in this book all tables have been moved to the 
end of the corresponding chapter.
19 The nominal wages have been deflated using the consumer price index of the German Federal Statistical Office with 
2006 = 100.
20 I exclude full-time employed workers earning a daily wage of less than 20.1 € (21.5 €) in East (West) Germany 
in prices of 2006; this is equivalent to a monthly wage of about 602 € (645 €).The results of the analysis are not 
altered significantly by choosing a higher cut-off point. Furthermore, I also exclude individuals earning a wage 
below 2/3 of the median in both starting years 2000 and 2001 while working full-time in higher-paying jobs, such 
as technicians, engineers, managers or jobs belonging to the occupational group of the professions. Since the 
dataset is highly reliable, this problem affects only about 5 % of full-time employees.
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In the remainder of the chapter, I use this dataset to analyse the amount of 
real wage growth of the low-wage workers between 2001 and 2006 and their 
transitions between a low wage and a higher wage in 2001, in 2004, and in 2006.
2.4 Descriptive evidence
2.4.1 The real wage growth of low-wage workers
As can be inferred from Table 2.2, the full-time employed low-wage workers in the 
sample earned a real daily wage of about 43.4 € on average in 2001. Until 2006, 
they experienced a relative real wage growth of about 10.4 %. Disaggregation by 
individual characteristics shows that women earned about 2.4 € less than men, 
while their amount of relative real wage growth was roughly half the amount 
of wage growth of men. Foreigners in the low-wage sector earned 2 € more 
than Germans, whereas there was hardly any difference between the two groups 
regarding wage growth. 
Another interesting result can be seen when looking at the wage level of 
a full-time low-wage worker in 2001, which is measured by categorising the 
workers into three groups: those workers earning a wage below the 5th percentile 
of the entire wage distribution, those earning a wage between the 5th and the 10th 
percentile, and those earning a wage between the 10th percentile and the low-
wage threshold.21 As can be seen from the figures, the worst-paid workers in the 
low-wage sector experienced a much higher positive relative wage growth than 
the better-paid low-wage workers (23.5 % versus 7.7 % and 4.2 %, respectively). 
However, only about 11 % of the worst-paid low-wage workers were able to 
cross the low-wage threshold, whereas about 23.5 % of the best-paid low-wage 
workers and about 12 % of the wage group in between managed this career move 
(these figures are not shown in the table).
As the figures reflect both positive growth (wage increases) as well as negative 
growth (wage losses), the table shows that there has been a considerable degree of 
upward wage mobility in the low-wage sector. After disaggregating these figures 
into workers who experienced wage increases and workers who experienced wage 
decreases, I find some more interesting results. Overall, about 10,300 of the low-
wage workers from 2000/01 experienced wage increases, whereas about 9,700 
of them suffered wage decreases (these figures are not shown in the table). This 
demonstrates that there is a considerable amount of downward wage mobility 
21 In 2001, the 5th percentile of the daily wages of all full-time employees corresponded to a nominal daily wage of 
30.5 € (38.0 €) in East (West) Germany; the 10th percentile corresponded to a daily wage of 35.1 € (48.0 €); and the 
low-wage threshold corresponded to a daily wage of 43.5 € (59.4 €).
IAB-Bibliothek 35024
Escaping the low-wage sector? Wage growth and career patterns of German
low-wage workers
in the low-wage sector which is probably connected to the comparatively higher 
job instability and the higher unemployment risk of these workers. However, the 
relative magnitude of the average wage increases (+31.1 %) is almost three times 
the relative magnitude of the average wage decreases (-11.5 %). This is the reason 
why in Table 2.2, I observe a considerable extent of positive wage growth for low-
wage workers on average, despite the fact that the frequencies of wage increases 
and wage decreases are quite close. In previous studies, this significant amount 
of upward and downward wage mobility in the low-wage sector remained hidden 
since these studies narrowed their analysis to the probability of low-wage workers 
crossing the low-wage threshold.
2.4.2 The career patterns of low-wage workers
While the previous section aimed at shedding light on the development of the wages 
of full-time employed low-wage workers, this section examines the career patterns 
of low-wage workers while also taking into account workers who leave full-time 
employment. In contrast to previous studies, I adopt a multi-period perspective 
by analysing the career patterns of the low-wage workers from 2000/01 that had 
reached higher-paid employment by the year 2004. Particularly, I would like to 
know how many of these workers were still in higher-paid employment in 2006. 
Figure 2.1 gives information about the employment state of the low-wage 
workers from 2000/01 in the years 2004 and 2006 by presenting the frequency 
of different career patterns in these two years.22 While “N” characterises workers 
who were no longer full-time employed in the year 2004 or 2006, “L” represents 
the workers who were still full-time employed and still earning a low wage. Finally, 
“H” indicates that a low-wage worker from 2000/01 was still full-time employed 
but receiving a wage above the low-wage threshold. For example, in this context, 
the pattern “LH” indicates that a low-wage worker from 2000/01 was still low-
paid in 2004 (“L”) but had reached higher-paid employment in 2006 (“H”).
Figure 2.1 shows that more than 32 % of the low-wage workers were no longer 
full-time employed in 2004 (see the sum of the frequencies for the first three 
career patterns on the left hand side: “NN”, “NL” and “NH”). Interestingly, even 
two years later, most of these individuals (more than 25 % of all low-wage workers 
from 2000/01, see career pattern “NN”) had not returned to full-time employment. 
More than 35 % of the low-wage workers from 2000/01 still received a low wage 
22 See Bingley et al. (1995) for a similar analysis for Germany and Denmark for the years 1984–1990. Of course, even 
more could be learned by incorporating more years into this descriptive analysis; for example, one could try to 
identify low-wage workers who frequently switch between a low wage and a higher wage. However, due to the 
increased complexity that would result, this is not addressed here.
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in 2004 and in 2006 while being full-time employed (see career pattern “LL”). 
The high persistence in low pay as well as the high number of transitions out of 
(full-time) low-paid employment has also been found by previous studies on the 
mobility of low-wage workers, for example, by Stewart (2007) for the UK and by 
Uhlendorff (2006) for Germany. Therefore, not taking into account transitions from 
full-time employment into part-time employment or into the state of no longer 
being employed would result in overestimating the upward mobility of low-wage 
workers. In line with previous studies on low-wage mobility in Germany, I further 
find that about 15 % of the low-wage workers had found higher-paid employment 
three years later (“HN”, “HL”, “HH”). More than 60 % of these workers (i.e., about 
9 % of all low-wage workers) were still higher-paid in 2006 (“HH”), whereas about 
4 % of all low-wage workers were no longer full-time employed in 2006 after 
having moved to higher-paid employment by the year 2004 (“HN”). Only about 
2 % of all low-wage workers were again low-paid in 2006 after having reached a 
higher-paid position by 2004 (“HL”). In summary, despite the high persistence in 
low-paid employment and the considerable number of transitions out of full-time 
employment that accounts for an important part of the mobility in the low-wage 
sector, there also seems to be a certain amount of upward mobility of low-wage 
workers that results in longer-lasting higher-paid jobs for about 9 % of all low-
wage workers in the sample.
Table 2.3 presents disaggregated information on the career patterns of the 
low-wage workers, focusing on the question of which of them were able to 
maintain higher-paid employment until 2006. For analytical reasons and for the 
purpose of clarity, I have built three aggregated groups out of the nine career 
patterns used in Figure 2.1. The first group consists of the low-wage workers who 
were “low-paid in 2004 or not full-time employed in 2004” (this comprises about 
85 % of all low-wage workers from 2000/01)23; the second group contains the 
workers who were “higher-paid in 2004, low-paid or not full-time employed in 
2006” (“HN” and “HL”, about 6 % of the low-wage workers), while the third group 
of workers was “higher-paid both in 2004 and 2006” (“HH”, about 9 %).
Women were more likely than men to be low-paid or to no longer be full-time 
employed in 2004, and at the same time, they were less likely to be higher-paid both 
in 2004 and in 2006; while about 13 % of the male low-wage workers were higher-
paid in 2004 and in 2006, only about 8 % of the females had managed to achieve 
higher-paid employment. The differences between the figures for Germans and for 
foreigners are not particularly pronounced. Compared to relatively poorly paid low-
wage workers, relatively well-paid low-wage workers more often managed to be 
23 These are: „NN“, „NL“, „NH“, „LN“, „LL” and „LH“.
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higher-paid both in 2004 and 2006. Interestingly, in the third column, the figures 
for the workers earning less than the 5th percentile are quite close to the figures 
for the workers earning a wage between the 5th percentile and the 10th percentile, 
while the number of the previously best-paid low-wage workers from 2000/01 
who were higher-paid both in 2004 and in 2006 is more than twice as high. This 
shows that the best-paid low-wage workers more often remain in higher-paid 
employment than the relatively poorly-paid low-wage workers.
Using the descriptive results of this section as a starting point, it will be 
interesting to see which factors influence the real wage growth and the careers of 
the low-wage workers in the multivariate analysis. 
2.5 Econometric analysis
2.5.1 The determinants of the real wage growth of low-wage workers
In the first part of the multivariate analysis, I investigate the determinants of the 
real wage growth of low-wage workers between 2001 and 2006 by estimating a 
Heckman sample selection model. In doing so, I correct for the selectivity of the 
sample by taking into account that the status of being a low-wage worker in 
2000/01 and of still being full-time employed in 2006 might not be exogenous.24
Let yi 0 be a dummy variable which is 1 if a full-time employed individual from 
2000/01 is low-paid in these two years: 
P (yi 0 = 1) = P (y *i 0  = (zi γ  * + εi 0 ) < κ ) = Φ1(ziγ ), (1)
where y *i 0 is the underlying latent variable, zi is a vector of variables determining 
low pay status, κ is the low-wage threshold, and γ = –γ *. I assume εi 0 to be 
distributed N (0, 1). Φ1 denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. This 
probit model represents the selection equation.
Let Δlnwi be the difference of the logarithms of an individual’s real wages in 
2006 and 2001, which is observed only if the individual was low-paid in 2000/01 
and is still full-time employed in 2006:
Δlnwi = xi β + εi 1,  (2)
where xi is the vector of variables determining wage growth and εi 1 is distributed 
N (0, σ
ε 1 ). Assuming that the error terms εi 0 and εi 1 have a bivariate normal 
24 This could result in the so-called initial conditions problem, see Heckman (1981) or Stewart and Swaffield (1999).
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distribution with zero means, standard deviations σ
ε 0 and σε 1 and correlation ρ, 
then
E (Δlnwi | yi 0 = 1) = (xi β + βλ Φ2 (zi γ  */σε 0 )Φ1(zi γ */σε 0 )
),  (3)
where Φ2 is the standard normal density function and 
Φ2 (zi γ  */σε 0 )
Φ1(zi γ  */σε 0 )
 is the inverse 
Mills Ratio.
Following the theoretical considerations discussed earlier, I include a 
number of explanatory variables in the model. Explanatory variables that enter 
both zi and xi are individual characteristics (gender, age, level of education, 
non-German nationality and the occupational group) and several establishment 
characteristics. The latter are dummy variables describing establishment size 
and a number of variables describing the composition of the workforce in 
the establishment, including the percentage of women, the percentage of 
foreigners, the percentage of highly-skilled workers, the median age and the 
median daily wage of all full-time workers in the establishment. To control 
for industry affiliation, 18 industry dummy variables have been included. In 
addition, xi contains three dummy variables describing the wage level of the 
worker in 2001 which has been discussed in the descriptive part of the chapter. 
All explanatory variables mentioned so far are measured in the year 2001 and 
are held fixed during estimation. xi further contains four variables describing 
the amount of individual labour market experience and tenure between 1992 
and 2006 and one dummy control variable indicating that a worker changed 
establishments between 2001 and 2006.25 In contrast, zi contains a variable 
that is not included in the wage growth equation. This variable measures 
the difference between the logarithm of the East (West) German low-wage 
threshold (2/3 of the median wage in the respective part of the country) and 
the logarithm of 2/3 of the median wage calculated at the level of the district 
in which an individual was employed.26 The higher the difference between these 
two wage levels in 2001, the more likely it is that an individual working in the 
respective district in 2001 received a wage below the East (West) German low-
wage threshold of 2/3 of the median wage. Therefore, I expect this variable to 
influence the selection of a full-time employed worker from 2000/01 into the 
group of the low-paid in these two years. However, this variable is a highly 
aggregated one because it has been calculated by aggregating the wages of 
more than 950 full-time employees per district on average. Therefore, this 
25 Labour market experience and tenure enter the equation in linear and squared form. The tenure variable refers to 
the firm at which a worker was employed in the year 2006.
26 Germany is organised into 429 administrative districts.
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variable is not likely to have a significant impact on the wage growth of an 
individual low-wage worker between 2001 and 2006. For this reason, I use this 
variable as an exclusion restriction.27
The first column of Table 2.4 presents the estimates of the determinants of 
the log wage growth of low-wage workers.28 The correlation coefficient of the 
error terms ρ and the effect of the exclusion restriction are highly significant, 
indicating that the use of a simple OLS regression instead of the sample selection 
model would result in biased estimates. 
As expected, women, older workers and low-skilled workers have a 
comparatively lower real wage growth than men, younger workers and higher-
skilled workers. Furthermore, I find that labour market experience and tenure are 
positively related to the wage growth of low-wage workers, at decreasing rates. 
However, the marginal effect of labour market experience is only significant at 
the 10 %-level.
The two dummy variables describing the wage level of a low-wage worker are 
positively associated with individual real wage growth: compared to the reference 
group of workers who earned a wage between the 10th percentile and the low-
wage threshold of 2/3 of the median wage, the worst-paid workers in the low-
wage sector had a higher real wage growth by roughly 15 %. The workers earning 
a wage between the 5th and the 10th percentile had a higher wage growth than 
the reference group by roughly 4 %. Of course, this result must be interpreted with 
caution due to the potential endogeneity of the dummy variables which describe 
the individual wage level of a worker. Nevertheless, this result suggests that even 
the worst-paid low-wage workers experience a significant amount of individual 
wage growth. In addition, this result supports the search theory hypothesis 
discussed in the theoretical part of the chapter: the higher the wage of a low-
wage worker, the lower her relative wage growth.
With respect to the establishment characteristics, as expected, I find 
establishment size to be positively associated with the wage growth of low-wage 
workers. In contrast, the variables describing the composition of the workforce 
in the establishment are not always statistically significant. Interestingly, even 
27 Note that, as it is also the case for most of the exclusion restrictions which are used in the literature, one could 
argue that this exclusion restriction is debatable. Therefore, I have run robustness checks using other possible 
exclusion restrictions which are available in this dataset, such as lagged low pay status; the results did not change 
significantly. Other studies, as for example Stewart and Swaffield (1999), are using information on the socio-
economic background of the parents as exclusion restriction. However, such variables are not available in my 
dataset.
28 Due to the non-comparability of the daily wages of the full-time and part-time workers in this administrative 
dataset, and because of the non-existence of wage estimates for the low-wage workers who left employment, in 
this section, I aim to control for the transition of low-wage workers out of (full-time) employment by including 
those low-wage workers who were no longer full-time employed in 2006 into the selection equation of the model. 
More specifically, I include these workers into the “0” of the dependent variable of the selection equation.
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after controlling for a number of individual and establishment characteristics, the 
median daily wage in the establishment is positively associated with individual 
real wage growth. This variable has not been analysed by previous studies on the 
upward wage mobility of low-wage workers. Considering all explanatory variables 
at their mean value, a higher median daily wage in the establishment by 10 € is 
associated with a 2 % higher individual wage growth of the low-wage workers 
who were employed there in 2001. As discussed in the theoretical part of the 
chapter, this result suggests that there might be a considerable extent of inter-
firm heterogeneity which is relevant for the wage growth of low-wage workers 
and which is not captured by the other firm variables integrated in the regression. 
In addition, it is also worth noting that low-wage workers in East Germany had a 
more than 6 % higher real wage growth than low-wage workers in West Germany, 
which might reflect a catch-up process due to the initially lower wage level in the 
eastern part of the country.29
To account for the fact that low pay often constitutes a “special affliction” 
of women (Asplund and Persson, 2000: p. 53), the second and third column of 
Table 2.4 present separate estimations by gender. In this way, I try to control 
for deeper gender-specific differences that might not be captured by the gender 
dummy variable used in the previous regression. The results reveal a number of 
interesting differences between male and female low-wage workers.
For example, the amount of labour market experience does not have an 
influence on the wage growth of women in the low-wage sector, while the 
marginal effect of this variable on the wage growth of men is now highly 
significant at the 1 %-level. Another interesting result is that although the 
individual wage level is positively associated with the wage growth of both 
women and men, the marginal effects of these variables are about two times 
higher for men than for women. For women, I also find a positive relationship 
between establishment size and wage growth; for men, no significant 
relationship can be identified. Furthermore, the positive marginal effect of 
the median daily wage in the establishment is five times bigger for men than 
for women. Overall, these results might reflect systematic job or workplace 
differences between the sexes that are not captured by the variables included 
in the regressions.
Last but not least, in all estimations, I find a highly significant positive marginal 
effect of the dummy variable that describes a change of the establishment. Of 
29 As mentioned earlier, all establishment characteristics were measured at baseline and are held fixed during 
estimation. Therefore, the results for these variables should not be confounded by time-varying shocks. However, 
I cannot exclude the possibility that some establishment variables might be correlated with unobserved time-
constant heterogeneity of workers or establishments.
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course, one should keep in mind the potential endogeneity of this variable when 
interpreting it. Nevertheless, changing establishments seems to be a relevant 
element of the wage growth of low-wage workers.
2.5.2 The determinants of the career patterns of low-wage workers
As stated earlier, in contrast to previous studies, I now adopt a multi-period 
perspective and investigate the development of the careers of low-wage workers 
after they have moved to higher-paid employment. To be able to analyse the 
career development of low-wage workers from 2000/01 that have reached higher-
paid employment by the year 2004, in the second part of the multivariate analysis, 
I estimate an ordered probit model with endogenous sample selection (for an 
extended review of this model, see Greene and Hensher, 2010). According to the 
aggregation of the employment states into the three broad categories presented 
earlier in Table 2.3, an ordered dependent variable yord that characterises the career 
of a low-wage worker can take three values, indicating temporary or permanent 
status improvements: 
yord  = 1 if a low-wage worker from 2000/01 was low-paid or not full-
time employed in 2004,
yord  = 2 if a low-wage worker from 2000/01 was higher-paid in 2004, 
and low-paid or not full-time employed in 2006,
yord  = 3 if a low-wage worker from 2000/01 was higher-paid both in 
2004 and 2006.
According to Long and Freese (2006), Williams (2006) and Gerner (2010), an 
ordered probit model can be regarded as equivalent to a sequence of related 
binary probit models. Although, in some cases, these related binary probit models 
might be less efficient than the “conventional” ordered probit model, this so-
called “generalised” ordered probit model is consistent. Furthermore, it allows for 
a relaxation of the parallel lines assumption that is inherent to the conventional 
model, and which might be violated in certain cases. By estimating two related 
binary probit models with endogenous sample selection in Stata using maximum 
likelihood, I am therefore able to mimic the estimation of a generalised ordered 
probit model with endogenous sample selection, which would be computationally 
more burdensome when estimated directly.
When doing so, the procedure of defining the values of the two binary 
dependent variables in the career pattern equations of the two related binary 
probit models with sample selection is crucial: one needs to make sure to choose 
their respective values in a way that these two models together indeed mimic an 
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ordered probit model with sample selection. Table 2.5 illustrates the recoding of 
the ordered outcome variable yord into the dummy outcome variables of the two 
related binary probit models with sample selection.
As in the analysis of the determinants of wage growth, I correct for the 
selectivity of the sample. The two selection equations for the two related binary 
probit models with sample selection are identical. In each of these probit selection 
equations, yi 0 is a dummy variable which is 1 if a full-time employed individual 
from 2000/01 is low-paid in these two years: 
P (yi 0 = 1) = P (y *i 0  = (zi γ  * + εi 0 ) < κ ) = Φ1(ziγ ), (4)
where y *i 0 is the underlying latent variable, zi is a vector of variables determining low 
pay status, κ is the low-wage threshold, and γ = –γ  *  . I assume εi 0 to be distributed 
N (0, 1). Again, Φ1 denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
In the first of the two related binary probit models with sample selection, let 
yi 1a be a dummy variable which takes the value “0” if a low-wage worker from 
2000/01 was low-paid or not full-time employed in 2004 (i.e., if yord  = 1), and “1” 
if in 2004, she was receiving a wage above the low-wage threshold (i.e., if yord  ≥ 2). 
This yields a probit model for the probability of a low-wage worker being higher-
paid in 2004:
P (yi 1a = 1) = P (y *i 1a = (xi  β*a + εi1a ) > κ ) = Φ1a (xi  βa ). (5)
In the second of the two related binary probit models with sample selection, 
I estimate the probability of a low-wage worker being higher-paid both in 2004 
and in 2006. For this second model, let yi 1b be a dummy variable which takes the 
value “0” if a low-wage worker was low-paid or not full-time employed in 2004; 
or if she has been higher-paid in 2004 but returned to low pay or exited full-
time employment in 2006 (i.e., if yord ≤ 2). Accordingly, yi 1b takes the value “1” if 
a low-wage worker was higher-paid in both 2004 and 2006 (i.e., if yord  = 3). The 
probability of a low-wage worker being higher-paid in both 2004 and 2006 is 
then given by:
P (yi 1b = 1) = P (y *i 1b = (xi  β*b + εi1b ) > κ ) = Φ1b (xi  βb ).  (6)
The error terms (εi 0, εi1a ) and (εi 0, εi1b ) are assumed to follow a bivariate standard 
normal distribution with correlation ρa and ρb , respectively.
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Therefore, the conditional probability that a low-wage worker was higher-paid in 
2004 is
P (yi 1a = 1 | yi 0 = 1) = 
Φ2a (xi βa , zi γ, ρa )
Φ1(zi γ )
 ,  (7)
and the conditional probability that a low-wage worker was higher-paid both in 
2004 and in 2006 is
P (yi 1b = 1 | yi 0 = 1) = 
Φ2b (xi βb , zi γ, ρb )
Φ1(zi γ )
 ,  (8)
where Φ2a and Φ2b are the cumulative bivariate standard normal distributions. 
Φ2a is derived from equations (4) and (5), Φ2b from equations (4) and (6). 
The variables included in xi are largely the same as the ones used in the wage 
growth equation in the analysis of the real wage growth of low-wage workers 
in the previous section. However, because in this section I take into account 
transitions out of full-time employment also in the outcome equation, xi contains 
neither the tenure variables nor the dummy variable indicating a change of 
establishment.
The selection equations in both models are supposed to correct for the fact that 
the probability of a full-time employed worker from 2000/01 being low-paid in 
these two years might not be exogenous. The set of explanatory variables included 
in zi is the same as those used in the selection equation for the estimation of the 
real wage growth in the previous section. However, as an identifying restriction, 
I now use a dummy variable indicating whether or not a full-time employed worker 
from 2000/01 was low-paid in 1999. I assume that this variable influences the 
probability that a full-time employed worker from 2000/01 was low-paid in these 
two years. Due to the temporal distance, I do not expect this variable to influence 
the probability of leaving low-paid employment in 2004 or 2006. Table 2.6 presents 
the results of this generalised ordered probit model with sample selection. 
First, one can see that compared to men, women exhibit a lower probability 
of reaching higher-paid employment and also a lower probability of remaining 
in higher-paid employment after an upward move. Compared to men, their 
probability of reaching higher-paid employment is more than 11 percentage points 
lower (see marginal effect in the first column), while their probability of staying 
in higher-paid employment after an upward move is more than 13 percentage 
points lower than the corresponding probability for men (see marginal effect in 
the second column). 
Regarding the occupational groups, I find that compared to the reference 
category of skilled commercial and administrative occupations, most occupational 
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groups have a lower probability of reaching higher-paid employment and of 
staying in higher-paid employment afterwards.
Labour market experience is associated positively at a decreasing rate with the 
probability of a low-wage worker reaching higher-paid employment and with his 
probability of remaining in higher-paid employment afterwards. This points to the 
importance of work experience for the career advancement of low-wage workers.
The results for the variables describing the wage level of a low-wage 
worker in 2001 show that the worst-paid workers in the low-wage sector have 
a significantly lower probability of crossing the low-wage threshold than the 
reference group of the best-paid low-wage workers. Compared to the reference 
group of workers who earned a wage between the 10th percentile and 2/3 of the 
median wage, the worst-paid workers had a more than 13 percentage points lower 
probability of reaching higher-paid employment by the year 2004 and a more than 
11  percentage points lower probability of staying in higher-paid employment after 
an upward move. Interestingly, the career prospects of medium-paid low-wage 
workers (i.e., the group of workers earning a wage between the 5th percentile and 
the 10th percentile) were worse than the career prospects of the worst-paid low-
wage workers.
Regarding the marginal effects of establishment characteristics, similar to the 
analysis of the determinants of wage growth, I find a positive relationship between 
establishment size and upward mobility. Furthermore, there is a highly significant 
positive marginal effect of the median daily wage in the establishment. Again, 
the latter variable can be interpreted as a proxy for firm heterogeneity in the 
low-wage sector, which is not captured by the firm variables in the regressions. 
A higher median daily wage in the establishment by 10 € is associated with a 
2 percentage points higher probability of a low-wage worker reaching higher-
paid employment by the year 2004; the probability of staying in higher-paid 
employment after moving up is higher by 2 percentage points as well. The results 
are qualitatively robust towards a further disaggregation of the analysis by gender.
2.6 Conclusions
Using administrative linked employer-employee data from Germany, this 
chapter has provided several new insights into the real wage growth and career 
patterns of full-time employed low-wage workers between 2001 and 2006.
First, there is a significant extent of upward and downward real wage mobility 
in the low-wage sector, as the number of low-wage workers experiencing real 
wage increases is only slightly higher than the number of low-wage workers 
experiencing real wage losses. However, even the worst-paid workers in the 
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low-wage sector, i.e., the workers who earned a wage below the 5th percentile, 
experienced a considerable extent of upward wage mobility: on average, their 
real wages increased by more than 23 % between 2001 and 2006. Since previous 
studies analysed only the probability of a low-wage worker crossing the low-
wage threshold, this considerable extent of upward and downward wage mobility 
within the low-wage sector was previously not known.
Second, in line with previous studies, I find that only about 15 % of all low-
wage workers managed to move up to higher-paid employment within three years. 
In addition, I go beyond the previous studies by analysing the careers of these 
workers after their upward move. I find that more than 60 % of these workers 
were still higher-paid two years later. This result shows that the upward wage 
mobility of low-wage workers is not a merely transitory phenomenon, but can 
lead to longer-lasting higher wage levels for low-wage workers.
Third, the multivariate analysis shows the relevance of individual, job and firm 
characteristics for the wage growth and the career advancement of low-wage 
workers. Notably, I find a highly significant positive marginal effect of the median 
daily wage in the establishment. This variable can be interpreted as a proxy for 
firm heterogeneity and has not been taken into account by previous studies. 
Therefore, the results point to the existence of firms in the low-wage sector that 
choose a “high road” strategy. Besides higher wage growth, such a strategy might 
also involve better prospects and career opportunities for low-wage workers. 
For the US, studies have shown that employers indeed play an important role 
in the earnings and the employment outcomes of low-wage workers (see Holzer, 
2005, for a discussion). Therefore, future researchers might be able to identify 
potential career firms for German low-wage workers by addressing the aspect of 
firm heterogeneity in the low-wage sector in more detail. In doing so, qualitative 
approaches should also be considered. As Lane (2009) points out, case studies 
might constitute a particularly helpful tool for understanding the relationship 
between employers and wage inequality.
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2.7 Figure and tables to chapter 2
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of variables in the sample
Obser vations Mean Std. Dev.
Full-time employed workers with low wage in 2000/01
Individual characteristics
Woman (1 = yes) 36,459 0.70 0.46
Foreigner (1 = yes) 36,456 0.10 0.31
Age 15–24 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.12 0.33
Age 25–34 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.25 0.43
Age 35–54 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.56 0.45
Age 55–58 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.06 0.24
School leaving certificate without vocational training (1 = yes) 36,459 0.18 0.39
School leaving certificate with vocational training (1 = yes) 36,459 0.58 0.49
High school certificate or university degree (1 = yes) 36,459 0.03 0.16
Education unknown (1 = yes) 36,459 0.21 0.41
Unskilled manual occupations (1 = yes) 36,459 0.19 0.39
Skilled manual occupations (1 = yes) 36,459 0.13 0.33
Unskilled service occupations (1 = yes) 36,459 0.22 0.42
Skilled service occupations (1 = yes) 36,459 0.12 0.33
Unskilled commercial and administrative occupations (1 = yes) 36,459 0.15 0.35
Skilled commercial and administrative occupations (1 = yes) 36,459 0.16 0.37
Semi-professions (1 = yes) 36,456 0.03 0.16
Occupation unknown (1 = yes) 36,459 0.01 0.09
Labour market experience 1992–2006, in years 34,580 10.90 3.21
… squared 34,580 129.16 65.52
Tenure 1992–2006, in years 34,580 5.21 5.01
… squared 34,580 52.15 70.96
Wage < 5th percentile in 2001 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.31 0.46
5th percentile < wage < 10th percentile in 2001 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.32 0.47
10th percentile < wage < 2/3 of the median wage in 2001 (1 = yes) 36,459 0.37 0.48
Change of establishment (1 = yes) 26,590 0.48 0.50
Establishment characteristics
1–20 employees (1 = yes) 36,459 0.54 0.50
21–100 employees (1 = yes) 36,459 0.27 0.45
101–500 employees (1 = yes) 36,459 0.16 0.36
More than 500 employees (1 = yes) 36,459 0.04 0.19
Median age of the full-time workers 36,398 37.82 7.03
Percentage of women 36,459 59.08 31.45
Median daily wage of the full-time workers 36,398 53.32 18.98
Percentage of foreigners 36,459 9.37 18.10
Percentage of highly qualified workers 36,459 1.97 6.50
East Germany (1 = yes) 36,459 0.21 0.41
All full-time employed workers from 2000/01
Difference between the log of 2/3 of the East (West)  
German median wage and the log of 2/3 of the median  
wage in the district
344,893 -0.13 0.112
Low-wage employed in 1999 (1 = yes) 344,961 0.10 0.30
Notes:  own calculations based on IEB and BHP. The individual and establishment-level characteristics are 
measured in 2001.
IAB-Bibliothek 35036
Escaping the low-wage sector? Wage growth and career patterns of German
low-wage workers
Table 2.2: Real daily wages and wage growth of the low-wage workers from 2000/01
Mean wage 
in 2001
Δ wage
(2001–2006)
N (N full-time 
employed in 
2006)
Individual characteristics
Women 42.7 € 7.7 % 25,346 (13,708)
Men 45.1 € 16.5 % 11,113 (6,228)
Germans 43.2 € 10.4 % 32,662 (18,158)
Foreigners 45.2 € 10.6 % 3,794 (1,778)
Secondary school certificate without  
vocational training
44.9 € 10.2 % 6,707 (3,612)
Secondary school certificate with  
vocational training
43.3 € 9.2 % 21,005 (11,800)
High school certificate or university degree 43.5 € 38.9 % 946 (495)
Education unknown 42.6 € 10.7 % 7,801 (4029)
Wage 2001 < 5th perc. 31.7 € 23.5 % 11,331 (5,306)
5th perc. < wage 2001 < 10th perc. 44.6 € 7.7 % 11,688 (6,335)
10th perc. < wage 2001 < 2/3 of the median wage 52.3 € 4.2 % 13,440 (8,295)
No change of establishment 44.5 €* 3.5 % –    (12,141)
Change of establishment 44.8 €* 21.2 % –    (7,795)
Establishment characteristics
1–20 employees 41.7 € 10.6 % 19,495 (10,386)
21–100 employees 44.7 € 8.8 % 9,929 (5,654)
101–500 employees 46.4 € 10.4 % 5,679 (3,207)
More than 500 employees 47.0 € 21.8 % 1,356 (689)
West Germany 45.6 € 10.8 % 28,661 (15,609)
East Germany 35.4 € 9.1 % 7,798 (4,327)
Overall 43.4 € 10.4 % 36,459 (19,936)
Notes:  own calculations based on IEB and BHP. * only workers included who were full-time employed in 2001 and 
2006.
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Figure 2.1:  Career patterns of the low-wage workers from 2000/01 in 2004 and 2006 
(percentages)
Note: own calculations based on IEB and BHP.
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Employment state in the years 2004 and 2006
Legend: N: No longer employed full-time
L: Low wage (full-time) 
H: Higher wage (full-time)
Example: LH = Low wage in 2004, Higher wage 
in 2006.
N = 36,459.
IAB-Bibliothek 35038
Escaping the low-wage sector? Wage growth and career patterns of German
low-wage workers
Table 2.3: Aggregated career patterns of the low-wage workers from 2000/01
Low-paid or
not full-time 
employed  
in 2004
(1)
Higher-paid 
in 2004; 
low-paid or 
not full-time 
employed  
in 2006
(2)
Higher-paid 
both in 2004 
and in 2006
(3)
Individual characteristics
Women 86.7 % 5.7 % 7.7 %
Men 81.5 % 5.9 % 12.7 %
Germans 85.0 % 5.7 % 9.3 %
Foreigners 86.1 % 6.0 % 7.9 %
Secondary school certificate without  
vocational training
87.1 % 4.6 % 8.4 %
Secondary school certificate with  
vocational training
84.3 % 6.1 % 9.6 %
High school certificate or university degree 78.0 % 6.7 % 15.3 %
Education unknown 86.5 % 5.6 % 7.9 %
Wage 2001 < 5th perc. 90.0 % 4.4 % 5.6 %
5th perc. < wage 2001 < 10th perc. 89.6 % 4.4 % 6.0 %
10th perc. < wage 2001 < 2/3 of the median wage 77.1 % 8.0 % 14.9 %
Establishment characteristics
1–20 employees 85.7 % 5.9 % 8.4 %
21–100 employees 85.4 % 5.3 % 9.2 %
101–500 employees 83.7 % 5.5 % 10.8 %
More than 500 employees 79.7 % 7.3 % 13.0 %
West Germany 84.5 % 6.0 % 9.5 %
East Germany 87.3 % 4.9 % 7.9 %
Overall 85.1 % 5.7 % 9.2 %
Observations 31,030 2,091 3,338
Notes:  own calculations based on IEB and BHP. The aggregated pattern (1) contains the career patterns „NN“, 
„NL“, „NH“, „LN“, „LL” and „LH“; (2) contains “HN” and “HL”; (3) contains “HH”. 
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Table 2.4: Determinants of the real wage growth of the low-wage workers from 2000/01
All workers Women Men
Individual characteristics
Woman (1 = yes) -0.084*** – –
(0.006)
Foreigner (1 = yes) -0.022*** 3.8e-04 -0.041***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Age 25–34 (1 = yes) -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.032***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
Age 35–54 (1 = yes) -0.091*** -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Age 55–58 (1 = yes) -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.084***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.022)
School leaving certificate with vocational training (1 = yes) 0.001 -4.7e-04 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
High school certificate or university degree (1 = yes) 0.089*** 0.064*** 0.108***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.033)
Education unknown (1 = yes) -0.005 -0.002 -0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Unskilled manual occupations (1 = yes) -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.069***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.019)
Skilled manual occupations (1 = yes) -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.068***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
Unskilled service occupations (1 = yes) -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.089***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.018)
Skilled service occupations (1 = yes) -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.069**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.035)
Unskilled commercial and administrative occupations (1 = yes) -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.061***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.023)
Semi-professions (1 = yes) 0.021 -0.003 0.113**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.048)
Occupation unknown (1 = yes) -0.048** -0.048* -0.077*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.041)
Labour market experience 1992–2006, in years 0.011* -0.004 0.031***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
… squared -0.001* 1.4e-04 -0.001***
(2.8e-04) (3.8e-04) (4.3e-04)
Tenure 1992–2006, in years 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.053***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
… squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(1.3e-04) (1.7e-04) (2.3e-04)
Wage < 5th percentile in 2001 (1 = yes) 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.221***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015)
5th percentile < wage < 10th percentile in 2001 (1 = yes) 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Change of establishment (1 = yes) 0.162*** 0.132*** 0.204***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
Establishment characteristics
21–100 employees (1 = yes) -0.003 2.9e-04 -0.010
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
101–500 employees (1 = yes) 0.016*** 0.024*** -0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
More than 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.040*** 0.061*** -0.003
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
Median age of the full-time workers -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(3.0e-04) (3.5e-04) (0.001)
Percentage of women -2.0e-05 -1.9e-04 3.1e-05
(9.0e-05) (1.2e-04) (1.6e-04)
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Table 2.4 (cont.): Determinants of the real wage growth of the low-wage workers from 2000/01
All workers Women Men
Median daily wage of the full-time workers 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.005***
(1.8e-04) (1.9e-04) (4.1e-04)
Percentage of foreigners 2.4e-04 2.1e-05 0.001**
(1.5e-04) (1.9e-04) (2.3e-04)
Percentage of highly qualified workers 4.2e-04 3.5e-04 0.001
(3.8e-04) (4.1e-04) (0.001)
East Germany (1 = yes) 0.062*** 0.040*** 0.104***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Joint significance of dummy variable groups Age***,
level of 
education***, 
type of  
occupation***, 
wage level  
in 2001***,
establishment 
size***,  
industry***
Age***,
level of 
education**, 
type of  
occupation***, 
wage level  
in 2001***,
establishment 
size***,  
industry***
Age***,
level of  
education***, 
type of  
occupation***, 
wage level  
in 2001***,
establishment 
size***,  
industry***
Observations 19,918 13,694 6,224
Selection equation
Difference between the log of 2/3 of the  
East (West) German median wage and 2/3  
of the log of the median wage in the district
0.007***
(9.1e-04)
0.041***
(0.005)
0.001***
(2.8e-04)
ρ (correlation of the error terms) 0.846*** 0.837*** 0.868***
Significance of model
χ2(48) = 
3263.35***
χ2(47) =  
1732.93***
χ2(47) =  
1932.99***
Observations 344,766 116,077 228,689
Notes:  own calculations based on IEB and BHP. Heckman sample selection models. Standard errors in parentheses 
(clustered at establishment level). 17 industry dummies suppressed in the table. Reference group of the 
dummy variable groups: age 15–24; secondary school certificate without vocational training; skilled 
commercial and administrative occupations; wage between the 10th percentile and 2/3 of the median 
wage; 1–20 employees. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; n.s. denotes statistical 
insignificance. 
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Table 2.5:  Recoding of the ordered outcome variable yord into the dummy outcome variables of 
the related binary probit models with endogenous sample selection (yi 1a and yi 1b )
Ordered dependent 
variable yord:
“Low-paid
or not full-time  
employed in 2004”
(1)
“Higher-paid in 2004; 
low-paid or  
not full-time  
employed in 2006”
(2)
“Higher-paid both  
in 2004 and in 2006”
(3)
Coded into
Two related binary dependent variables:
yi 1a  = 0 1
yi 1b  = 0 1
Corresponding to the 
probability of a low-
wage worker being …
“Low-paid in 2004 or 
no longer full-time 
employed in 2004”
“Higher-paid at least 
in 2004”
(1) vs. (2) & (3)
“Higher-paid both  
in 2004 and 2006”
(1) & (2) vs. (3)
Notes:  yord  = 1 contains the career patterns “NN”, “NL”, “NH”, “LN”, “LL” and “LH”; yord  = 2 contains “HN” and “HL”; 
yord  = 3 contains “HH”. 
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Table 2.6: Determinants of the career patterns of the low-wage workers from 2000/01
Regression 1 Regression 2
Values of the binary outcome variable yi 1a
0 = “Low-paid or not 
full-time employed  
in 2004“
1 = “Higher-paid  
in 2004“
yi 1b
0 = “Low-paid or not 
full-time employed 
in 2004“ or “Higher-
paid in 2004; low-
paid or not full-time 
employed in 2006“
1 = “Higher-paid both 
in 2004 and in 2006“
Estimating the probability of a low-wage  
worker being …
“Higher-paid  
at least in 2004”
“Higher-paid  
in 2004 and 2006”
Individual characteristics
Woman (1 = yes) -0.118*** -0.137***
(0.010) (0.011)
Foreigner (1 = yes) 0.026* 0.021
(0.015) (0.016)
Age 25–34 (1 = yes) -0.065*** -0.081***
(0.010) (0.010)
Age 35–54 (1 = yes) -0.159*** -0.169***
(0.011) (0.012)
Age 55–58 (1 = yes) -0.229*** -0.232***
(0.013) (0.012)
School leaving certificate with vocational training 0.014 -0.008
(1 = yes) (0.010) (0.011)
High school certificate or university degree (1 = yes) 0.083*** 0.084***
(0.023) (0.024)
Education unknown (1 = yes) 0.008 -0.006
(0.011) (0.012)
Unskilled manual occupations (1 = yes) -0.077*** -0.077***
(0.013) (0.013)
Skilled manual occupations (1 = yes) -0.077*** -0.084***
(0.013) (0.013)
Unskilled service occupations (1 = yes) -0.094*** -0.105***
(0.012) (0.012)
Skilled service occupations (1 = yes) -0.012 -0.056***
(0.018) (0.018)
Unskilled commercial and administrative occupations -0.051*** -0.069***
(1 = yes) (0.013) (0.012)
Semi-professions (1 = yes) 0.002 -0.006
(0.024) (0.025)
Occupation unknown (1 = yes) -0.095** -0.096**
(0.039) (0.038)
Labour market experience 1992–2006, in years 0.134*** 0.142***
(0.007) (0.008)
… squared -0.005*** -0.005***
(3.4e-04) (3.4e-04)
Wage < 5th percentile in 2001 (1 = yes) -0.135*** -0.112***
(0.008) (0.008)
5th percentile < wage < 10th percentile in 2001 (1 = yes) -0.158*** -0.133***
(0.007) (0.007)
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Table 2.6 (cont.): Determinants of the career patterns of the low-wage workers from 2000/01
Regression 1 Regression 2
Values of the binary outcome variable yi 1a
0 = “Low-paid or not 
full-time employed  
in 2004“
1 = “Higher-paid  
in 2004“
yi 1b
0 = “Low-paid or not 
full-time employed 
in 2004“ or “Higher-
paid in 2004; low-
paid or not full-time 
employed in 2006“
1 = “Higher-paid both 
in 2004 and in 2006“
Estimating the probability of a low-wage  
worker being …
“Higher-paid  
at least in 2004”
“Higher-paid  
in 2004 and 2006”
Establishment characteristics
21–100 employees (1 = yes) 0.005 0.011
(0.009) (0.009)
101–500 employees (1 = yes) 0.027** 0.040***
(0.011) (0.011)
More than 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.059*** 0.053**
(0.020) (0.021)
Median age of the full-time workers -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Percentage of women -2.3e-04 -2.1e-04
(1.6e-04) (1.7e-04)
Median daily wage of the full-time workers 0.002*** 0.002***
(2.8e-04) (3.0e-04)
Percentage of foreigners -3.0e-04 -0.001**
(2.7e-04) (2.9e-04)
Percentage of highly qualified workers -2.0e-04 -2.4e-04
(0.001) (0.001)
East Germany (1 = yes) -0.001 0.004
(0.010) (0.011)
Joint significance of dummy variable groups Age***,
level of education**,
type of occupation***,
wage level in 2001***,
establishment size*, 
industry***
Age***,
level of education***,
type of occupation***,
wage level in 2001***,
establishment size*, 
industry***
Observations 34,522 34,522
Selection equation
Low-wage employed in 1999 (1 = yes) 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.004) (0.004)
ρ (correlation of the error terms) 0.212*** 0.220***
Significance of model χ2(45) = 1894.44*** χ2(45) = 1628.98***
Observations 342,893 342,893
Notes:  own calculations based on IEB and BHP. Generalised ordered probit model with endogenous sample 
selection estimated by two related probit regressions with endogenous sample selection; marginal effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at establishment level). 17 industry dummies suppressed in the 
table. Reference group of the dummy variable groups: age 15–24; secondary school certificate without 
vocational training; skilled commercial and administrative occupations; wage between the 10th percentile 
and 2/3 of the median wage; 1–20 employees. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  
n.s. denotes statistical insignificance.
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3  Does it matter where you work? Employer 
characteristics and the wage growth of low-wage 
workers and higher-wage workers
3.1 Introduction
Wage inequality in Germany has been rising in recent decades, at both the top 
and bottom ends of the wage distribution (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2009), while 
wage mobility has been decreasing (e.g., Gernandt, 2009; Bayaz-Ozturk et al., 
2011; Riphahn and Schnitzlein, 2011).30 At the same time, the low-wage sector 
has grown considerably (Eichhorst et al., 2005; Kalina, 2008). In addition, concerns 
have been raised that there might have emerged a two-tier labour market in 
Europe that consists of “good” and well-paid jobs on the one hand and “bad” and 
low-paid jobs on the other hand (see, e.g., European Commission, 2001; Pouliakas 
and Theodossiou, 2010). Although these developments have led to a significant 
amount of research on low-wage work, several research gaps still exist.
For example, previous studies on low-wage work have shown that certain 
individual, job and firm characteristics are increasing the probability of low-wage 
workers escaping low pay. The fact that firm characteristics do play a significant 
role for the wage mobility of low-wage workers is important for two reasons. First, 
this information can help low-wage workers to move up on their own initiative 
by trying to find a job with an employer that offers them better chances for 
wage growth. Second, as suggested by Andersson et al. (2005) this information 
can provide a starting point for labour market policies aimed at increasing the 
wage mobility of low-wage workers, by improving their access to such firms, for 
example. However, due to a lack of data, previous studies have only been able to 
analyse a part of the considerable amount of firm heterogeneity that is associated 
with the wage growth of low-wage workers (Stephani, 2012).31 Therefore, one 
aim of this chapter is to identify further characteristics of wage-growth firms for 
low-wage workers, i.e., firms that provide higher wage growth for these workers.
In addition, previous studies have focused exclusively on low-wage workers 
and have not compared their wage mobility to that of other workers (whom I 
will call higher-wage workers, for the sake of simplicity). This is surprising, given 
that it is not clear “[…] whether the distinction between low-wage employment 
and the rest of the economy is due to the level of pay simply being lower than 
elsewhere or a different functioning of the labor market” (Lucifora and Salverda, 
30 See Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011) for an overview of the literature on wage mobility in Germany and other 
developed countries.
31 Stephani (2012) is the study on which chapter 2 of this dissertation is based.
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2009: p. 272). Therefore, after investigating possible characteristics of wage-
growth firms for low-wage workers, this chapter also analyses whether the 
results are typical for low-wage workers, i.e., whether there are establishment 
characteristics that increase or decrease the wage growth of low-wage workers 
only and have no impact on the wage growth of higher-wage workers. In addition, 
this chapter investigates whether there are establishment characteristics that 
influence the wage growth of higher-wage workers only.
To answer these research questions, this chapter analyses the real wage growth 
of full-time employed workers between 2002 and 2007, using endogenous switching 
regression models and rich linked employer-employee data from Germany. The 
chapter adds to the literature in two ways. First, it shows that being employed in a 
large firm or a firm with a high export share or a low proportion of fixed-term co-
workers increases the wage growth of low-wage workers. Second, it demonstrates 
that the establishment characteristics associated with individual wage growth differ 
between low-wage workers and higher-wage workers. The chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief overview of the previous literature. Section 3.3 
discusses the theoretical background. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 
and 3.6 present and discuss the empirical results. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature review
Previous studies on the wage mobility of low-wage workers in Germany can be 
categorised roughly into a few groups, depending on their research objectives.32 
One group of studies provides evidence for the existence of state dependence in 
low wages and in unemployment (see, e.g., Uhlendorff, 2006; Mosthaf et al., 2009; 
Grün et al., 2011; Aretz and Gürtzgen, 2012; Knabe and Plum, 2013; Mosthaf, 
2014). In addition, these studies find that this state dependence has increased 
over time. Nevertheless, especially for low-skilled workers, low-wage employment 
seems to be a stepping stone to higher-wage employment.
Another group of studies shows that male, younger and higher-skilled workers 
have comparatively better chances of escaping low wages, i.e., of crossing the low-
wage threshold and reaching higher-paid employment. In addition, the chances 
of escaping low wages are also higher for workers in large firms and firms with 
low proportions of females or of low-wage workers (see, e.g., Schank et al., 2009; 
Mosthaf et al., 2011; Schnitzlein and Stephani, 2011). Gürtzgen and Heinze (2010) 
32 There are also a number of studies on the mobility of low-wage workers in other countries, such as those by 
Stewart and Swaffield (1999), Stewart (2007) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2008a, 2008b) for the UK, Bolvig (2005) 
for Denmark, Blázquez Cuesta (2008) for Spain, Cappellari (2002, 2007) for Italy and Andersson et al. (2005) for the 
US. In addition, there are studies comparing the mobility of low-wage workers in several countries, such as those 
by the OECD (1996); Asplund et al. (1998); the European Commission (2004) and Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013).
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find that collective bargaining coverage and the existence of a works council in 
the establishment positively impact on the probability of within-firm low-pay 
transitions in the West German manufacturing sector and service sector; however, 
this impact is different for women than for men.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that there is a significant amount of 
upward and downward wage mobility in the low-wage sector. The majority of 
low-wage workers who were able to escape low wages were still higher-paid 
two years later. In addition, firm heterogeneity which is not captured by firm 
size, industry affiliation and the composition of the workforce in the firm is also 
important for the upward mobility of low-wage workers.
While the studies mentioned so far have analysed the wage mobility of 
low-wage workers exclusively, several studies have investigated various aspects 
of individual wage growth for all workers in Germany. For example, studies by 
Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Schönberg (2007) and Dustmann and Pereira (2008) 
measure the effects of tenure, sector-specific labour market experience, general 
labour market experience and job mobility on the wage growth of German workers.
Gernandt (2009) finds that university graduates, younger workers, white-
collar workers and public sector employees are more likely to move up in the 
German wage distribution. In addition, he shows that wages are more volatile 
for low-wage workers and for workers who are moving downward in the wage 
distribution. Pavlopoulos et al. (2007) find that in Germany, workers in the lowest 
quartile of the wage distribution (categorised as low-paid workers) experience a 
greater amount of wage growth than workers in the highest quartile (categorised 
as high-paid workers). A voluntary change of employer results in wage growth for 
low-paid workers but not for high-paid workers.
In summary, previous studies have only investigated the impact of a few firm 
characteristics on the wage growth of low-wage workers. Furthermore, virtually 
none of these studies has analysed whether these firm characteristics also impact 
the wage growth of higher-wage workers. To the best of my knowledge, there 
are also no studies that analyse in detail the impact of firm characteristics on 
the wage growth of all workers in Germany. The following section presents a 
theoretical discussion of possible determinants of individual wage growth.
3.3 Theoretical background and hypotheses
According to human capital theory and job search theory, both the accumulation of 
human capital, via on-the-job learning and further training, and an improvement 
in job match quality should result in a higher individual wage (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2004, chapters 2 and 3). In addition, the theories of segmented labour 
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markets state that the labour market can be divided roughly into a primary and a 
secondary segment (see, e.g., Taubman and Wachter, 1986; Reich, 2008). Jobs in 
the primary segment are well paid and offer good opportunities for further training 
and upward mobility, while jobs in the secondary segment are often low paid, offer 
unfavourable working conditions and a low degree of upward mobility (Schömann, 
1994). Although the German labour market is complex, it is likely that compared to 
higher-wage workers, low-wage workers often work in jobs that have features of a 
“secondary” segment. The labour market theories presented in this paragraph yield 
several hypotheses about the wage growth of individual workers.
According to human capital theory, it is reasonable to expect that due to a 
lower growth of individual productivity, a higher probability of work interruptions 
and a higher unemployment risk, women, foreigners, low-skilled workers and 
older workers experience less individual wage growth than men, Germans, higher-
skilled workers and younger workers. In addition, individual wages are expected 
to grow with labour market experience and tenure, at a decreasing rate (Topel, 
1991). In contrast, the theories of segmented labour markets imply that labour 
market experience and tenure are associated with individual wage growth only 
for higher-wage workers.
Concerning the employer characteristics that are of key interest in the study 
at hand, the literature indicates that large establishments are more likely to have 
an internal labour market and to provide further training; in addition, collective 
agreements often imply wage increases based on pre-defined tenure profiles 
(Gürtzgen and Heinze, 2010; Siebert and Addison, 1991; Gerner and Stegmaier, 
2009). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Gerner and Stegmaier (2009) indicate that 
establishments with a low proportion of fixed-term workers might be more likely 
to offer further training to their workers because the probability that their workers 
will leave the establishment is smaller. However, if the internal labour market and 
further training are not accessible for low-wage workers, the establishment size, 
the coverage by a collective agreement and the proportion of fixed-term workers 
can be expected to influence the wage growth of higher-wage workers only. 
Works councils in Germany are not supposed to bargain directly over wages; 
however, they are involved in the implementation of collective agreements and 
the negotiations on performance-related pay at the establishment level (Gürtzgen 
and Heinze, 2010). In addition, works councils increase the probability of firm-
provided training (Gerlach and Jirjahn, 2001; Stegmaier, 2012). In principle, 
this should lead to higher individual wage growth in firms that have a works 
council. However, there is evidence that works council members in Germany are 
significantly older than their co-workers (Behrens, 2009) and that the incidence 
of low pay is especially high among young workers (Schnitzlein and Stephani, 
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2011). In addition, low-wage workers are often only loosely connected to the 
labour market and have a high unemployment risk (de Lathouwer and Marx, 
2005). Assuming that there is a tendency for works councils to get involved in 
actions that are advantageous to their own peer group, a positive effect of works 
councils on individual wage growth might be especially pronounced for higher-
wage workers, who often are older employees and employees with longer tenure.
Workers who are employed in establishments where the state of the technology 
is more current might have better chances for individual wage growth, due to the 
opportunity to accumulate human capital that is more up to date than the human 
capital that workers employed in establishments using outdated technology have 
the opportunity to accumulate. Grün et al. (2011) note that young establishments 
might be characterised by a high number of low-quality jobs that provide few 
or no possibilities for human capital accumulation. Brixy et al. (2007) show that 
newly founded firms do pay lower wages than incumbent firms in the first years 
after their foundation, although this wage differential vanishes after four years.
In addition, the chances for individual wage growth might also vary according 
to the composition of the workforce in the firm. For example, low-wage workers 
and higher-wage workers are likely to have increased wage growth due to 
knowledge spillover when working in an establishment with a high proportion of 
highly qualified co-workers. A high proportion of women, foreigners or low-wage 
workers in an establishment might be an indicator of workplace segregation or 
low-cost strategies in the firm, which also implies fewer possibilities for human 
capital accumulation and lower wage growth for low-wage workers (Bolvig, 2005; 
Mosthaf et al., 2011). In contrast, the proportion of women, foreigners and low-
wage workers in the firm is not necessarily associated with the wage growth of 
higher-wage workers. For example, think of a company that offers low-skilled 
services, such as a cleaning company. Because the cleaning staff often consists of 
women, foreigners and low-wage workers, the proportions of these workers in the 
establishment are quite high. Nevertheless, one may expect that the wage growth 
of the higher-wage workers in the company (e.g., the managerial staff) is not lower 
than the wage growth of comparable higher-wage workers in establishments with 
smaller proportions of women, foreigners and low-wage workers. 
Several authors argue that due to higher job-match quality, greater informal 
learning and higher returns to education, individual productivity and wages should 
be expected to grow more rapidly in densely populated areas (see Phimister et al., 
2006, for an overview). Because exporting firms are more productive and pay 
higher wages than firms that operate only on the domestic market (Schank et 
al., 2007, 2010), one may expect the export share of a firm to also be positively 
associated with the wage growth of individual workers.
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According to search theory, the probability that a new wage offer that a worker 
receives either from her current employer or from another employer will exceed 
her current wage declines with the level of her current wage (e.g., Fitzenberger 
and Garloff, 2007). This implies that low-wage workers are likely to have – ceteris 
paribus – higher wage growth than higher-wage workers. Accordingly, it is likely 
that the effect of any given explanatory variable on the individual wage growth of 
a worker is higher for low-wage workers than for higher-wage workers.
3.4 The data
I use the cross-sectional version of the Linked Employer-Employee Data Set LIAB of 
the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) for the year 2002. The LIAB is 
compiled by matching the representative IAB Establishment Panel Survey with the 
personal information and employment histories of the employees of the surveyed 
establishment. The employee data stem from the labour administration and social 
security data processing of the Federal Employment Agency. By combining these 
data sources, the LIAB provides a rich and unique dataset for analysing both the 
demand side and the supply side of the German labour market. For more information 
on the LIAB, see Alda et al. (2005) and Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2010).33 To 
improve the quality of the linkage between the survey data and the administrative 
data, I adopt a procedure suggested by Jacobebbinghaus (2008: p. 53).
The dataset at hand provides individual, job and employer information, as well 
as the daily wage of a worker on 30 June 2002, together with her daily wage and 
employment state five years later (i.e., on 30 June 2007). This dataset enables 
me to analyse the wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers 
between 2002 and 2007. Because the data do not include precise information on 
the daily working time, accurate categorisation of part-time workers as low-wage 
workers or higher-wage workers is not possible. Therefore, I limit my analysis to 
full-time workers. Based on the literature, I classify a full-time worker as being 
low-paid (higher-paid) if she earns less (more) than the commonly accepted low-
wage threshold of 2/3 of the median daily gross wage of all full-time employees. 
Because the LIAB is representative only at the establishment level, I compute 
the low-wage threshold separately for West Germany and East Germany, using a 
representative 2 % random sample from the Integrated Employment Biographies 
(IEB) of the IAB (see Jacobebbinghaus and Seth, 2007, and Dorner et al., 2010, for 
information on these data).
33 The analysis in chapter 5 of this dissertation is based on a cross-sectional version of the LIAB, too. See section 5.3 
for a more detailed presentation of the LIAB cross-sectional data. 
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Individual wages in the LIAB are censored at the top due to legal requirements. 
The nominal value of the censoring threshold is set separately every year for West 
Germany and East Germany by the German government. To avoid biased results and 
time inconsistencies due to time-varying proportions of censored observations, I 
apply ‘consistent top-coding’, as suggested by Burkhauser et al. (2009) and by 
Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011). First, I use the representative wage distribution 
computed from the IEB to determine the individual rank position in the German 
wage distribution in a given year for every full-time worker in the LIAB. I then 
delete those worker observations from the LIAB that correspond to wages among 
the top 15 % (10 %) in West (East) Germany in each year’s wage distribution.
Because it stems from administrative sources, the information on individual 
workers in the LIAB can be regarded as highly reliable. Nevertheless, I exclude 
full-time workers who earn implausibly low hourly wages of less than 4 € (3.5 €) 
in West (East) Germany in 2006 prices.34 Because this chapter focuses on the core 
groups of the labour market, I further limit the sample to workers who are liable 
to social security and I exclude workers younger than 20 and older than 59 years35 
in 2002, as well as trainees, working students and retired individuals. After these 
modifications, my sample covers 9,591 low-wage workers and 322,521 higher-
wage workers. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the dataset.
3.5 Descriptive evidence
Table 3.2 presents the real wage levels and real wage growth of low-wage workers 
and higher-wage workers in the LIAB, disaggregated by selected individual and 
establishment characteristics.36 The first column shows that in 2002, the low-wage 
workers in the dataset had a real daily wage of approximately 45 € on average and 
34 This is equivalent to a monthly wage of about 645 € in West Germany (4 € × 37.5 h × 4.3 weeks) and 602 € in East 
Germany (3.5 € × 40 h × 4.3 weeks) and is affecting about 1 % of the full-time employed workers in the LIAB. I 
compute real wages by using the consumer price index of the German Federal Statistical Office, with 2006 = 100.
35 My results are robust towards varying the lower age threshold.
36 Note that due to the disproportionately stratified sampling procedure of the IAB Establishment Survey, 
the proportion of low-wage workers in this dataset is lower than the proportion of low-wage workers in the 
representative IEB sample. However, as there are no longitudinal weights in the LIAB which fit the research purpose 
of this chapter, I use the unweighted data. A robustness check using the cross-sectional weights indicates the 
weighted figure for the proportion of low-wage workers among all full-time workers in the LIAB was about 17.6 % 
in 2002, while the proportion of low-wage workers calculated from the representative IEB was 17.9 % in 2002. 
In addition, the weighted average of the real daily wages of the full-time workers in the LIAB in 2002 was about 
43.9 € for low-wage workers and 88.4 € for higher-wage workers. These weighted figures are very close to the 
average real daily wages computed from the representative IEB: in that dataset, the average of the real daily wages 
in 2002 was 45.0 € for low-wage workers and 89.2 € for higher-wage workers. Therefore, I am confident that 
this LIAB sample can be used for a representative analysis of the German labour force: after correcting for the 
disproportionately stratified sampling procedure of the IAB Establishment Survey by including the stratification 
variables (establishment size, industry sector and federal state) in the regression analyses, one can expect the results 
to deliver an unbiased picture of the real wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers in Germany 
(see Winship and Radbill, 1994, for the validity of this correction).
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that they experienced a real wage growth of approximately 11 % between 2002 
and 2007. In addition, the figures suggest that low-wage workers have a higher 
relative real wage growth in certain establishments, e.g., in establishments that 
are covered by a collective agreement or that have a works council, establishments 
that use modern technology, establishments that export and establishments that 
are located in highly urbanised areas.
The figures in the second column of Table 3.2 show that higher-wage workers 
experienced a relative wage growth of approximately 4 % on average. They often 
have higher wage growth in the same types of establishments in which low-wage 
workers have higher wage growth. However, low-wage workers experience a large 
and positive amount of wage growth when changing employers, while higher-
wage workers experience a slightly negative amount of wage growth in this case. 
Based on these descriptive results, the next section provides an econometric 
analysis to address the two research questions posed by this chapter.
3.6 Econometric analysis
3.6.1 The model
In analysing the determinants of the individual real wage growth of low-wage 
workers and higher-wage workers, one needs to take into account that the selection 
into the state of being a low-wage worker or a higher-wage worker may not be 
exogenous. Due to this initial conditions problem, the estimation of two separate 
linear wage growth regressions (one for low-wage workers and one for higher-
wage workers) may lead to biased estimates. To take into account this potential 
endogeneity, I apply an endogenous switching regression model (see Maddala, 1983: 
pp. 223–224; and Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004, for a general exposition of this model).
The model can be described as follows: let si be a dummy variable that takes 
the value 0 if an individual who was employed full-time in 2002 and 2007 was a 
higher-wage worker in 2002 and 1 if the individual was a low-wage worker in 2002:
P (si = 0) = P (s*i = (ziγ * + εi 0 ) > κ ) = 1 – Φ0(ziγ ) (for a higher-wage worker), (1)
P (si = 1) = P (s*i = (ziγ * + εi 0 ) < κ ) = Φ0(ziγ ) (for a low-wage worker); (2)
s*i  denotes the underlying latent variable and κ denotes the low-wage threshold. 
Φ0 is the cumulative normal distribution, and zi is a vector of variables that 
influence the selection of a worker into the state of being a higher-wage worker 
or a low-wage worker. This yields a probit selection equation.
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The differences of the logarithms of the real daily wages of higher-wage workers 
and low-wage workers between 2007 and 2002 are given by
Δlnwi 1 = xi β1 + εi 1 (for a higher-wage worker) and (3)
Δlnwi 2 = xi β2 + εi 2 (for a low-wage worker), (4)
where xi is a vector of variables that determine the real wage growth of a worker. 
I assume that εi 0 , εi 1 , and εi 2 follow a trivariate normal distribution with mean 
vector zero and a covariance matrix
Ω = 
 σ0
2 σ0, 1 σ0, 2 
 σ0, 1 σ1
2
 ·
 σ0, 2 · σ2
2
 ,  (5)
where σ0
2 is the variance of the error term in the selection equation, σ1
2 and σ2
2 are 
the variances of the error terms in the wage growth equations (3) and (4), σ0, 1 is 
the covariance between εi 1 and εi 0 and σ0, 2 is the covariance between εi 2 and εi 0 . 
Because Δlnwi 1 and Δlnwi 2 are never observed simultaneously for a given worker, 
the covariance between εi 1 and εi 2 is not defined. Accordingly, the differences of 
the logarithms of the real daily wages of workers between 2007 and 2002 are 
E (Δlnwi 1 | si  = 0) = xi β1 – σ1 ρ1 Φ1 (zi γ  */σε 0 )1 – Φ0(zi γ  */σε 0 )   
(for a higher-wage worker) and (6)
E (Δlnwi 2 | si  = 1) = xi β2 + σ2 ρ2 Φ1 (zi γ  */σε 0 )Φ0(zi γ  */σε 0 )
 (for a low-wage worker), (7)
where ρ1 is the correlation coefficient between εi 0 and εi 1, ρ2 is the correlation 
coefficient between εi 0 and εi 2 , Φ1 is the standard normal density function, and 
 
Φ1 (zi γ  */σε 0 )
1 – Φ0(zi γ  */σε 0 )
 and  
Φ1 (zi γ  */σε 0 )
Φ0(zi γ  */σε 0 )
 are the inverse Mills Ratios for a higher-wage
worker and a low-wage worker, respectively.
Based on the theoretical considerations presented in section 3.3, zi and xi 
contain a number of individual, job and establishment characteristics. Both zi 
and xi contain dummy variables describing the gender, age, level of education, 
citizenship and occupational group of a worker, as well as variables describing 
establishment size, the industry affiliation, the proportion of highly qualified 
workers in the establishment, the proportion of women, the proportion of 
foreigners, the proportion of low-wage workers and the median age of the 
workforce. In addition, variables are also included in order to analyse the impact 
of a number of potential establishment-level determinants of individual wage 
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growth that have not been investigated in previous studies. These are the coverage 
by a sector-level collective agreement or a firm-level collective agreement, the 
existence of a works council in the establishment, the state of the technology that 
is used in the establishment, the establishment age, the degree of urbanisation at 
the location of the establishment (calculated according to the BIK classification; 
see Arbeitsgruppe Regionale Standards, 2005: pp. 54–60), the export share of the 
establishment, the proportion of fixed-term workers and the German federal state. 
All explanatory variables mentioned so far were measured in the starting year 
2002 and are held fixed during the estimations. 
In addition, there are some variables that are included in xi  only. These are four 
variables describing a worker’s individual labour market experience37 and tenure 
between 1993 and 2007, in linear and squared form, and one dummy control 
variable indicating whether a worker changed establishments between 2002 and 
2007. As an exclusion restriction, zi contains a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a worker was low-wage employed in 1998. I expect the latter variable to 
have a positive impact on whether the worker was a low-wage worker in 2002. 
Due to the temporal distance of four years to the starting period, I do not expect 
this variable to influence the amount of real wage growth of low-wage workers 
and higher-wage workers between 2002 and 2007.38 The model is estimated in 
Stata, using the maximum likelihood estimator for the endogenous switching 
regression model by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004).
3.6.2 Estimation results
Table 3.3 presents the average marginal effects on the differences between the 
logarithms of the real daily wages of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers 
between 2002 and 2007. The discussion of the estimation results is split into 
two parts, reflecting the two research objectives of this chapter. First, I aim to 
identify further characteristics of firms that provide higher wage growth for low-
wage workers. Second, I investigate whether these results are typical for low-
wage workers or not, i.e., whether there are firm-level determinants that influence 
37 Due to lack of data, empirical studies often use the age of an individual together with years of schooling as a proxy 
for her amount of labour market experience. In doing so, these studies might report biased results since they do 
not take into account possible voluntary or involuntary work interruptions of individuals. Such work interruptions 
can occur, e.g., due to unemployment periods, childcare or elderly care needs, or sabbaticals. Therefore, the age of 
an individual together with years of schooling is not necessarily a good proxy for her amount of labour market 
experience. Due to the comparatively high unemployment risk of low-wage workers, this is especially relevant when 
analysing the wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers.
38 Other studies on the wage mobility of low-wage workers, such as the one by Stewart and Swaffield (1999), use 
socio-economic information about the parents as exclusion restrictions. However, such information is not available 
in this dataset.
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the wage growth of low-wage workers but not the wage growth of higher-wage 
workers and vice versa.
Consistent with the results of previous studies, the results in the left column of 
Table 3.3 show that the wage growth of low-wage workers is positively associated 
with being employed in large establishments and negatively associated with 
the proportion of women and low-paid workers in the establishment. Compared 
to the reference group of low-wage workers in small establishments with up 
to 19 employees, low-wage workers in large establishments with more than 
499  employees experience wage growth that is more than 5 % higher. A proportion 
of low-paid workers in the establishment that is higher by 10 % is associated with 
a lower wage growth of approximately 1 %.
Turning to the establishment characteristics that have not been investigated 
in previous studies, the results show that low-wage workers who are employed 
in establishments that are covered by a sector-level collective agreement or 
in establishments that have a works council have a real wage growth that is 
approximately 2 % higher; however, these effects are only significant at the 
10 %-level. Furthermore, an export share that is higher by 10 % is associated 
with a higher individual wage growth for low-wage workers of approximately 1 %. 
Obviously, the fact that exporting firms are usually more productive and pay better 
than non-exporting firms also translates into higher upward wage mobility for their 
low-paid employees. Compared to workers employed in less densely urbanised areas, 
workers in highly urbanised areas have a higher wage growth by approximately 2 %. 
In contrast, certain potential determinants such as the state of technology or the 
establishment age are not found to influence the wage growth of low-wage workers.
To control for differences between the employment trajectories of women and 
men that are not captured by the gender dummy variable integrated in the previous 
analysis, the results of separate estimations for low-paid women and low-paid 
men are presented in column 1 and column 3 of Table 3.4. The results of these 
separate estimations qualitatively confirm several of the results from the previous 
analysis. For example, this is the case for the effects of the proportion of low-paid 
workers, the proportion of women and the export share. However, the effect of the 
coverage by a sector-level agreement is statistically significant only for low-paid 
women, while the effect of a works council is significant only for low-paid men. 
In addition, the proportion of fixed-term workers is negatively associated with the 
wage growth of low-paid women, while the proportion of highly qualified co-
workers is positively associated with the wage growth of low-paid men.
Compared to the reference group of low-paid women in small establishments 
with up to 19 employees, low-paid women in medium-sized establishments with 
20–499 employees have a significantly lower amount of individual wage growth. 
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In contrast, no significant difference between the wage growth of the reference 
group and the group of low-paid women in large establishments with more than 
499 employees can be found. This suggests that small establishments and large 
establishments do not differ in the extent of upward wage mobility that they 
provide for low-paid women.39
Although quite a few years have passed since German reunification, pronounced 
differences between West Germany and East Germany still exist, with respect to 
labour market performance and the relevance of industrial relations, for example 
(Görzig et al., 2004; Jung and Schnabel, 2011). To see whether these differences 
might influence the results, I further disaggregate the sample into West Germany 
and East Germany. Most of the results of the previous models are qualitatively 
confirmed after this disaggregation (see columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 3.5). However, 
the effects of the variables describing industrial relations are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels here. In addition, only low-paid women in West 
Germany have a lower wage growth in medium-sized establishments.
In summary, after controlling for a number of potential determinants of 
individual wage growth, a high export share seems to be a characteristic of 
wage-growth firms for low-wage workers. In contrast, a high proportion of fixed-
term co-workers seems to be a characteristic of firms that provide lower wage 
growth for female low-wage workers. In addition, there is also weak evidence 
that the state of industrial relations and the degree of urbanisation are positively 
associated with the wage growth of low-wage workers. However, the latter results 
are not robust to splitting of the sample by gender and by West Germany versus 
East Germany. To see whether the results that have been presented so far are 
typical for low-wage workers or whether they apply to higher-wage workers as 
well, I now compare the results for low-wage workers with the results for higher-
wage workers that are presented in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, too.
In comparing the results for low-wage workers and higher-wage workers in 
column 1 and column 2 of Table 3.3, one can see that certain firm variables affect 
the wage growth of both low-wage workers and higher-wage workers: just as 
for low-wage workers, for higher-wage workers, the coverage by a sector-level 
collective agreement and the existence of a works council in the establishment 
increase individual wage growth, while the proportion of low-paid co-workers 
decreases individual wage growth. The latter result shows that low-cost strategies 
39 Interestingly, in chapter 2 of this dissertation I find that firm size is positively related to the wage growth of both 
female and male low-wage workers. However, the analysis in chapter 3 is controlling for a considerably larger 
number of establishment characteristics and is not restricting the sample to individuals who were low-paid in two 
consecutive years. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that the individual employment trajectories of women 
are more heterogeneous than those of men. Taken together, these aspects may be responsible for the differing 
results concerning the impact of firm size on the wage growth of low-paid women.
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of employers that are often characterised by employing a high proportion of low-
wage workers dampen the wage growth of all of their employees. While for low-
wage workers, changing establishments is associated with an individual wage 
growth that is approximately 17 % higher, for higher-wage workers, changing 
establishments is associated with an individual wage growth that is approximately 
4 % lower. Of course, these results must be interpreted with caution, due to the 
possible endogeneity of workers changing employers.40
In contrast, there are several establishment characteristics that are associated 
with higher wage growth for low-wage workers but not for higher-wage workers. 
These are the establishment size, the export share and the degree of urbanisation 
at the location of the establishment. The reason for this might be that firms provide 
higher-wage workers with career prospects and further training irrespective of 
their size, exporting activity or geographical location.
In addition, certain establishment characteristics, such as the state of the 
technology used in the establishment and the establishment age, increase the wage 
growth of higher-wage workers only. Higher-wage workers who are employed in 
an establishment that is using modern technology instead of outdated technology 
have an individual wage growth that is approximately 2 % higher, while higher-
wage workers in incumbent establishments that are older than four years have an 
individual wage growth that is approximately 3 % higher. The fact that the effects 
of these variables are not relevant for low-wage workers suggests a certain degree 
of segmentation of the German labour market.
Most of the results of this aggregate analysis are qualitatively confirmed in 
separate analyses by gender (see Table 3.4) and in separate analyses by gender and 
by West Germany versus East Germany (see Table 3.5).41 Table 3.6 in the Appendix 
provides an overview of the most interesting results of the aggregated analysis, 
40 Note that only 7 % of the low-wage workers and 4 % of the higher-wage workers in the LIAB changed establishments 
between the years 2002 and 2007. Therefore, holding the establishment characteristics fixed at the level of 2002 and 
at the same time controlling for possible establishment changes of workers ensures that the estimation results for 
the establishment variables are not confounded by variations of the establishment characteristics between 2002 and 
2007. 
41 Since I analyse the wage growth of employed individuals between two points in time, I need to restrict the sample 
to workers who had positive earnings both in the starting year and in the ending year; this procedure is standard in 
the analysis of wage growth (see, e.g., Riphahn and Schnitzlein, 2011). However, compared to higher-wage workers, 
low-wage workers have a higher risk of becoming unemployed and therefore dropping out of the sample. To assess 
whether this risk biases the results, I estimate two separate Heckman selection models for the wage growth of 
low-wage workers and higher-wage workers. The selection equation of the model for the wage growth of low-
wage workers (higher-wage workers) also incorporates full-time low-wage workers (higher-wage workers) from 
2002 who were no longer employed full-time in 2007. By doing so, I control for a possible bias due to differences 
between the unemployment risk of low-wage workers and that of higher-wage workers. I find that most results are 
qualitatively robust to non-random selection of full-time workers from 2002 into the group of full-time workers 
in 2007. However, for low-paid women, the effect of the proportion of fixed-term co-workers, and for higher-paid 
men, the effect of the share of low-paid co-workers, exhibit p-values of 11.5 % and 18.3 %, respectively, and are 
therefore not statistically significant at conventional levels.
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while Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 in the Appendix give an overview of the most 
interesting results of the separate analyses by gender and by West Germany versus 
East Germany. Overall, the results summarized in this section suggest that firms that 
provide higher wage growth for low-wage workers differ from firms that provide 
higher wage growth for higher-wage workers in certain respects. This indicates that 
there indeed are typical wage growth firms for low-wage workers.
3.7 Conclusions
Using the German Linked Employer-Employee Data Set of the IAB (LIAB), this 
chapter contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the wage mobility of 
low-wage workers and higher-wage workers in several ways. First, I investigate 
the impact of a number of potential establishment-level determinants on the 
wage growth of low-wage workers that have not been analysed before. I find that 
large firms and firms with high export shares or low proportions of fixed-term 
workers are typical wage-growth firms for low-wage workers, while several other 
potential establishment-level determinants cannot explain their wage growth.
Second, I find that the wage growth of all employees in a firm is dampened 
by a high proportion of low-paid co-workers. While the impact of this variable 
on the wage growth of low-wage workers has been detected in previous studies, 
its impact on the wage growth of higher-wage workers was unknown to date. 
Obviously, there are employers that pursue a “low-road” or a low-cost strategy 
that dampens the upward wage mobility of all of their employees. 
Third, certain establishments, such as establishments that use modern 
technology or incumbent establishments that are older than four years provide 
higher wage growth only for higher-wage workers, not for low-wage workers. This 
result points to a certain degree of segmentation of the German labour market.
In summary, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that it may be 
necessary to investigate firm heterogeneity in more detail to identify further 
characteristics of typical wage-growth firms for low-wage workers. For example, 
there might be specific personnel policies that help low-wage workers to move 
up that are not captured by the (rather generic) establishment variables that are 
available in large-scale establishment surveys such as the one used in this study. 
As suggested by previous studies (e.g., Lane, 2009; Stephani, 2012), case studies 
might be helpful in this context.
In addition, this chapter shows that one cannot apply the existing theoretical 
and empirical knowledge about the factors that influence the wage growth of 
individual workers to the wage growth of individual low-wage workers. On the 
one hand, this insight may be helpful to policy makers because it makes clear that 
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any policy measure aimed at increasing the wage growth of low-wage workers 
needs to be specifically tailored to them. On the other hand, this insight suggests 
that the current understanding of the wage mobility of individual workers might 
be extended considerably by analysing this mobility at different quantiles of the 
wage distribution rather than only at the mean. In light of important labour market 
trends, such as polarisation and rising wage inequality (see, e.g., Antonczyk et al., 
2010a), this may be a promising area for future research.
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3.8 Tables to chapter 3
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of variables in the sample
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
 
Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Individual characteristics
Real daily wage in 2002 9,591 44.97 9.38 322,521 95.50 19.96
Real wage growth 2002–2007 (in %) 9,591 0.11 0.38 322,521 0.03 0.13
Woman (1 = yes) 9,591 0.71 0.46 322,521 0.25 0.43
Foreigner (1 = yes) 9,591 0.07 0.25 322,521 0.08 0.27
20–24 years (1 = yes) 9,591 0.10 0.31 322,521 0.05 0.22
25–34 years (1 = yes) 9,591 0.21 0.41 322,521 0.24 0.43
35–54 years (1 = yes) 9,591 0.65 0.48 322,521 0.69 0.46
55–59 years (1 = yes) 9,591 0.03 0.18 322,521 0.03 0.16
Secondary school certificate without 
voc. training (1 = yes)
9,591 0.22 0.41 322,521 0.15 0.36
Secondary school certificate with voc. 
training (1 = yes)
9,591 0.63 0.48 322,521 0.75 0.44
High school certificate (1 = yes) 9,591 0.02 0.16 322,521 0.04 0.19
University degree (1 = yes) 9,591 0.01 0.10 322,521 0.04 0.19
Education unknown (1 = yes) 9,591 0.12 0.32 322,521 0.03 0.17
Agricultural occ. (1 = yes) 9,591 0.04 0.20 322,521 0.01 0.09
Unskilled manual occ. (1 = yes) 9,591 0.33 0.47 322,521 0.33 0.47
Skilled manual occ. (1 = yes) 9,591 0.11 0.31 322,521 0.23 0.42
Unskilled comm. and administr. occ. 
(1 = yes)
9,591 0.09 0.28 322,521 0.03 0.16
Skilled comm. and administr. occ. 
(1 = yes)
9,591 0.15 0.36 322,521 0.14 0.35
Unskilled services (1 = yes) 9,591 0.16 0.37 322,521 0.10 0.30
Skilled services (1 = yes) 9,591 0.05 0.22 322,521 0.03 0.17
Semiprofessions (1 = yes) 9,591 0.03 0.18 322,521 0.05 0.23
Technicians/engineers/professions/
managers (1 = yes)
9,591 0.04 0.19 322,521 0.07 0.26
Tenure 1993–2007, in years 9,591 9.53 4.17 322,521 11.98 3.58
… squared 9,591 108.10 74.36 322,521 156.36 72.14
Experience 1993–2007, in years 9,591 12.00 2.86 322,521 13.92 1.81
… squared 9,591 152.20 61.98 322,521 196.93 42.68
Change of estab. 2002–2007 (1 = yes) 9,591 0.07 0.25 322,521 0.04 0.19
Low-paid in 1998 (1 = yes) 9,591 0.14 0.35 322,521 0.003 0.06
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Table 3.1 (cont.): Summary statistics of variables in the sample 
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
 
Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Establishment characteristics
1–19 employees (1 = yes) 9,591 0.13 0.34 322,521 0.01 0.12
20–99 employees (1 = yes) 9,591 0.31 0.46 322,521 0.08 0.27
100–499 employees (1 = yes) 9,591 0.40 0.49 322,521 0.28 0.45
More than 499 employees (1 = yes) 9,591 0.17 0.37 322,521 0.63 0.48
Proportion of highly qualified workers 9,591 4.71 8.00 322,521 10.08 10.11
Proportion of women 9,591 50.76 25.47 322,521 28.72 24.06
Proportion of foreigners 9,591 6.00 10.47 322,521 7.13 8.34
Median age of the workforce 9,591 39.80 5.06 322,521 40.56 3.27
Proportion of low-paid workers 9,591 38.32 29.47 322,521 1.89 6.51
Sector-level collective agreement 
(1 = yes)
9,591 0.39 0.49 322,521 0.69 0.46
Firm-level collective agreement 
(1 = yes)
9,591 0.10 0.30 322,521 0.20 0.40
Works council (1 = yes) 9,591 0.45 0.50 322,521 0.92 0.28
Modern technology in use (1 = yes) 9,591 0.74 0.44 322,521 0.68 0.46
Proportion of fixed-term workers 9,591 6.29 14.14 322,521 4.30 7.68
Estab. older than 4 years (1 = yes) 9,591 0.95 0.21 322,521 0.97 0.18
Export share 9,591 11.75 19.80 322,521 28.93 29.47
Highly urbanised area (1 = yes) 9,591 0.37 0.48 322,521 0.60 0.49
East Germany (1 = yes) 9,591 0.39 0.49 322,521 0.25 0.43
Note: own calculations based on LIAB.
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Table 3.2:  Real daily wages and wage growth of the low-wage workers and higher-wage workers 
in the sample
 Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
 Mean wage
in 2002
Δ wage
(2002–2007)
Mean wage
in 2002
Δ wage
(2002–2007)
Individual characteristics
Women 44.4 € 8.2 % 88.4 € 2.6 %
Men 46.3 € 17.3 % 97.8 € 3.8 %
Germans 44.6 € 10.7 % 95.3 € 3.4 %
Foreigners 50.4 € 12.7 % 98.2 € 4.0 %
No change of establishment 45.0 € 9.0 % 95.6 € 3.6 %
Change of establishment 45.0 € 36.8 % 92.5 € -0.4 %
Establishment characteristics
1–19 employees 41.6 € 3.7 % 76.3 € -1.3 %
20–99 employees 43.3 € 5.2 % 81.6 € 0.6 %
100–499 employees 46.6 € 8.8 % 88.4 € 2.5 %
More than 499 employees 47.0 € 31.7 % 100.8 € 4.4 %
No collective agreement 43.3 € 6.1 % 80.6 € 1.6 %
Sector-level collective agreement 47.0 € 16.3 % 96.2 € 3.9 %
Firm-level collective agreement 45.7 € 13.8 % 101.0 € 3.0 %
No works council 43.3 € 4.9 % 78.7 € -0.1 %
Works council 47.1 € 18.3 % 97.0 € 3.8 %
No modern technology in use 44.5 € 8.4 % 98.9 € 1.4 %
Modern technology in use 45.1 € 11.7 % 93.9 € 4.4 %
Establishment age 0–4 years 44.4 € 10.4 % 90.8 € 0.6 %
Establishment older than 4 years 45.0 € 10.9 % 95.7 € 3.6 %
No exporter 43.3 € 6.5 % 88.6 € 1.5 %
Exporter 47.1 € 16.5 % 98.5 € 4.4 %
Not highly urbanised area 44.9 € 8.8 % 89.4 € 3.9 %
Highly urbanised area 45.1 € 14.3 % 99.5 € 3.2 %
West Germany 49.3 € 13.6 % 101.0 € 3.8 %
East Germany 38.2 € 6.6 % 78.9 € 2.5 %
Overall 45.0 € 11.1 % 95.5 € 3.5 %
Note: own calculations based on LIAB.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of the real wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
(1) (2)
Individual characteristics
Woman (1 = yes) -0.045*** -0.011***
(0.009) (0.002)
Foreigner (1 = yes) 0.004 -0.001
(0.013) (0.001)
25–34 years (1 = yes) -0.032*** -0.048***
(0.011) (0.004)
35–54 years (1 = yes) -0.083*** -0.080***
(0.010) (0.005)
55–59 years (1 = yes) -0.118*** -0.096***
(0.015) (0.005)
Secondary school certificate without -0.010 0.003
voc. training (1 = yes) (0.010) (0.002)
High school certificate (1 = yes) 0.105*** 0.018***
(0.026) (0.003)
University degree (1 = yes) 0.051 -0.006**
(0.033) (0.003)
Education unknown (1 = yes) -0.015 -0.007
(0.012) (0.006)
Agricultural occ. (1 = yes) 2.8e-04 -0.008
(0.020) (0.006)
Skilled manual occ. (1 = yes) -0.019 0.004
(0.017) (0.003)
Unskilled comm. and administr. occ. (1 = yes) -0.016 0.013**
(0.014) (0.005)
Skilled comm. and administr. occ. (1 = yes) 0.014 0.029***
(0.013) (0.003)
Unskilled services (1 = yes) -0.051*** -0.004
(0.013) (0.003)
Skilled services (1 = yes) -0.021 0.012*
(0.022) (0.007)
Semiprofessions (1 = yes) 0.031 0.015***
(0.028) (0.004)
Technicians/engineers/professions/managers 0.039* 0.021***
(1 = yes) (0.022) (0.003)
Tenure 1993–2007, in years 0.009** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.004)
… squared -4.4e-04** -0.001***
(2.0e-04) (1.8e-04)
Experience 1993–2007, in years 0.014 -0.010**
(0.011) (0.004)
… squared -0.001 4.3e-04**
(0.001) (1.9e-04)
Change of establishment 2002–2007 (1 = yes) 0.174*** -0.038***
(0.022) (0.009)
Establishment characteristics
20–99 employees (1 = yes) -0.009 -4.0e-05
(0.009) (0.004)
100–499 employees (1 = yes) -0.017 0.004
(0.012) (0.006)
More than 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.054** 0.009
(0.022) (0.007)
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Table 3.3 (cont.):  Determinants of the real wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage 
workers
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
(1) (2)
Proportion of highly qualified workers 0.001 0.001***
(0.001) (2.5e-04)
Proportion of women -0.001*** -1.0e-04
(2.1e-04) (1.3e-04)
Proportion of foreigners -7.3e-06 -0.001
(0.001) (3.8e-04)
Median age of the workforce -0.002** 4.7e-04
(0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of low-paid workers -0.001*** -0.001***
(1.9e-04) (1.7e-04)
Sector-level collective agreement (1 = yes) 0.020* 0.012**
(0.011) (0.005)
Firm-level collective agreement (1 = yes) 0.024 0.008
(0.017) (0.009)
Works council (1 = yes) 0.021* 0.016***
(0.012) (0.005)
Modern technology in use (1 = yes) 0.007 0.019***
(0.009) (0.006)
Proportion of fixed-term workers -3.8e-04 2.1e-05
(3.4e-04) (1.9e-04)
Establishment older than 4 years (1 = yes) -0.013 0.027**
(0.014) (0.010)
Export share 0.001*** 1.3e-04
(3.6e-04) (1.2e-04)
Highly urbanised area (1 = yes) 0.021** -0.007
(0.010) (0.005)
Joint significance of dummy variable groups Age***, level of 
education***, 
occupational group***, 
estab. size***,  
industry***, fed. state n.s.
Age***, level of 
education***, 
occupational group***, 
estab. size n.s., 
industry***, fed. state***
Observations 9,591 322,521
Selection equation
Low-paid in 1998 (1 = yes), effect on 0.035***
the probability of being low-paid in 2002 (0.002)
Correlation coefficient ρ1 – -0.006
Correlation coefficient ρ2 0.194*** –
Significance of the model χ2(72) = 3443.99***
Wald Test for the independence of all three equations χ2(2) = 60.92***
Observations 332,112
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. Endogenous switching regression model, conditional average marginal 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at establishment level). 20 industry dummies and 16  federal 
state dummies suppressed in the table. Reference category of the dummy variable groups: age 20–24; 
secondary school certificate with vocational training; unskilled manual occupations; 1–19 employees; not 
covered by a collective agreement. Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; n.s. denotes statistical 
insignificance.
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Table 3.4:  Determinants of the real wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage workers, 
separate estimations by gender
Women Men
Low-wage 
workers
Higher-
wage 
workers
Low-wage 
workers
Higher-
wage 
workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual characteristics
Foreigner (1 = yes) 0.006 -0.005* 0.001 -1.8e-04
(0.014) (0.003) (0.023) (0.001)
25–34 years (1 = yes) -0.002 -0.066*** -0.060*** -0.042***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.004)
35–54 years (1 = yes) -0.053*** -0.093*** -0.108*** -0.074***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005)
55–59 years (1 = yes) -0.091*** -0.105*** -0.141*** -0.091***
(0.016) (0.007) (0.027) (0.005)
Secondary school certificate 0.001 0.003 -0.030** 0.003
without voc. training (1 = yes) (0.012) (0.003) (0.015) (0.002)
High school certificate (1 = yes) 0.075*** 0.016*** 0.143** 0.019***
(0.024) (0.003) (0.065) (0.003)
University degree (1 = yes) 0.094*** -0.005 -0.101 -0.007*
(0.036) (0.003) (0.092) (0.004)
Education unknown (1 = yes) -0.007 -0.001 -0.008 -0.009
(0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.007)
Agricultural occ. (1 = yes) 0.005 -0.019* 0.007 -0.004
(0.025) (0.010) (0.027) (0.005)
Skilled manual occ. (1 = yes) -0.025 -0.005 -0.023 0.005*
(0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003)
Unskilled comm. and -0.023 0.015** -0.016 -0.001
administr. occ. (1 = yes) (0.015) (0.007) (0.028) (0.007)
Skilled comm. and administr. 0.011 0.026*** 0.073** 0.030***
occ. (1 = yes) (0.013) (0.006) (0.031) (0.003)
Unskilled services (1 = yes) -0.048*** 0.002 -0.050*** -0.005**
(0.015) (0.005) (0.018) (0.003)
Skilled services (1 = yes) -0.014 0.005 -0.060 0.015
(0.024) (0.006) (0.038) (0.010)
Semiprofessions (1 = yes) 0.026 0.011* 0.059 0.014***
(0.027) (0.006) (0.126) (0.005)
Technicians/engineers/professions/managers 0.019 0.017*** 0.099*** 0.021***
(1 = yes) (0.023) (0.006) (0.038) (0.003)
Tenure 1993–2007, in years 0.003 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
… squared -1.5e-04 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001***
(2.6e-04) (1.1e-04) (2.7e-04) (2.2e-04)
Experience 1993–2007, in years 0.039** 0.007 -0.021* -0.016***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005)
… squared -0.002** -2.7e-04 0.001* 0.001***
(0.001) (3.5e-04) (0.001) (7.0e-04)
Change of establishment 2002–2007 (1 = yes) 0.138*** -0.017 0.178*** -0.048***
(0.030) (0.012) (0.026) (0.010)
Establishment characteristics
20–99 employees (1 = yes) -0.023** -0.001 0.026 0.001
(0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.005)
100–499 employees (1 = yes) -0.031** 0.005 0.021 0.005
(0.014) (0.008) (0.020) (0.006)
More than 499 employees (1 = yes) 0.021 0.010 0.162*** 0.009
(0.021) (0.009) (0.043) (0.008)
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Table 3.4 (cont.):  Determinants of the real wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-wage 
workers, separate estimations by gender
Women Men
Low-wage 
workers
Higher-wage 
workers
Low-wage 
workers
Higher-wage 
workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of highly qualified workers 7.7e-05 0.001*** 0.003** 0.001***
(0.001) (1.7e-04) (0.001) (3.4e-04)
Proportion of women -0.001*** -2.0e-04 -0.002*** -9.5e-05
(2.5e-04) (1.2e-04) (3.3e-04) (1.4e-04)
Proportion of foreigners 1.1e-04 -2.0e-04 -1.8e-04 -0.001*
(0.001) (3.6e-04) (0.001) (4.0e-04)
Median age of the workforce -0.001 0.001** -0.004*** 2.5e-04
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of low-paid workers -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -4.7e-04**
(2.0e-04) (1.6e-04) (2.6e-04) (2.1e-04)
Sector-level collective agreement (1 = yes) 0.020* 0.012** 0.029 0.011*
(0.011) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006)
Firm-level collective agreement (1 = yes) 0.032* 0.010 -0.014 0.007
(0.018) (0.008) (0.030) (0.010)
Works council (1 = yes) 0.009 0.011* 0.048** 0.019***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006)
Modern technology in use (1 = yes) 0.010 0.012*** -0.001 0.021***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.013) (0.007)
Proportion of fixed-term workers -0.001** 9.8e-05 1.0e-04 -4.4e-05
(3.9e-04) (1.6e-04) (0.001) (2.5e-04)
Establishment older than 4 years (1 = yes) -0.018 0.038*** 0.006 0.023**
(0.017) (0.011) (0.023) (0.011)
Export share 0.001** 7.8e-05 0.002*** 1.3e-04
(3.4e-04) (1.3e-04) (0.001) (1.2e-04)
Highly urbanised area (1 = yes) 0.017 -0.001 0.023 -0.008
(0.011) (0.004) (0.018) (0.006)
Joint significance of dummy variable groups Age***,
level of 
education***, 
occupational 
group***, 
estab. size***, 
industry**,  
fed. state**
Age***,
level of 
education***, 
occupational 
group***, 
estab. size n.s., 
industry***,  
fed. state***
Age***,
level of 
education*, 
occupational 
group***,  
estab. size***,  
industry n.s.,  
fed. state n.s.
Age***,
level of 
education***, 
occupational 
group***, 
estab. size n.s., 
industry***,  
fed. state***
Observations 6,783 80,148 2,808 242,373
Selection equations
Low-paid in 1998 (1 = yes), effect on the 
probability of being low-paid in 2002
0.076***
(0.005)
0.014***
(0.001)
Correlation coefficient ρ1 – -0.027*** – -0.022**
Correlation coefficient ρ2 0.166*** – 0.197*** –
Significance of the model χ2(71) = 1839.99*** χ2(71) = 2982.73***
Wald Test for the independence of all three 
equations
χ2(2) = 41.61*** χ2(2) = 30.32***
Observations 86,931 245,181
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. Endogenous switching regression models, conditional average marginal 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at establishment level). 20 industry dummies and 16  federal 
state dummies suppressed in the table. Reference category of the dummy variable groups: age 20–24; 
secondary school certificate with vocational training; unskilled manual occupations; 1–19 employees; not 
covered by a collective agreement. Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; n.s. denotes statistical 
insignificance.
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3.9 Appendix to chapter 3
Table 3.6: Summary of selected results from Table 3.3
Average marginal effects of selected establishment 
characteristics on the real wage growth of low-wage 
workers and higher-wage workers
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
Coverage by a sector-level collective agreement (1 = yes) (+) +
Existence of a works council (1 = yes) (+) +
Proportion of low-paid workers – –
Establishment size + n.s.
Proportion of women – n.s.
Export share + n.s.
Highly urbanised area (1 = yes) + n.s.
Modern technology (1 = yes) n.s. +
Proportion of highly qualified workers n.s. +
Establishment older than 4 years (1 = yes) n.s. +
Proportion of fixed-term workers n.s. n.s.
Note:  “+/–” denotes a positive/negative relationship that is statistically significant at least at the 5 %-level; 
brackets denote a relationship that is significant at the 10 %-level only; n.s. denotes statistical 
insignificance.
Table 3.7: Summary of selected results from Table 3.4
Average marginal effects of selected establishment  
characteristics on the real wage growth of low-wage 
workers and higher-wage workers
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
Women Men Women Men
Coverage by a sector-level collective agreement (1 = yes) (+) n.s. + (+)
Existence of a works council (1 = yes) n.s. + (+) +
Proportion of low-paid workers – – – –
Establishment size –/n.s. + n.s. n.s.
Proportion of women – – n.s. n.s.
Export share + + n.s. n.s.
Highly urbanised area (1 = yes) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Modern technology (1 = yes) n.s. n.s. + +
Proportion of highly qualified workers n.s. + + +
Establishment older than 4 years (1 = yes) n.s. n.s. + +
Proportion of fixed-term workers – n.s. n.s. n.s.
Note:  “+/–” denotes a positive/negative relationship that is statistically significant at least at the 5 %-level; 
brackets denote a relationship that is significant at the 10 %-level only; n.s. denotes statistical 
insignificance.
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Table 3.8: Summary of selected results from Table 3.5
Average marginal effects of selected 
establishment characteristics on the real wage 
growth of low-wage workers and higher-
wage workers
Low-wage workers Higher-wage workers
Women Men Women Men
West East West East West East West East
Coverage by a sector-level collective agreement 
(1 = yes)
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. (+) (+) n.s. (+)
Existence of a works council (1 = yes) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. (+) n.s. + n.s.
Proportion of low-paid workers – – – (–) – – n.s. –
Establishment size – + + + n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Proportion of women n.s. – – – n.s. n.s. (–) (+)
Export share + n.s. + + n.s. n.s. n.s. +
Highly urbanised area (1 = yes) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. (–) n.s.
Modern technology (1 = yes) n.s. (+) n.s. n.s. n.s. + + +
Proportion of highly qualified workers n.s. n.s. (+) n.s. + + + +
Establishment older than 4 years (1 = yes) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. + + n.s. +
Proportion of fixed-term workers n.s. – (+) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Note:  “+/–” denotes a positive/negative relationship that is statistically significant at least at the 5 %-level; 
brackets denote a relationship that is significant at the 10 %-level only; n.s. denotes statistical 
insignificance.
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4 Locus of Control and low-wage mobility42
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyse whether personality traits or, more generally, non-
cognitive skills are important determinants of the labour market processes at the 
low-wage margin, which is a question that has not been investigated previously. 
Our main focus is an individual’s perceived Locus of Control – the extent to which 
an individual believes that he or she has control over his or her life. In addition, 
our data allow us to control for the Big Five personality traits and measures of 
reciprocity.
Over the last two decades, the literature has developed on the importance 
of non-cognitive skills for economic and social outcomes (see Almlund et al., 
2011, for an extensive overview). Heckman et al. (2006) show that for many 
labour market outcomes, non-cognitive skills have the same predictive power as 
cognitive skills, which are the classic focus in economic analyses. Non-cognitive 
skills help to explain the observed variance in earnings (see Heckman et al., 2006; 
Müller and Plug, 2006; and Groves, 2005, for evidence from the US; Heineck 
and Anger, 2010, for evidence from Germany; Heineck, 2011, and Groves, 2005, 
for evidence from the UK), educational outcomes (Barón and Cobb-Clark, 2010) 
and occupational choices (Antecol and Cobb-Clark, 2013). Blázquez Cuesta and 
Budría (2012) show that non-cognitive skills affect unemployment persistence, 
and Caliendo et al. (forthcoming) find that non-cognitive skills influence job 
search behaviour.
However, the impact of Locus of Control and other non-cognitive skills on 
the wage mobility of low-wage workers has not been investigated to date. 
Previous studies on low-wage mobility have shown that the chances of escaping 
the low-wage sector are higher for males than females, for younger individuals 
than for older individuals and for more highly-skilled individuals than less 
skilled individuals. The odds of leaving the low-wage sector are also higher for 
workers in certain firms, such as large firms or firms with a low percentage of 
women or low-wage workers. In addition, there is evidence for the existence 
of state dependence in low pay, i.e., being low-paid today increases the 
probability of being low-paid in the future. Furthermore, the results of previous 
studies imply that the factors mentioned above account only for a part of the 
heterogeneity which is relevant for the upward wage mobility of low-wage 
42 This chapter is based on Schnitzlein and Stephani (2013), which is joint work with Daniel D. Schnitzlein.
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workers.43 A significant part of this heterogeneity remains unobserved. A part of 
this unobserved heterogeneity could be due to differing levels of non-cognitive 
skills between individual workers.
If Locus of Control is a relevant determinant for escaping low-wage employment, 
there are two important implications for social policy. (i) First, potential programs 
to support low-wage workers have to consider the existing heterogeneity in non-
cognitive skills between different individuals. For example, the individuals who 
believe that they do not have much influence on their future will need more 
support by case workers than individuals who believe that they have full control 
over their life. (ii) Second, while Locus of Control and other non-cognitive skills are 
seen as rather stable in adulthood (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012, 2013)44, they 
are malleable in early childhood and adolescence and therefore can be targeted 
by interventions.45 If having a more internal individual level of Locus of Control 
significantly increases the individual chances of low-wage workers escaping low 
pay, internalising an individuals’ Locus of Control may be a good starting point for 
policy interventions during childhood.46 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of Locus of Control on the wage 
mobility of low-wage workers using dynamic multinomial logit models with 
random effects that consider initial conditions and state dependence. In 
addition, we control for possible correlations with other non-cognitive skills, 
such as the Big Five personality traits and reciprocity. We contribute to the 
literature by answering the following research questions: does Locus of Control 
influence the probability of being low-paid or higher-paid? Does the extent of 
state dependence in low pay vary with Locus of Control, i.e., does a specific 
individual level of Locus of Control facilitate escaping low pay? The chapter is 
43 For example, Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013) provide cross-country evidence for Europe. For Germany see, e.g., 
Knabe and Plum (2013) and Mosthaf (2014). See section 3.2 of this dissertation for a more detailed review of the 
studies on the mobility of low-wage workers.
44 The stability of non-cognitive skills in adulthood is a debated topic in the psychological literature. Psychologists 
are mainly interested in the mean-level stability and rank-order stability of personality traits. While the traditional 
view is that personality is stable at least after age 30 (e.g. Costa and McCrae, 1988), Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) 
and Roberts et al. (2006) challenge this view and present an extensive meta-analysis of rank-order and mean-level 
change in personality traits. For both concepts, they find that values change over the full age range of individuals. 
Specht et al. (2013) find similar results using German SOEP data. However, Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2013) point 
out that in an economic context intra-individual stability is the more relevant measure. By analysing the effects of 
life events on individuals’ non-cognitive skills, they find high intra-individual stability for the Big Five (Cobb-Clark 
and Schurer, 2012) and Locus of Control (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013) using Australian data for individuals of 
working ages. Specht et al. (2011) find high intra-individual stability of these non-cognitive skills based on German 
SOEP data for working aged individuals. 
45 See, for example, Heckman et al. (2012) for an overview on the mechanisms through which one specific early 
intervention programme, namely the Perry Pre-School programme, supported the participants.
46 A fruitful target is to support the children of disadvantaged families. Stephens and Delys (1973) argue that children 
of disadvantaged families are less convinced they have control over their lives already at an early age relative to 
other children. Peter (2013) shows that a mother’s job loss has a causal, negative effect on children’s non-cognitive 
skills.
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structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents theoretical considerations and 
derives our hypotheses on the influence of Locus of Control on transitions into 
and out of the low-wage sector. Section 4.3 describes our data. Section 4.4 
outlines our empirical approach. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the results, 
and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Measures of non-cognitive skills
4.2.1 Locus of Control
The psychological concept of perceived Locus of Control (LoC) dates back to 
Rotter (1966). LoC measures the extent to which an individual believes that he 
or she controls the events in his or her life. Psychologists differentiate between 
individuals with a more internal LoC and individuals with a more external LoC. 
Individuals with a more internal LoC are convinced that the events that happen 
in their life are caused by their actions and their behaviour. Individuals with a 
more external LoC have a more fatalistic view on their life. They believe that their 
influence on their life is very limited and that what happens to them is caused not 
by their decisions but is mainly the result of faith or luck.47
This sense of control over one’s life has important implications for an 
individual’s human capital investments. Being convinced that effort will lead to 
success leads to comparatively higher expected returns on their human capital 
investments because the expected probability to fail is lower. Therefore, these 
internal LoC individuals invest more in their human capital than their external LoC 
counterparts (Caliendo et al., forthcoming). Barón and Cobb-Clark (2010) showed 
that a more internal LoC is associated with positive educational outcomes.48 But 
LoC also influences labour market behaviour other than investments in education. 
Caliendo et al. (forthcoming) analyse the role of LoC for the job search behaviour 
of unemployed persons. They find that having a more internal LoC is associated 
with higher search intensity, a higher job offer rate and a higher reservation wage 
than having an external LoC. In addition, Caliendo et al. note that it is plausible 
that an internal LoC is related to positive labour market outcomes and economic 
success in general.
47 The data on non-cognitive skills used in this study are also used for research by psychologists. See, for example, 
Dyrenforth et al. (2010) for the relationship between personality and satisfaction, Lucas and Donnellan (2011) and 
Specht et al. (2011) for the development of personality, and Specht et al. (2013) for the development of LoC over 
the life course.
48 See Wang et al. (1999) for a detailed overview of the sociological and psychological literature on the relationship 
between LoC and educational outcomes.
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In the context of our study, we therefore expect that:
H1:  Individuals with a more internal LoC are more likely to work in higher-
wage employment than individuals with a more external LoC.
H2:  Conditional on being employed in the low-wage sector, the individual 
probability to move to higher-wage employment is positively correlated 
with a more internal LoC.
Although the focus of this chapter is on Locus of Control, we also include other 
non-cognitive skills to control for possible correlations between these non-
cognitive skills and Locus of Control (Almlund et al., 2011). More specifically, we 
follow the literature and control for the correlation between Locus of Control and 
the Big Five and reciprocity.
4.2.2 Big Five and reciprocity
The Big Five taxonomy of personality traits (McCrae and Costa Jr., 1999) classifies 
an individual’s personality into 30 personality traits that are grouped into five main 
factors. These factors are Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness and Neuroticism. Openness to experience is the extent to which 
individuals are open to new occurrences in their life. Conscientiousness contains 
the subscales order, competence, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline 
and deliberation. Individuals with higher scores on Conscientiousness are seen 
as more effectively organised than those with lower values. Extraversion covers 
the dimensions of social behaviour towards other people and is the opposite 
of introversion. Agreeableness also contains dimensions of social behaviour. 
Individuals with low scores on Agreeableness describe themselves as egocentric 
and uncooperative. Neuroticism is the opposite of emotional stability.
The third measure of non-cognitive skills considered in this chapter is reciprocity.49 
Reciprocity measures the extent to which an individual is willing to respond to 
positive or negative behaviour. One can distinguish positive reciprocity, i.e., the extent 
to which individuals respond positively to positive actions, and negative reciprocity, 
i.e., the extent to which individuals respond negatively to negative behaviour.
49 Similar to risk and trust measures, reciprocity is usually seen as being a preference and not a personality trait. 
Preferences may be complementary to personality traits in explaining labour market outcomes (see Becker et 
al., 2012, for a discussion). Although the focus of this study is on personality traits and not on preferences, we 
included reciprocity to make our analysis comparable to previous studies on non-cognitive skills (most of which 
include Locus of Control, the Big Five and reciprocity together). However, our results are robust to the exclusion of 
reciprocity from our models. For the sake of readability, in this chapter, we group Locus of Control, the Big Five and 
reciprocity into the term “non-cognitive skills”. 
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4.3 Data and descriptive evidence
4.3.1 The data
Our estimates are based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP), which is a representative household panel survey that started in 1984 
(Wagner et al., 2007). The SOEP conducts annual personal interviews with all 
household members aged 18 years and older and provides rich information on 
the socio-demographic characteristics, the family background, and the childhood 
environment of approximately 20,000 individuals in more than 11,000 families in 
the most recent wave. The SOEP included measures of LoC, Big Five, and reciprocity 
in 2005 and repeated measures of the Big Five in 2009 and reciprocity and LoC in 
2010 (Richter et al., 2013). All non-cognitive skill measures were included in the 
main questionnaire and therefore represent self-ratings by the respondents. LoC is 
measured by seven items, the Big Five are measured by 15 items and reciprocity is 
measured by six items. The detailed questions are shown in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 
in the Appendix. Each item can be answered on 7-point Likert type scales. 
Our analysis is based on data for the years 2006–2011.50 We restrict our analysis 
to West German men who are aged 25–59 in the respective years. Because of 
the heterogeneous employment trajectories of women, which may additionally 
interact with their non-cognitive skills, we limit our analysis to men.51 Individuals 
are excluded from our analysis after not participating in the SOEP for at least one 
year. Because we focus on the core groups of the labour market, we also exclude 
individuals who are still in the education system, self-employed individuals and 
early retirees. We use the commonly accepted low-wage threshold of two-thirds of 
the median hourly wage and we calculate this threshold from our sample for each 
year.52 We define three different employment states: i) Higher-wage employment 
is defined as having a job that pays wages above the low-wage threshold in that 
year; ii) Low-wage employment is defined as having a job that pays wages below 
the low-wage threshold; and iii) Not working is defined as being unemployed or 
out of the labour force. 
50 We use SOEPv28.
51 While it would be interesting to analyse East German men as well, due to data limitations, we are unable to do so. 
Because the East and West German labour market developed differently with respect to patterns of wage mobility 
(Riphahn and Schnitzlein, 2011), it is necessary to analyse West German men and East German men separately to 
obtain meaningful results. However, the small size of the East German SOEP sample would lead to very small cells, 
some with fewer than 20 observations. Such small cell sizes would not be a reasonable basis for analysis.
52 We exclude all observations with an hourly real wage lower than 2.5 € (in 2010 prices, calculated by using the 
Consumer Price index of the German Federal Statistical Office).
IAB-Bibliothek 35078
Locus of Control and low-wage mobility
As measures of non-cognitive skills, we use the 2005 data on the psychological 
constructs discussed above. We do not include the 2009 and 2010 measures for 
two reasons. First, recent empirical contributions show that non-cognitive skills, at 
least for the age range of our sample, are reasonably stable (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 
2012, 2013). Given these results and the short time range, six years, between the 
measurement and latest observation year, the 2005 values are reasonable proxies, 
even for personality, in 2011. The more important reason is that by using the 2005 
measures we avoid a reverse causality problem. Although non-cognitive skills are 
reasonably stable for the age range of our sample,53 if we used the 2009/2010 
measures we would not be able to completely rule out the possibility that these 
measures are influenced by the transitions that we want to model.54 
The main descriptive statistics of our sample are shown in Table 4.1. Our 
sample consists of 10,456 person-year observations. Approximately 86 % of these 
observations are higher-wage person-year observations. Approximately 5 % are 
low-wage observations, and 9 % of the observed person-years are from individuals 
who were not working. This high proportion of non-working individuals underlines 
the need to explicitly model this state. Our main variable of interest, LoC, is given 
both as a continuous variable ranging from 1 (external) to 7 (internal) and as a 
categorical variable with three levels. The first category of the LoC is a dummy 
variable that indicates that an individual has a score of LoC of up to four (i.e., an 
external LoC). The second dummy variable indicates that an individual has a LoC 
score that is larger than four but less than five (i.e., a medium LoC). The third 
dummy variable indicates that an individual has a score of LoC larger than five and 
up to seven (i.e., an internal LoC). 
The average individual score of LoC in the sample is 4.88 for higher-wage 
workers and 4.53 for low-wage workers. The three dummy variables for LoC show 
that while 45 % of the higher-wage workers report an internal LoC, only 18 % of 
them report an external LoC. In contrast, low-wage workers are distributed evenly 
over the three categories of Locus of Control: while 33 % of them report an internal 
Locus of Control, 34 % of them report an external Locus of Control. Our additional 
individual control variables show the patterns expected from the existing literature. 
The next section provides descriptive evidence on our hypotheses.
53 In our sample, 77 % of the respondents answered the questions on Locus of Control both in 2005 and in 2010. 
The mean change (on a scale from 1–7) between the two years is very small (-0.03). The 25th percentile of the 
distribution of changes is -0.57, and the 75th percentile is 0.57. 83 % of the respondents answered the questions 
concerning the Big Five both in 2005 and in 2009. Again, the mean changes are very small, ranging from -0.1 
(Extraversion) to -0.17 (Openness). 78 % of the respondents answered the questions on reciprocity in 2005 and 
2010 and report mean changes of -0.05 (positive reciprocity) and -0.02 (negative reciprocity).
54 See Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2013) for a detailed discussion of potential biases. We follow their suggestions and 
restrict our sample to the working age population. In addition, according to their suggestions, we reran our models 
with an age standardised version of our non-cognitive skill measures. The results were not substantively different.
79Chapter 4
The econometric model
4.3.2 Descriptive evidence
Figure 4.1 presents descriptive evidence of H1 by depicting the percentage of 
individuals in each of the three employment states, higher-wage employment, 
low-wage employment and not working, by the categories of LoC. The first 
implication of H1 is that the proportion of higher-wage workers should be higher 
among the group of individuals with a more internal LoC. This implication is 
clearly supported by Figure 4.1 because the percentage of workers in higher-wage 
employment is higher for the internal LoC group. In addition, Figure 4.1 shows 
that the percentage of individuals in low-wage employment is decreasing with a 
more internal LoC. Figure 4.2 contains evidence on H2 by depicting the mobility 
from low-wage employment to higher-wage employment for each group of LoC. 
The percentage of workers who remain in low-wage employment from one year to 
the next is decreasing with a more internal LoC, while the percentage of workers 
who are moving from low pay to higher pay is increasing. 
4.4 The econometric model
To investigate the impact of Locus of Control on transitions between low pay, 
higher pay and not working, we use dynamic multinomial logit models with 
random effects that take into account unobserved heterogeneity, initial conditions 
and state dependence.55 This type of model has been used by others, including 
Mosthaf et al. (2009) and Mosthaf (2014). We follow these two papers and model 
the latent probability Y*  of an individual i to be in the employment state j  (higher-
wage employment, low-wage employment, not working) in the year t  = 1 … T as:
Y*ijt = Xit βj + Yit – 1αj + NCi γj + υij + εijt  (1)
where i = 1, …, N;  j = 1, 2, 3;  and t = 2007–2011. Xit is a vector of time-constant and 
time-varying individual characteristics that are supposed to influence an individual’s 
probability to be in a given employment state56. Following human capital theory 
55 Although the focus of this chapter is on transitions from low pay to higher pay, we include individuals who are not 
working in order to take into account the possibly endogenous selection of individuals into this employment state.
56 Because previous studies have found that establishment characteristics, such as establishment size, impact the 
wage mobility of low-wage workers, it would be interesting to see whether our results are robust to the inclusion 
of establishment characteristics. Because there are no establishment characteristics for individuals who are not 
working, we test the robustness of our models by defining two different sets of explanatory variables for employed 
individuals and for individuals who are not working. For the employed individuals, we include three establishment 
size dummies; for non-working individuals we do not. Unfortunately, due to the heavy computation involved in 
estimating dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects that incorporate different sets of explanatory 
variables, these models do not converge.
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and job search theory as well as previous studies on state dependence in low pay,57 
we include in Xit a dummy variable that indicates migration background, age in the 
linear and in squared form, three dummy variables describing the individual level 
of education, a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was married in 
time period t and a variable indicating the number of doctor visits in the last year. 
The number of doctor visits in the last year is a more objective measure of an 
individual’s health status than self-reported health conditions. Yit – 1 is a vector of 
three dummy variables that describe the lagged employment state in the period 
t – 1; this vector captures state dependence. NCi includes the non-cognitive skill 
Locus of Control measured by the three dummy variables discussed earlier.58 We 
later augment our model by including the Big Five non-cognitive skills: Openness 
to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism as 
well as positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity. υij  is a time-invariant, person-
specific random component. εijt is an individual-specific error term that is assumed 
to be uncorrelated across individuals and time and uncorrelated with υij and Xit . A 
full set of year dummies is included to control for the macroeconomic situation.
As Heckman (1981) pointed out, the inclusion of lagged dependent variables 
leads to an initial conditions problem. Because the initial employment state of an 
individual is influenced by his previous employment history and his observable and 
unobservable characteristics, not addressing this endogeneity may lead to biased 
results. Wooldridge (2005) suggested tackling the initial conditions problem in 
dynamic nonlinear panel data models by explicitly modelling the joint distribution 
of all endogenous variables conditional on the initial value and the observed 
history of the strictly exogenous explanatory variables.59 His approach follows 
Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) and allows for correlation of the time-
invariant, person-specific component υij with the observed characteristics in the 
model. We follow Wooldridge (2005) and model 
υij  = Yi 0δj + 
—Xiζj + ηij ,  (2)
where Yi 0 is the employment state of an individual in the year 2006;  ¯Xi are Mundlak 
terms consisting of the individual-specific, time-averaged values of the four 
57 See, e.g., Cappellari and Jenkins (2008b) and Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013).
58 We include Locus of Control measured by three dummy variables instead of the continuous variable to allow for a 
more flexible functional form.
59 Several studies use the Wooldridge approach, such as the studies by Contoyannis et al. (2004); Stewart (2007); 
Arulampalam and Stewart (2009); Michaud and Tatsiramos (2011); Clark and Kanellopoulos (2013); Drakos and 
Konstantinou (2013); and Mosthaf (2014). While Akay (2012) conducts Monte Carlo experiments and finds that the 
Wooldridge method can be biased in panels shorter than five periods, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) present 
different possibilities to avoid this bias. Although we use a six-period panel, we follow Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
(2013) to rule out possible bias.
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time-varying explanatory variables age, age squared, number of doctor visits, and 
marital status; ηij are random effects that are orthogonal to the other explanatory 
variables in the model and are assumed to be normally distributed. Furthermore, 
to more accurately control for the influence of the previous employment history 
on the initial employment state than in the standard Wooldridge approach, we 
follow Mosthaf (2014) and include a vector Hi in our model that contains the 
individual amount of full-time work experience and the individual amount of 
unemployment experience measured in years. Substituting equation (2) into (1) 
and including Hi in equation (1) yields
Y*ijt = Xit βj + Yit – 1αj + NCi γj + Yi 0δj + —Xiζj + Hi ψj  + ηij  + εijt . (3)
To investigate whether state dependence in low pay varies with different scores 
of Locus of Control, we later include interaction terms between the lagged 
employment states and the Locus of Control dummy variables (Yit – 1 * NCi ). As 
suggested by Wooldridge (2005), we additionally include interaction terms 
between the employment state in the first observation period and Locus of Control 
(Yi 0 * NCi ) to consistently control for heterogeneity in state dependence. Including 
the interaction terms in equation (3) yields 
Y*ijt = Xit βj + Yit – 1αj + NCi γj + Yi 0δj + —Xiζj + Hi ψj + Yit – 1 * NCi τj  + Yi 0 * NCi κj  + ηij  + εijt . (4)
We assume that εijt has a type I extreme value distribution, which leads to a 
dynamic multinomial logit model with random effects. Therefore, the probability 
of an individual i to be in employment state j in time period t > 0 is
P (Yijt | Xit ,Yit – 1, NCi,Yi 0, 
—Xi ,Hi ,Yit – 1 * NCi ,Yi 0 * NCi ,ηij ) = 
exp (Xit βj + Yit – 1αj + NCi γj + Yi 0δj + 
—
Xiζj + Hi ψj + Yit – 1 * NCi τj  + Yi 0 * NCi κj  + ηij )
∑ exp (Xit βk + Yit – 1αk + NCi γk + Yi 0δk + 
—
Xiζk + Hi ψk + Yit – 1 * NCi τk + Yi 0 * NCi κk  + ηik )
3
k = 1
  (5)
We use higher-wage employment as the reference category in the multinomial 
logit model. Therefore, for the model to be identified, we set β1, α1, γ1, δ1, ζ1, ψ1, τ1, 
κ1 and ηi 1 to zero. We estimate the model by applying adaptive a Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature with eight quadrature points.60
60 Increasing the number of quadrature points in this type of estimation may lead to more precise estimates because 
the likelihood is evaluated more accurately when the number of quadrature points is higher. To assess the 
robustness of our results, we reran our models using 12 quadrature points. However, the estimates only differed at 
the third decimal place.
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4.5 Results
Table 4.2 shows the results of the different specifications of dynamic multinomial 
logit models with random effects for the probability of West German men to 
be higher-paid, low-paid or not working. The employment state “not working” 
is heterogeneous and is included mainly to control for the possibly endogenous 
selection of individuals into this employment state. Therefore, results with respect 
to this employment state should be interpreted with caution. 
4.5.1  The impact of Locus of Control on the probability to be low-paid  
or higher-paid
In model 1, we include the three Locus of Control dummy variables along with 
the other variables discussed in the previous section except for the interaction 
terms, the Big Five and reciprocity.61 The results for this model are shown in the 
first two columns of Table 4.2. The parameters of the variance-covariance matrix 
are highly significant, indicating the existence of unobserved heterogeneity even 
after controlling for Locus of Control. The highly significant coefficients of the 
lagged employment states “Low wage in t - 1” and “Not working in t - 1” indicate 
that there is state dependence in low pay and in the “not working” employment 
state. Furthermore, the significant positive coefficients of the employment states 
in the initial observation period demonstrate the importance of controlling for the 
initial conditions problem. In addition, the individual amount of unemployment 
experience prior to 2006 is positively correlated with the probability of being low-
paid or not working instead of being higher-paid in period t.
The results for the Locus of Control dummy variables show that compared to the 
reference group of individuals with an external Locus of Control, individuals with a 
medium Locus of Control or an internal Locus of Control have a significantly lower 
probability of being low-paid instead of higher-paid. Individuals with a medium or 
an internal Locus of Control also have a lower probability of not working instead 
of being higher-paid. However, the time-invariant variables in such models might 
be correlated with the random effects, i.e., they do not necessarily represent 
causal relationships.
To examine whether our results are robust towards the inclusion of other non-
cognitive skills, we augmented our model by adding the Big Five taxonomy and 
by including the measures of positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity (see 
61 As a robustness check, we reran all our models using the continuous Locus of Control variable instead of the three 
dummy variables. However, this change did not alter our findings.
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model 2 in Table 4.2). The coefficients from this augmented model 2 are similar 
to the coefficients from model 1, which included only Locus of Control. Therefore, 
the positive impact of Locus of Control on the probability of being higher-paid 
instead of low-paid or not working is corroborated after controlling for other non-
cognitive skills. Interestingly, we find an impact for some of these additional non-
cognitive skills on the probability of being low-paid instead of higher-paid: the 
individual scores of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and negative reciprocity 
are positively related to the probability of being low-paid instead of higher-paid. 
The coefficients from multinomial logit models cannot be interpreted 
concerning their economic significance. Therefore, we fix the random effects at 
their mean value zero, and then calculate the average predicted probabilities to be 
higher-paid, low-paid or not working from model 2 for the three different Locus of 
Control categories. This approach leads to predictions for typical individuals. The 
average predicted probability to be higher-paid is 0.774 for individuals with an 
external Locus of Control, while for individuals with a medium Locus of Control, 
this probability is 0.898. Finally, for individuals with an internal Locus of Control, 
the probability to be higher-paid is 0.937. The 95 %-confidence intervals of these 
probabilities do not overlap between the different Locus of Control categories, 
indicating that the probability to be higher-paid is significantly higher for 
individuals with an internal Locus of Control.62
4.5.2 The impact of Locus of Control on the probability to escape low pay 
From a dynamic perspective, it is also important to know whether state dependence 
in low pay varies with individual scores of Locus of Control, i.e., whether individuals 
with an internal Locus of Control are more likely to exit the low-wage sector 
by moving to higher-wage employment. To investigate this question, we now 
interact Locus of Control with the lagged employment state and the employment 
state in the first observation period. Model 3 in Table 4.3 gives the results for this 
interacted version of model 1, i.e., it does not include any non-cognitive skills 
other than Locus of Control. Model 4 gives the results for the interacted version of 
model 2, i.e., it tests for robustness by additionally including the Big Five measures 
and reciprocity as well as interactions between these non-cognitive skills and the 
lagged employment states. 
Except for variables which have been interacted, the coefficients of model  3 
are similar to the corresponding coefficients in model 1 in Table 4.2. As mentioned 
62 For individuals with an external Locus of Control, the confidence intervals range from 0.762 to 0.786, while for 
individuals with a medium Locus of Control this range is 0.890 to 0.907. For individuals with an internal Locus of 
Control, the confidence intervals are from 0.930 to 0.943.
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earlier, “Higher wage in t - 1” is the reference category for the dummy variables 
“Low wage in t - 1” and “Not working in t - 1”. These two variables are the 
reference categories for their interactions with Locus of Control and therefore 
describe the individuals in the reference group, i.e., individuals with an external 
Locus of Control.
The coefficient of “Low wage in t - 1” is positive and statistically significant. This 
finding indicates that for individuals with an external Locus of Control, being low-
paid in period t - 1 increases the probability of being low-paid in period t instead 
of being higher-paid in period t . The coefficients for the interactions between 
Locus of Control and lagged low pay status are negative but not statistically 
significant at conventional levels; this indicates that compared to the reference 
group of individuals with an external Locus of Control who were low-paid in 
t - 1, individuals with a medium or an internal Locus of Control have a lower (yet 
statistically insignificant) risk of being low-paid in period t if they have been 
low-paid in t - 1. Therefore, from this model we cannot infer that the probability 
of escaping low pay is significantly different for individuals with different scores 
of Locus of Control.
However, the results of model 4 in Table 4.3 show that the inclusion of the Big 
Five measures and reciprocity and their interactions with the lagged employment 
states partly changes our results. First, the coefficient for “Low wage in t - 1” has 
lost its significance and now exhibits a fairly high standard error. This indicates 
that after controlling for the impact of the Big Five and reciprocity, within the 
group of individuals with an external Locus of Control the probability of being 
low-paid in period t does not differ anymore significantly between the individuals 
who were low-paid in t - 1 and the individuals who were higher-paid in t - 1. 
However, compared to the individuals with an external Locus of Control who were 
low-paid in t - 1, individuals with an internal Locus of Control who were low-paid 
in t - 1 have a significantly higher probability to be higher-paid in period t (see the 
interaction term between having an internal Locus of Control and “Low wage in 
t - 1”). This indicates that state dependence in low pay is lower for individuals with 
an internal Locus of Control, i.e., that these individuals have a higher probability 
of escaping low pay. 
We quantify the impact of Locus of Control on the probability of escaping 
low pay by using the same technique as in the previous section 4.5.1. We use 
the results of model 4 and fix the random effects at their mean value zero to 
calculate the average predicted probabilities to be in a specific employment 
state, conditional on the lagged employment state and Locus of Control. The 
results are presented in Table 4.4. We are mainly interested in the probabilities 
of being higher-paid in period t  conditional on being low-paid in period t - 1 
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and Locus of Control. These probabilities are presented together with their 
95 %-confidence intervals in the first column of Table 4.4. Conditional on being 
low-paid in year t - 1, individuals with an external Locus of Control have a 
probability of 0.432 to be higher-paid in year t . For individuals with a medium 
Locus of Control, this probability is 0.484, while for individuals with an internal 
Locus of Control the probability to be higher-paid in period t  is 0.646. The 
confidence intervals of the probabilities for individuals with a medium Locus 
of Control overlap with the confidence intervals for the individuals with an 
external Locus of Control and with the confidence intervals of the individuals 
with an internal Locus of Control as well. However, the confidence intervals of 
the individuals with an external Locus of Control and the confidence intervals of 
the individuals with an internal Locus of Control do not overlap. This indicates 
that the probability of low-wage workers to be higher-paid in the next year 
is clearly higher for individuals with an internal Locus of Control than for 
individuals with an external Locus of Control. In sum, this evidence indicates 
that having an internal Locus of Control facilitates escaping low wages.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has investigated the impact of non-cognitive skills, in particular Locus 
of Control, on the wage mobility of male workers at the low-wage margin in West 
Germany. We apply dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects and 
investigate whether Locus of Control influences the probability of being higher-
paid or low-paid as well as the probability of escaping low wages by moving up 
to higher-paid employment.
We find a significant amount of state dependence in low pay even after 
controlling for Locus of Control and other non-cognitive skills, such as the 
Big Five and reciprocity. Compared to individuals with an external Locus of 
Control, individuals with a more internal Locus of Control have a significantly 
higher probability of being higher-paid instead of low-paid. Conditional on 
being low-paid, individuals with an internal Locus of Control additionally have 
a significantly higher probability of moving to higher-paid employment in the 
following year than individuals with an external Locus of Control. This indicates 
that individuals who strongly believe that they control the events in their life 
have a lower probability of being low-paid. In addition, this also indicates that 
conditional on being low-paid, individuals who strongly believe that they control 
the events in their life additionally have a better chance of escaping low wages 
by moving to higher-wage employment compared to individuals with an external 
Locus of Control.
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Our results suggest that having an internal Locus of Control is an important non-
cognitive skill in the context of low wages because this skill may help individuals 
to avoid low-wage jobs and may help individuals to move from low-paid jobs 
to higher-paid jobs. Labour market policy instruments targeting low-wage 
workers have to take this finding into account because these heterogeneities can 
result in different reactions to applied measures. In particular, individuals with 
a more external LoC may need a higher level of external assistance. In addition, 
the determination of Locus of Control in childhood or early adulthood may be a 
starting point for long-term labour market policy measures aimed at improving 
individual wage mobility. In this context, it would additionally be important to 
analyse the broader impact of non-cognitive skills on labour market dynamics and 
to include women, who were not included in this study due their heterogeneous 
employment trajectories. Furthermore, it would be important to study whether the 
impact of non-cognitive skills on wage mobility additionally varies with job and 
firm characteristics. However, these topics are left for future research.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 Higher wage Low wage Not working
Non-cognitive skills
Locus of Control
Measured as continuous variable 
(scale from 1 to 7)
4.88 4.53 4.27
Measured by three dummy variables 
external (yes = 1) 0.18 0.34 0.43
medium (yes = 1) 0.37 0.33 0.33
internal (yes = 1) 0.45 0.33 0.24
Big Five personality traits (scale from 1 to 7)
Openness 4.42 4.38 4.37
Conscientiousness 5.94 5.96 5.73
Extraversion 4.72 4.65 4.61
Agreeableness 5.27 5.44 5.17
Neuroticism 3.60 3.84 4.10
Reciprocity (scale from 1 to 7)
Positive 5.88 6.03 5.86
Negative 3.26 3.64 3.57
Individual characteristics
No German citizen (yes = 1) 0.12 0.21 0.25
Age (in years) 45.14 41.18 48.68
Number of annual doctor visits 7.24 7.29 16.66
Married (1 = yes) 0.75 0.55 0.63
General elementary education (1 = yes) 0.09 0.15 0.20
Middle vocational educ./Abitur (1 = yes) 0.52 0.70 0.60
Higher vocational educ. and higher educ. (1 = yes) 0.39 0.15 0.20
Full-time work experience until 2006 (in years) 20.89 15.34 18.91
Unemployment experience until 2006 (in years) 0.34 1.71 3.66
Overall (N = 10,456) 86.27 % 4.61 % 9.12 %
Note: own calculations based on SOEPv28, pooled (2007–2011).
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Figure 4.1: Employment state by Locus of Control (percentages)
Note: own calculations based on SOEPv28, pooled (2007–2011).
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Figure 4.2: Wage mobility of low-wage workers by Locus of Control (percentages)
Note: own calculations based on SOEPv28, pooled (2007–2011).
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Table 4.2: Models 1–2, dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects, no interactions
Model 1 Model 2
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Lagged employment state (ref.: Higher wage in t – 1)
Low wage in t – 1 1.000*** 0.815*** 1.004*** 0.842***
(0.246) (0.310) (0.245) (0.312)
Not working in t – 1 1.214*** 3.136*** 1.201*** 3.177***
(0.301) (0.309) (0.301) (0.314)
Non-cognitive skills
Medium Locus of Control (1 = yes) -0.800*** -0.677*** -0.780*** -0.660***
(0.249) (0.227) (0.249) (0.228)
Internal Locus of Control (1 = yes) -0.635*** -0.819*** -0.628** -0.804***
(0.246) (0.233) (0.261) (0.247)
Openness – – -0.004 -0.048
(0.091) (0.084)
Conscientiousness – – 0.291** 0.118
(0.125) (0.110)
Extraversion – – -0.110 -0.018
(0.094) (0.087)
Agreeableness – – 0.223** -0.110
(0.110) (0.100)
Neuroticism – – 0.075 -0.088
(0.087) (0.080)
Positive reciprocity – – 0.088 0.024
(0.118) (0.106)
Negative reciprocity – – 0.148** 0.104*
(0.067) (0.063)
Other individual characteristics
No German citizen (1 = yes) 0.497* 0.498** 0.398 0.507**
(0.258) (0.241) (0.260) (0.241)
Age -0.255 -0.184 -0.259 -0.168
(0.303) (0.325) (0.303) (0.325)
Age squared 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of annual doctor visits -0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Married (1 = yes) -0.326 0.907 -0.335 0.898
(0.490) (0.591) (0.492) (0.584)
General elementary education (1 = yes) -0.367 -0.129 -0.370 -0.132
(0.297) (0.271) (0.295) (0.268)
Higher vocational education -1.065*** -0.724*** -1.015*** -0.695***
and higher education (1 = yes) (0.268) (0.235) (0.266) (0.233)
Individual averages ÝXt
Indiv. average of age -0.012 -0.007 -0.009 -0.026
(0.311) (0.334) (0.311) (0.333)
Indiv. average of age squared -0.006* -0.008** -0.006 -0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Indiv. average of number of annual doctor visits 0.021** 0.041*** 0.023** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Indiv. average of married -0.010 -1.281** 0.023 -1.273**
(0.544) (0.628) (0.545) (0.620)
IAB-Bibliothek 35090
Locus of Control and low-wage mobility
Table 4.2 (cont.):  Models 1–2, dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects,  
no interactions
Model 1 Model 2
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Initial employment state (ref.: Higher wage in t = 0)
Low wage in t = 0 4.605*** 2.706*** 4.514*** 2.640***
(0.451) (0.477) (0.444) (0.474)
Not working in t = 0 4.147*** 4.164*** 4.114*** 4.109***
(0.519) (0.624) (0.516) (0.633)
Full-time work experience until 2006, in years 0.002 -0.079*** -0.010 -0.083***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022)
Unemployment experience until 2006, in years 0.205*** 0.258*** 0.195*** 0.250***
(0.062) (0.055) (0.061) (0.054)
Constant 1.669 -1.975 -1.919 -1.873
(2.424) (2.344) (2.673) (2.532)
Variance η2 5.107 (0.891)*** 4.885 (0.861)***
Variance η3 4.082 (1.017)*** 3.844 (1.003)***
Covariance η2, η3 3.937 (0.793)*** 3.768 (0.773)***
AIC 4675.422 4672.823
Log Likelihood -2286.7112 -2271.4117
Observations 10,456 10,456
Notes:  own calculations based on SOEPv28, pooled (2007–2011). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Reference groups: external Locus of Control, middle vocational 
education/Abitur. Full set of year dummies included.
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Table 4.3: Models 3–4, dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects, with interactions
Model 3 Model 4
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Lagged employment state (ref.: Higher wage in t – 1)
Low wage in t – 1 1.397*** 0.863* -0.137 -1.630
(0.392) (0.456) (2.434) (2.925)
Not working in t – 1 1.047** 2.911*** -4.399 1.193
(0.487) (0.438) (3.583) (3.006)
Non-cognitive skills
Medium Locus of Control (1 = yes) -0.896*** -0.893*** -0.808** -0.928***
(0.322) (0.291) (0.321) (0.294)
Internal Locus of Control (1 = yes) -0.638** -0.896*** -0.492 -1.047***
(0.305) (0.285) (0.324) (0.311)
Openness – – -0.111 0.036
(0.113) (0.107)
Conscientiousness – – 0.394** 0.227
(0.169) (0.147)
Extraversion – – -0.151 0.035
(0.121) (0.114)
Agreeableness – – 0.288** -0.293**
(0.142) (0.130)
Neuroticism – – 0.200* -0.138
(0.109) (0.102)
Positive reciprocity – – 0.066 0.039
(0.155) (0.137)
Negative reciprocity – – 0.213** 0.005
(0.085) (0.083)
Interactions between non-cognitive skills and Low wage in t – 1
Medium Locus of Control * Low wage in t – 1 -0.405 0.121 -0.555 0.076
(0.520) (0.620) (0.541) (0.642)
Internal Locus of Control * Low wage in t – 1 -0.728 -0.177 -1.364** -0.532
(0.494) (0.627) (0.573) (0.702)
Openness * Low wage in t – 1 – – 0.418** 0.360
(0.202) (0.250)
Conscientiousness * Low wage in t – 1 – – -0.119 -0.167
(0.281) (0.347)
Extraversion * Low wage in t – 1 – – 0.276 0.267
(0.189) (0.250)
Agreeableness * Low wage in t – 1 – – 0.028 0.386
(0.241) (0.310)
Neuroticism * Low wage in t – 1 – – -0.256 -0.239
(0.191) (0.231)
Positive reciprocity * Low wage in t – 1 – – 0.113 -0.133
(0.270) (0.324)
Negative reciprocity * Low wage in t – 1 – – -0.097 0.160
(0.132) (0.167)
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Table 4.3 (cont.):  Models 3–4, dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects, with 
interactions
Model 3 Model 4
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Low wage
in t
Not working
in t
Interactions between non-cognitive skills and Not working in t – 1
Medium Locus of Control * Not working in t – 1 0.237 0.801 -0.099 0.917
(0.680) (0.565) (0.720) (0.603)
Internal Locus of Control * Not working in t – 1 0.367 -0.110 -0.200 0.121
(0.681) (0.563) (0.766) (0.643)
Openness * Not working in t – 1 – – 0.091 -0.171
(0.246) (0.205)
Conscientiousness * Not working in t – 1 – – -0.143 -0.746**
(0.373) (0.322)
Extraversion * Not working in t – 1 – – 0.728*** 0.557**
(0.280) (0.238)
Agreeableness * Not working in t – 1 – – 0.245 0.368
(0.332) (0.265)
Neuroticism * Not working in t – 1 – – -0.209 0.212
(0.245) (0.202)
Positive reciprocity * Not working in t – 1 – – 0.271 0.044
(0.334) (0.277)
Negative reciprocity * Not working in t – 1 – – 0.204 0.401**
(0.198) (0.177)
Other individual characteristics
No German citizen (1 = yes) 0.491* 0.509** 0.344 0.511**
(0.259) (0.240) (0.259) (0.243)
Age -0.234 -0.176 -0.208 -0.091
(0.305) (0.327) (0.307) (0.331)
Age squared 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of annual doctor visits -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Married (1 = yes) -0.387 0.924 -0.383 0.882
(0.494) (0.593) (0.505) (0.594)
General elementary education (1 = yes) -0.360 -0.120 -0.428 -0.161
(0.297) (0.270) (0.295) (0.273)
Higher vocational education -1.089*** -0.725*** -1.044*** -0.675***
and higher education (1 = yes) (0.269) (0.235) (0.267) (0.234)
Individual averages ÝXt
Indiv. average of age -0.033 0.003 -0.045 -0.102
(0.314) (0.336) (0.316) (0.340)
Indiv. average of age squared -0.005 -0.008** -0.005 -0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Indiv. average of number of annual doctor visits 0.021* 0.042*** 0.019* 0.041***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Indiv. average of married 0.043 -1.293** 0.030 -1.265**
(0.548) (0.629) (0.556) (0.630)
Initial employment state (ref.: Higher wage in t = 0)
Low wage in t = 0 3.834*** 2.254*** 5.724 1.872
(0.653) (0.654) (3.680) (3.867)
Not working in t = 0 4.128*** 4.082*** 13.893*** 7.537**
(0.697) (0.730) (4.008) (3.588)
Full-time work experience until 2006, in years -4.6e-04 -0.081*** -0.016 -0.088***
(0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.023)
Unemployment experience until 2006, in years 0.211*** 0.262*** 0.218*** 0.265***
(0.062) (0.056) (0.063) (0.057)
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Table 4.3 (cont.):  Models 3–4, dynamic multinomial logit models with random effects, with 
interactions
Interactions between non-cognitive skills and Low wage in t = 0
Medium Locus of Control * Low wage in t = 0 1.114 0.817 1.091 0.775
(0.773) (0.815) (0.782) (0.829)
Internal Locus of Control * Low wage in t = 0 0.986 0.190 1.381 0.483
(0.763) (0.853) (0.846) (0.948)
Openness * Low wage in t = 0 – – -0.079 -0.264
(0.289) (0.318)
Conscientiousness * Low wage in t = 0 – – 0.071 0.303
(0.402) (0.444)
Extraversion * Low wage in t = 0 – – -0.605** -0.520
(0.285) (0.329)
Agreeableness * Low wage in t = 0 – – 0.294 0.187
(0.343) (0.383)
Neuroticism * Low wage in t = 0 – – 0.026 0.156
(0.310) (0.340)
Positive reciprocity * Low wage in t = 0 – – -0.308 0.030
(0.394) (0.428)
Negative reciprocity * Low wage in t = 0 – – 0.183 0.067
(0.199) (0.217)
Interactions between non-cognitive skills and Not working in t = 0
Medium Locus of Control * Not working in t = 0 0.123 -0.316 0.086 -0.444
(0.790) (0.685) (0.823) (0.729)
Internal Locus of Control * Not working in t = 0 –0.359 0.451 -0.396 0.388
(0.836) (0.716) (0.903) (0.793)
Openness * Not working in t = 0 – – 0.029 -0.122
(0.302) (0.263)
Conscientiousness * Not working in t = 0 – – -0.386 0.265
(0.410) (0.367)
Extraversion * Not working in t = 0 – – -0.123 -0.399
(0.309) (0.276)
Agreeableness * Not working in t = 0 – – -0.703* -0.215
(0.377) (0.321)
Neuroticism * Not working in t = 0 – – -0.146 -0.121
(0.270) (0.239)
Positive reciprocity * Not working in t = 0 – – -0.172 0.017
(0.376) (0.333)
Negative reciprocity * Not working in t = 0 – – -0.545** -0.373*
(0.238) (0.212)
Constant 1.675 -2.278 -3.028 -1.567
(2.434) (2.353) (2.804) (2.676)
Variance η2 5.096 (0.889)*** 4.630 (0.825)***
Variance η3 4.011 (1.030)*** 3.783 (1.048)***
Covariance η2, η3 3.900 (0.797)*** 3.781 (0.780)***
AIC 4694.494 4724.907
Log Likelihood -2280.2468 -2225.4537
Observations 10,456 10,456
Notes:  own calculations based on SOEPv28, pooled (2007–2011). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Reference groups: external Locus of Control, middle vocational 
education/Abitur. Full set of year dummies included.
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Table 4.4:  Predicted probabilities to be in a given employment state in t, conditional on Locus of 
Control and employment state in t – 1, from model 4
 External Locus of Control
 Higher wage in t Low wage in t Not working in t
Higher wage in t – 1 0.962 (0.953) (0.972) 0.016 (0.010) (0.023) 0.021 (0.014) (0.028)
Low wage in t – 1 0.432 (0.333) (0.532) 0.413 (0.303) (0.523) 0.154 (0.096) (0.213)
Not working in t – 1 0.107 (0.078) (0.137) 0.068 (0.040) (0.096) 0.825 (0.786) (0.864)
Medium Locus of Control
Higher wage in t Low wage in t Not working in t
Higher wage in t – 1 0.981 (0.976) (0.986) 0.010 (0.006) (0.014) 0.009 (0.006) (0.012)
Low wage in t – 1 0.484 (0.378) (0.591) 0.419 (0.314) (0.523) 0.097 (0.052) (0.143)
Not working in t – 1 0.171 (0.124) (0.219) 0.059 (0.031) (0.087) 0.770 (0.718) (0.822)
Internal Locus of Control
Higher wage in t Low wage in t Not working in t
Higher wage in t – 1 0.986 (0.982) (0.990) 0.008 (0.005) (0.011) 0.006 (0.003) (0.009)
Low wage in t – 1 0.646 (0.543) (0.748) 0.298 (0.199) (0.396) 0.056 (0.026) (0.087)
Not working in t – 1 0.238 (0.183) (0.292) 0.065 (0.032) (0.099) 0.697 (0.637) (0.757)
Notes: own calculations based on SOEPv28, pooled (2007–2011). 95 %-confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Table 4.5: Measurement of Locus of Control in the SOEP questionnaire
Locus of Control
How my life goes depends on me. Internal LoC
If a person is socially or politically active, he/she can have an effect on social 
conditions.
Internal LoC
One has to work hard in order to succeed. Internal LoC
Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserved. External LoC
I frequently have the experience that other people have a controlling influence 
over my life.
External LoC
The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions. External LoC
I have little control over the things that happen in my life. External LoC
Source: SOEP questionnaire, SOEPv28.
Table 4.6: Measurement of the Big Five inventory in the SOEP questionnaire
I see myself as someone who …
is original, comes up with new ideas Openness to experience
values artistic experiences Openness to experience
has an active imagination Openness to experience
does a thorough job Conscientiousness
does things effectively and efficiently Conscientiousness
tend to be lazy (reversed) Conscientiousness
is communicative, talkative Extraversion
is outgoing, sociable Extraversion
is reserved (reversed) Extraversion
is sometimes somewhat rude to others (reversed) Agreeableness
has a forgiving nature Agreeableness
is considerate and kind to others Agreeableness
worries a lot Neuroticism
gets nervous easily Neuroticism
is relaxed, handles stress well (reversed) Neuroticism
Source: SOEP questionnaire, SOEPv28.
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Table 4.7: Measurement of reciprocity in the SOEP questionnaire
Reciprocity
If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it. Positive reciprocity
I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before. Positive reciprocity
I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before. Positive reciprocity
If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter 
what the cost.
Negative reciprocity
If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her. Negative reciprocity
If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back. Negative reciprocity
Source: SOEP questionnaire, SOEPv28.
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5 Union decline and the coverage wage gap in Germany63
5.1 Introduction
Most information on the union-nonunion wage differential in Germany – strictly, 
the wage gap between covered and uncovered workers – pertains to the 1990s 
or early 2000s. Yet, as is widely known, German unions have been in retreat both 
during and subsequent to these intervals. It is the very breadth of decline that makes 
investigation of the more recent interval more compelling. First, union density has 
fallen sharply. The decline can be dated from the mid-1980s, the sudden rise in 
membership after 1989 proving to be little more than a diversion. Accordingly, 
union density declined from 36 % in 1991 in the aftermath of unification to 19.3 % 
in 2009 (see Fitzenberger et al., 2011; Addison et al., 2007; Bispinck et al., 2010). 
By way of qualification, Hirsch and Schnabel’s (2014) measure of union bargaining 
power, based on a right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, suggests that 
the fall off in union strength occurred mostly after 2002, remaining fairly stable in 
the 1990s despite a fairly uniform drop in density over the entire period. 
Second, overall collective bargaining coverage as a share of employment fell in 
West Germany (East Germany) from 76 % (63 %) in 1998 to 65 % (51 %) in 2009 
(see Bispinck et al., 2010).64 The corollary was a continuing rise in the bargaining 
free sector.
Third, the decline in collective bargaining coverage was not deflected by a 
growth in “orientation” in the uncovered sector, nor was it to receive any support 
from the “extension principle.” Orientation refers to a process whereby uncovered 
firms claim to shadow the terms of sectoral agreements. The coverage of orienting 
firms in the private sector rose from 17.9 % of employment in 2000 to 22.4 % 
in 2010. This rising trend only partially compensated for the decline in sectoral 
bargaining: the share of employees covered by sectoral agreements fell from 
59.9 % to 49.3 % over the same interval. Moreover, these are simple frequencies. 
The wages paid by orienting firms have been shown to lie well below those set 
under collective bargaining (see Addison et al., 2012b). As far as the extension 
of collective agreements to employees and employers not bound by the relevant 
sectoral agreement is concerned, this, too, has evinced pronounced decline. For 
example, considering just the extension of primary collective agreements under 
the 1949 Collective Agreement Act, their number fell from 408 (or 5.4 % of all 
such agreements) to just 245 (1.5 %) in 2009 (Bispinck et al., 2010). 
63 This chapter is based on Addison et al. (2012a), which is joint work with John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira, and Lutz 
Bellmann.
64 The link between density and coverage by a collective agreement is noted in section 5.2.
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Finally, German sectoral collective bargaining has been buffeted by decentralization 
in the form of opening clauses and pacts for employment and competitiveness 
(see, respectively, Bispinck, 2004; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005). Abstracting 
from the issue of whether the process has been destabilizing or fragmenting 
– so-called “internal erosion” (on which, see Hassel, 1999, inter al.) – the very 
extensive contractual innovations in question involved such elements as hardship 
clauses allowing firms in economic difficulties to deviate from sectorally-agreed 
provisions, temporary cuts in pay to safeguard jobs, the introduction of profit-
related pay substituting for previously guaranteed elements of the remuneration 
package, and concession bargaining more generally (see, for example, Haipeter 
and Lehndorff, 2009). 
The very scale of these developments in Europe’s largest economy makes Germany 
an interesting case for consideration. One primary interest is of course macroeconomic 
in scope. Specifically, has increasingly decentralized bargaining produced greater 
flexibility (i.e. improved) responsiveness of wages to their underlying determinants 
thereby benefiting employment, or, by analogy with concerns expressed after the 
collapse of the Swedish model, have the advantages associated with a coordinated 
system of bargaining been so compromised as to lead to the opposite outcome?65 
There is also a European-wide dimension to these developments, given the role of 
Germany in shaping EU social policy and institutions.
Our own concerns are less far ranging given the unsettled nature of research 
into the union premium, let alone its course through time. The focus of the present 
treatment is, then, to discover what has been happening to the union wage gap 
in the first decade of the 2000s. It offers a critical albeit partial first step in the 
analysis of the consequences of the decline in unionism. It is partial because an 
estimate of average wage differences does not inform us about the distribution 
of wages. A small premium may be consistent with a large effect in the lower 
reaches of the distribution. Even if declines in the wage gap are unlikely to be 
undone by distributional effects, the latter require explicit consideration in future 
research. But, to repeat, basic knowledge of the effect of unions on average wages 
is itself underdeveloped and remains the basis of the present inquiry.
The chapter proceeds as follows. We first review the state of play on the 
union wage gap, drawing upon the German (and, briefly, the US) literature. We 
then outline our unique dataset, namely the cross sectional version of the linked 
employer-employee data supported by the German Institute for Employment 
Research. Our analysis is based on two (three-year) clouds of data at each end 
65 A related issue is whether the erosion of the industrial relations architecture might lead to ‘re-stabilization from 
above’ and hence greater involvement of the nation state in wage fixing via national minimum wages and/or 
heightened use of extension provisions.
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of the sample period 2000–2010, exploiting changes in establishment collective 
bargaining status over time. Our estimates of union wage effects are obtained 
by comparing the wage growth of workers employed by plants joining or leaving 
collective bargaining with that of workers employed by establishments that did not 
change their collective bargaining status – never members and always members, 
respectively. These counterfactuals are then reversed for robustness. Our main 
finding is that joining a sectoral agreement is found always to produce higher 
wages, while leaving one no longer produces wage losses if the transition is to 
a firm agreement. Leaving a firm agreement to non-coverage also leads to wage 
reductions, while joining one from non-coverage seems decreasingly favourable. 
The reverse counterfactuals in turn yield correspondingly smaller estimates (in 
absolute value) of wage development than reported for the initial counterfactuals.
5.2  A review of the literature on the collective bargaining 
premium
Recent studies of the magnitude of the collective bargaining premium in Germany 
use either the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) or the Linked Employer-
Employee Dataset of the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB). The thrust of 
studies using the GSES has been upon distributional issues, while those based 
on the LIAB have more often (though not exclusively) considered the effects of 
collective bargaining on wages and rent sharing.66 Furthermore, the GSES studies 
lack a longitudinal capacity, limiting inferences that can be made about causality. 
Note, finally, that the wage gap in Germany refers to coverage rather than 
membership since German constitutional law – specifically Article 9 of the Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz) – does not allow collective agreements to discriminate against 
non-union members. 
The main GSES studies that also examine the wage gap in addition to 
distributional issues are: (a) Stephan and Gerlach (2005) who use a regional 
manufacturing subsample from Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) of the GSES for 
the 1990, 1995, and 2001 waves; (b) Fitzenberger et al. (2013) who use the full 
survey for 2001 but focus on prime-age male employees in West Germany; and 
(c) Antonczyk (2010) who deploys the same GSES sample for 2001 but who seeks 
to account for the endogeneity of collective bargaining.67 Stephan and Gerlach’s 
66 The main exception is the study by Dustmann et al. (2009), which examines a number of explanations for the 
growth in German wage inequality over the last decades, including changes in collective bargaining.
67 See also the interesting analysis of the 1995 and 2005 waves of the GSES by Heinbach and Spindler (2007), using 
the Machado-Mata decomposition technique (see Machado and Mata, 2005, for further information on this 
technique).
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multi-level model provides estimates of the wage of an average worker in an 
average firm applying individual contracts (i.e. a no collective bargaining regime), 
and of the differentials that would apply had that worker been employed in an 
otherwise average firm with either an industry collective agreement or a firm-
level agreement. In 1990 the estimated wage premium was 4 % in the case of 
sectoral contracts and 3 % for firm-level contracts. Higher coverage premia are 
reported for the later sample years: respectively 9 % and 12 % in 1995, and 7 % 
and 11 % in 2001.68, 69
The study by Fitzenberger et al. (2013) is notable for its consideration of the 
wages of uncovered workers in covered firms and the role of (exogenous) union 
density in the relevant labour market segment in addition to firm coverage effects. 
The authors’ OLS results indicate that firms applying a collective agreement pay 
higher wages on average; specifically, the greater the share of workers in a firm 
covered by a collective contract, the higher are wages on average – and somewhat 
more so in the case of firm-level than sectoral agreements. For its part, an increase 
in union density reinforces the positive effects of higher coverage at firm level 
(while lowering wages in the uncovered sector). That said, individual coverage by a 
collective agreement in a covered firm shows a negative impact on the wage level, 
and the authors’ separate quantile regression analysis shows that this effect is 
elevated at higher quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. In other words, 
collective bargaining coverage serves to reduce wage inequality – reminding us 
that the main thrust of analyses based on the GSES is upon distributional issues.70
Antonczyk (2010) seeks to measure the causal effect of collective bargaining 
in 2001 – actually, sectoral bargaining alone – on wages, using two instrumental 
variables measured at district level; specifically, the share of Protestants and 
Catholics (the expectation being that Catholics are more likely to favour unionism), 
and historic gross union density (i.e. employed and unemployed union members as 
a share of employees). These variables are meant to provide exogenous variation in 
the treatment variable. Antonczyk reports the average treatment effect on wages 
or union wage effect, namely the expected gain from coverage of a randomly 
assigned individual with a given set of observable characteristics.71 The upshot 
of this procedure is that the simple ceteris paribus coverage premium shrinks 
from 3.6 log points to just 0.8 log points, the bulk of the unadjusted differential 
68 Similar results for a different state (Baden-Württemberg) are reported by Bechtel et al. (2004).
69 Stephan and Gerlach also report that the rates of return to human capital as well as the gender wage gap are lower 
in firms with collective agreements than in companies with individual contracts.
70 See also Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005), and Antonczyk et al. (2010b).
71 He also reports the average treatment effect on the treated – or idiosyncratic gain for the individual receiving the 
treatment – which is roughly twice the average treatment effect.
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seemingly reflecting the fact that individuals undergoing treatment have higher 
unobserved productivity than those undergoing the treatment.
Studies using the LIAB are sparse and, as noted earlier, are less concerned with 
distributional issues than with the effects of coverage on levels of wages and rents. 
The principal study is by Gürtzgen (2012), using data from the 1995–2008 LIAB for 
West German mining and manufacturing establishments. Gürtzgen presents OLS, 
establishment fixed effects, and spell fixed effects estimates of a wage equation 
where the dependent variable is the log daily wage. In the establishment fixed 
effects specification, the collective bargaining coverage premium is identified 
from establishments that change their contract status. The spell fixed effects 
specification first differences log wages within each individual-establishment cell, 
removing unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity. Raw coverage differentials 
of 20 log points for sectoral bargains and 29 log points for firm bargaining are 
reduced by 70 % and 80 %, respectively, in the OLS specification with the full set 
of controls. More importantly, these much reduced coverage premia vanish once 
the non-random selection of firms into bargaining regime is controlled for and 
also under spell differencing designed to control for the possibility that plants 
changing their bargaining status might at the same time also experience a change 
in unobserved worker skills. 
Finally, in the most contentious part of her analysis, Gürtzgen turns to the role 
of time-specific unobservables, the concern being that establishments that change 
their coverage status might be subject to different time-specific unobservables 
than are those maintaining the original contract status. To investigate this 
endogeneity issue, she adopts a trend-adjusted difference-in-difference estimator, 
analysing separate transitions from one bargaining regime to another (six cases in 
all) and allowing for differences in changes in time-specific shocks by subtracting 
the differential in wage growth in pre-transition intervals. Gürtzgen concludes 
from these comparisons of the wage growth of individuals experiencing a change 
in contract status with the wage growth of individuals employed by stable plants 
that there is no “true” wage effect of exiting sectoral bargaining to non-coverage. 
Although such individuals may experience wage losses, this outcome is indicative 
of the correlation of the transition with (more) negative demand shocks. The 
interpretation of firm collective bargaining transitions is altogether more nuanced, 
however, with some transitions leading to positive differentials and others giving 
rise to negative differentials, so that the small insignificant premium for firm-
level collective bargaining reported in the main estimation exercise represents 
the net effect of these different influences. This latter part of Gürtzgen’s analysis 
is rather speculative. The problem resides of course in implementing the adjusted 
difference-in-difference estimator (on which more below).
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We conclude this section with some contextual remarks on the evolving US 
literature. While the preponderance of American research has focused on the 
union membership premium – and also unlike the research reviewed here has 
continued to obtain some very large estimates of that particular premium using 
both cross sectional and longitudinal analysis of individual wage data72 – some 
more recent studies offer a closer match with the German literature in focusing 
on the wage effects of establishments becoming unionized. We refer to studies of 
union representation elections comparing establishments in which unions became 
recognized by a close margin of the vote with those in which they barely lost, and 
where evidence of a discontinuous relation between the vote share and wages is 
deemed to be the causal impact of unionization. Such regression discontinuity 
studies by DiNardo and Lee (2004) and Frandsen (2012) produce German-type 
estimates of the wage gap, and attribute the results of past US research using 
individual data to the contribution of unobserved firm heterogeneity.
Yet lest we draw premature conclusions about likely convergence in the two 
literatures, it should also be noted that recent US studies in the more conventional 
event-study tradition still find large effects of new unionization on publicly-traded 
firms’ equity values. Lee and Mas (2012), in particular, obtain estimates of lost 
market value attendant upon unionization that translate into a union coverage 
premium of 10 %. Importantly, these authors further argue that such equity losses 
are increasing in the union vote share in representation elections. 
Against this backdrop, the present exercise which seeks to obtain estimates 
of the course of the union wage gap at a time of unambiguously declining union 
authority and controlling for unobserved firm and worker heterogeneity gains 
additional purchase. 
5.3 The data
The present study uses the LIAB Cross-Sectional Model Version 2 1993–2010 
(LIAB QM2 9310) of the linked employer-employee data supported by the Institute 
for Employment Research in Nuremberg (IAB). The LIAB data are created at the 
Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency by linking the 
establishment data from the annual waves of the IAB Establishment Panel with 
information on individuals from the social security records of the German Federal 
Employment Agency. 
The IAB Establishment Panel is a large-scale annual establishment survey that 
covers up to 16,000 establishments every year, beginning in 1993 in West Germany 
72 See the excellent survey by Hirsch (2004).
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and extended in 1996 to the former East Germany. The participating establishments 
are surveyed on a large number of employment policy-related subjects. These 
include employment development, business policy and business development, 
collective bargaining, personnel structure and recruitment, remuneration, and 
working time. The survey is unique in Germany, since it is representative for all 
industries and establishment sizes nationwide and is conceived as a longitudinal 
survey. Therefore, it enables researchers to analyse developments over time and 
to conduct longitudinal studies of individual establishments as well (for further 
information on the IAB Establishment Survey, see Fischer et al., 2009).
The information on individual workers in the LIAB dataset comes from the 
social security records of the German Federal Employment Agency and covers 
all employees of the establishments surveyed in the IAB Establishment Panel. 
Specifically, it includes both employees who are liable to social security and also 
employees who are marginally part-time employed. For these employees, several 
demographic characteristics such as gender, age, nationality, level of education, 
occupational group, employment status and place of residence are provided. 
Furthermore, the data contain the individual daily wage of an employee. The latter 
is measured with high accuracy by the authorities since this wage information is 
decisive in calculating an individual’s social security payments.
In sum, the LIAB dataset is a unique data source for analysing both the supply 
side and the demand side the German labour market along various dimensions. Due 
to its coverage, it is one of the best-suited datasets for investigating the effects 
of collective bargaining coverage on the wages of individual workers in Germany. 
Several versions of the LIAB data including cross-sectional and longitudinal 
subsamples can be accessed for scientific purposes at the FDZ in Nuremberg.
We have undertaken several modifications to adapt the data to fit our research 
purposes. In the first place, in order to improve the quality of the linkage between 
the survey data and the administrative data, we adopted the procedure that is 
followed by the FDZ for some of the longitudinal versions of the LIAB, erasing 
observations that exhibit a bad linkage quality. In the FDZ procedure, a link is 
defined as having a bad quality if the number of employees and apprentices that an 
establishment has reported in the IAB Establishment Panel deviates significantly 
from the number of employees and apprentices that is calculated from the 
administrative data (for information on this procedure, see Jacobebbinghaus, 
2008: p. 53).
Second, other modifications concern the key wage variable that is central to 
our analysis. In the LIAB data, the reported individual wage of a worker is the gross 
daily wage. Fringe benefits are included only if they are subject to social security. 
Since there exists an upper contribution limit in the German social security system 
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– set annually for West and East Germany by the German government – the gross 
daily wages in these data are top-coded; in our dataset, this affects about 15 % 
(10 %) of the observations for West (East) Germany. We therefore imputed the 
wages above the contribution limit, using the procedure suggested by Gartner 
(2005). First, we estimated a Tobit regression of log daily wages on individual 
and establishment characteristics separately for both parts of the country and 
for each single year. Following Gartner (2005), we then constructed a truncated 
normal distribution by using the predicted values from the Tobit estimation as 
moments and by setting the lower truncation point equal to the contribution 
limit. Finally, we replaced censored wage observations by values randomly drawn 
from this truncated normal distribution. Furthermore, we deflated wages using 
the Consumer Price Index published by the German Federal Statistical Office; 
specifically, all wages are expressed in year 2000 values.
Third, because only a very broad measure of individual working hours is 
contained in the dataset – in particular, for part-time workers, whether working 
hours are less or greater than 18 per week – we restricted our analysis to full-time 
employed workers who are subject to social security. We further excluded those 
full-time workers who were recorded as receiving an implausibly low daily wage (of 
less than 16 €). In addition, we excluded observations from the following sectors/
enterprises: agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry, public administration, and 
not-for-profit entities.
Note that since we are using the cross-sectional version of the LIAB, we are 
unable to track a worker if he/she leaves one establishment for another that is not 
covered by the IAB Establishment Survey, or if he/she exits to non-employment. 
The same problem arises if a worker remains in an establishment that subsequently, 
and for whatever reason, no longer participates in the IAB Establishment Survey. 
Unfortunately, there is no way of circumventing this limitation of the data. Making 
use of one of the available longitudinal versions of the LIAB, or constructing our 
own LIAB-variant, would not suffice as the key information on the collective 
bargaining status of an establishment in a given year will not be available if 
the establishment fails to take part in the IAB Establishment Survey in that year 
(the reader is referred to Heining et al., 2013, for more information on the LIAB 
dataset).
5.4 Preliminary data analysis
Our analysis is based on two (three-year) clouds of data – annual observations 
for 2000–2002 and 2008–2010 – rather than the full 2000–2010 panel. Given 
the establishment rotation in the IAB survey, that disqualifies us in practice from 
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following other than workers in permanent panel establishments over a relatively 
long period, little is lost from our more selective approach. Further, it has the 
advantage of contrasting in a possibly more direct way two presumably distinct 
periods, occurring at the beginning and at the end of the first decade of the 
present century, marked by a material decline in collective bargaining coverage 
and in union density (see Addison et al., 2011).
Table 5.1 presents the main longitudinal features of each subset of observations. 
Three main observations are in order. First, we observe approximately the same 
number of workers in each sub-period: 2.4 million in 2000–2002 and 1.9 million 
in 2008–2010. Second, the share of individuals appearing in each and every year 
of each cloud is more or less the same: 29.9 % in the first interval, 32.9 % in the 
second. Finally, the percentage of individuals who are observed at least twice over 
the two intervals is also approximately constant: 50.9 % and 55.8 % of the total, 
respectively. In sum, the two clouds of data are highly comparable both in terms 
of the number of workers being observed and in their longitudinal profile. 
In Table 5.2 we look at the longitudinal pattern of individuals observed at 
least twice over the two observation windows. Here we want to know whether 
workers stay in the same establishment or switch employers. Clearly, either in the 
case of workers who are observed in three consecutive years or for those who 
are observed in just two years (consecutively or otherwise), job stayers massively 
dominate in each sub-period: on average, only 1 in 100 workers observed at least 
twice are job movers. It is this very nature of the LIAB data that forces us to 
identify the union wage effect based on the wage development of job stayers, in 
conjunction with observed changes in establishment collective bargaining status, 
as further elaborated upon in section 5.5 below. 
Table 5.3 indicates exactly how often establishments switch their collective 
agreement status, reporting both one-year and two-year transitions. In the 
interests of economy, we aggregate firm and sectoral agreements into a single 
category. We thus identify ‘any type of collective agreement’ here, be it firm-level 
or industry-wide in scope. Examination of the two separate collective bargaining 
arrangements is remitted to Table 5.7 in the Appendix.
As shown in the table, between 2000 and 2001, for example, 424 out of 3,639 
establishments (or 11.7 %) abandoned collective bargaining of either type while 
441 out of 2,792 (15.8 %) joined a collective agreement from an initial state of 
no coverage. This means that the percentage of collective bargaining switchers in 
the total number of possible cases is 13.5 % (= [(424 + 441) / 6,431] * 100). There 
is therefore a considerable share of establishments whose collective bargaining 
status changes over time, comprising roughly equal numbers of joiners and 
leavers. Note further that approximately the same percentage of collective 
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bargaining switchers is observed in 2001–2002, at 12.8 %. Similarly, for the years 
2008–2009 and 2009–2010, the percentage of switchers is 11.5 % and 6.8 %, 
respectively. Two-year transitions are slightly higher than the one-year transitions, 
at 14.5 % and 11.9 % in the first and second sub-periods, respectively. Note that 
the two-year transition rates would be substantially higher than their one-year 
counterparts had the two samples been the same. They are not precisely because 
two-year transitions in practice require establishments to be in the sample for 
three consecutive years, with the implication that the corresponding sample tends 
to be populated by a substantially higher proportion of permanent panel stayers.
Our estimates of the collective bargaining wage gap were obtained by fitting 
an augmented Mincerian earnings function to the separate cross-sections of 
data. Specifically, we conditioned the wage gap on 24 (67) worker (establishment) 
covariates. The former included gender, age (and its square), years of service (and 
its square), citizenship status, education (6 levels), and occupation (12 levels). The 
latter comprised dummies for location, establishment age, the profit situation, the 
state of technology, works council status, firm size (and its square), and industry 
(40 2-digit), together with the share of female, fixed-term, foreign and skilled 
workers, and employee median age (see Table 5.8).
The results, shown in the first column of Table 5.4, indicate a positive wage 
gap of 7 % to 14 % in favour of workers covered by sectoral agreements, relative 
to the comparison group of workers in non-covered establishments. This is a 
sizeable wage gap, consistent with some earlier OLS studies. Of some interest here 
is the upward trend of this wage gap. Next, the evidence on sectoral versus firm-
level agreements points to a wage gap favourable to the former: at 1.8 % to 4.0 %. 
Finally, the third column of the table points unequivocally to higher earnings 
under any form of collective bargaining than under individual bargaining, the 
margin amounting to some 6.3 % to 12.5 %. We next place our discussion of wage 
formation in a longitudinal context, allowing for unobserved establishment and 
worker heterogeneity.
5.5 Estimation strategy
Let us assume that the (log) gross daily wage for individual i in period t, yit , is 
given by:
yit = Zit β + δUjt + λt + θi + ψj + εit ,  (1)
where θi  and ψj denote worker- and firm-specific time-invariant effects, 
respectively; Zit is a vector of observed time-varying and time-invariant worker- 
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and firm-level characteristics, as noted in section 5.3; λt is a time dummy; Ujt is a 
dichotomous variable indicating the collective agreement status of firm j (so that 
δ denotes the collective bargaining wage premium); and εit is the error term of the 
model. As is conventional, we assume E (εit | Zit , Ujt , θi , ψj ) = 0.73
Given that each observation window (i.e. 2000–2002 and 2008–2010) 
comprises a 2-year interval, one possible route controlling for worker and firm 
heterogeneity is to take a 2-year difference from model (1), to obtain:
yit – yit – 2 = (Zit – Zit – 2 ) β + δ (Ujt – Ujt – 2 ) + (λt – λit – 2 ) + (ψjt – ψjt – 2 ) + (εit – εit – 2 ). (2)
Clearly, in following this approach we are aiming to capture some medium-term 
effect of collective bargaining coverage. Thus, using the sample of job stayers, for 
whom by construction we have (ψjt – ψjt – 2 ) = 0, model (2) yields:
yit – yit – 2 = (Zit – Zit – 2 ) β + δ (Ujt – Ujt – 2 ) + (λt –  λit – 2 ) + (εit – εit – 2 ). (3)
In other words, given that individuals stay in the same firm, identification of δ is 
achieved via workers whose establishments have changed their status from t – 2 to t.
For movers, on the other hand, in general (ψjt – ψjt – 2 ) ≠ 0. This means that 
under the assumption that (ψjt – ψjt – 2 ) + (εit – εit – 2 ) is uncorrelated with (Ujt – Ujt – 2 ), 
an OLS regression of model (2) will give an alternative estimate of the effect of 
collective bargaining coverage. Identification of δ in this case is via job movers 
whose establishments in t – 2 and t  have the same coverage status vis-à-vis job 
movers whose establishments have changed their status. Unfortunately, as was 
described in section 5.2, the number of job movers is too small to allow us to 
pursue this approach. Our empirical strategy will therefore perforce rely solely on 
job stayers.74
Since we do not want to impose symmetry on the effects of an establishment 
leaving/joining a collective agreement, implementation of our difference-in-
differences approach is carried out by running the selected models across separate 
73 Note that applying OLS to model (1), as was done in Table 5.3 in a purely cross-section fashion, is equivalent to 
assuming away worker and firm unobserved heterogeneity – or, alternatively, that ωit is not correlated with Ujt , 
where ωit = θi + ψj + εit .
74 It would also be possible to use the raw annual data and run the spell fixed-effects version of model (1). In 
this case, by first-differencing within each spell (only consecutive observations on job stayers are useable for 
estimation), we have Δθi = 0 and Δψj = 0, and therefore model (1) becomes Δyit = ΔZit β + δΔUjt + Δλt + Δεit , where 
Δ denotes the first difference operator. For completeness, we will comment on the results from estimating this 
model in section 5.6. Note that by computing 3- and 4-year differences, for example, we would have both a 
substantial reduction in the number of workers (as the number of establishments with four and five consecutive 
observations is much smaller than the number of establishments with two) and a sharply increasing proportion of 
large establishments in the total number of establishments with available data. Model (3) in turn forces us to use 
only those establishments observed in three consecutive years.
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subsamples of establishments. These comprise collective bargaining leavers and 
always members on the one hand, and collective bargaining joiners and never 
members on the other.
Our 2-year difference strategy of using the two groups of leavers and always 
members, on the one hand, and joiners and never members, on the other, and 
then regressing the changes in the wage outcome indicator on the corresponding 
change in collective bargaining status implicitly either assumes that any macro 
shock, proxied by a time dummy, has a similar impact on both treated and control 
groups (e.g. leavers and always members, respectively) or that the macro shock 
does not have any differentiated impact on the decision to leave/stay covered by 
a collective agreement in this particular case.
But one can obviously presume otherwise. Again taking the case of leavers 
versus always members, the beginning period characteristics may be such that, 
even after conditioning on the set of observables Z , selection into the treatment 
is not exogenous. In this case, δ in model (3) will tend to overestimate the causal 
effect of collective bargaining on worker earnings if, say, an adverse shock 
pressures covered establishments to leave an agreement rather than stay covered 
and where at the same time this shock has a negative impact on wages.
Had we observed, somewhere in the past, a group of establishments entirely 
similar to the group of leavers, and a group of establishments similar to the group 
of collective bargaining stayers, both confronting a similar macro shock, and where 
neither group had any possibility of changing its collective bargaining status in the 
pre-treatment interval, we would have been in a position to obtain a differential 
adjusted estimate of the causal effect of leaving collective bargaining. Formally, 
this modelling would necessarily entail the possibility that the macro effect is 
different across the treated (T ) and control (C ) groups. This would require λt in 
model (1) to be replaced by ki λt , where i ∈g indicates that an individual belongs 
to group C or T.75 In this case, the corresponding trend adjusted difference-in-
differences estimator (DADD ) after Bell et al. (1999) is given by:
δ∧DADD = {( ¯yt2T –  ¯yt1T  ) – ( ¯yt2C –  ¯yt1C  )} – {( ¯yt *
T  –  ¯yt 0
T  ) – ( ¯yt *
C  –  ¯yt 0
C  )}, (4)
where the second term in brackets is the difference-in-differences estimator 
obtained using the earlier interval (t0 , t* 
); (t1, t2) is the selected treatment interval; 
and y¯t jT = E (yit – Zit β  | t = tj , g = T ) is the regression-adjusted mean outcome for 
the treated group (and similarly for the control group C ). Note also that the 
75 Clearly, the difference-in-differences model in (3) does not contemplate any such differential macro effect. Indeed, 
it assumes kT  = kC .
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‘unadjusted’ difference-in-differences estimator, δ∧DD , is given solely by the first 
term in brackets, which can in turn be obtained by using the regression model (3) 
for the sample of job stayers.
Unfortunately, the trend adjusted estimator in (4) is difficult to implement. 
In the first place, it is very difficult to find a similar business cycle somewhere in 
past. Here, it is not simply a matter of searching for some pre-treatment period 
with, say, a similar GDP growth rate; rather, it is necessary to find a similar interval 
in which a comparable set of treated and untreated establishments are subject to 
a similar shock. In this context, the selection of a (preceding) 2-year interval, for 
example, is insufficient. And in going further back in time, the likelihood of finding 
similar groups decreases as establishments will change their workforce structures 
and technologies over time. Accordingly, more lies behind any observed differential 
change in wages than just a differential macro shock. More fundamentally, 
computation of the ‘trend’ will require, in the (t0 , t*  
) interval, the selection of two 
sets of firms neither of which is exposed to the treatment, that is, with no real 
chance of changing their collective bargaining status. This requirement is highly 
unlikely to be met in practice in our sample.
In short, although one might believe that the change in collective agreement 
status is not fully exogenous, the facts of the matter are that going beyond 
the ‘unadjusted’ difference-in-differences estimator is likely to rely upon even 
stronger assumptions. In our implementation, therefore, we do not attempt to 
correct for the possibility that the macro effect may be distinct over the treated 
and control groups. That said, we will seek to check the robustness of our results 
using alternative control groups, noting that even though treated and untreated 
groups may seem to have distinct observable characteristics, it does not necessarily 
follow that the two groups will respond differently to a given shock or, conversely, 
that a common set of characteristics will generate an identical propensity to 
change collective bargaining status. 
5.6 Two-year differences
Table 5.5 presents estimates of the collective bargaining premium in the two-year 
difference formulation, using the subset of job stayers. Establishments are grouped 
into separate samples of sectoral and firm-level agreement leavers and joiners and 
their corresponding comparison groups of sectoral and firm agreement stayers (i.e. 
always members and never members), as indicated in the first four columns of 
the table. The table thus gives the 2-year effect of collective bargaining – either 
sectoral or firm-level agreements – on those individuals who do not switch jobs 
between t – 2 and t but who happen to be in establishments whose status has 
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changed versus individuals whose establishments do not switch status. To repeat, 
identification of the union/collective bargaining effect is obtained via changes 
in an establishment’s collective agreement status, given that workers stay in the 
same establishment over the selected interval.
As can be seen from the table, workers whose establishments leave a sectoral 
agreement for no coverage have their wages reduced by 0.7 % over the 2000–2002 
interval, compared with those whose establishments remain covered by a sectoral 
agreement. The corresponding effect for the 2008–2010 period is -0.4 %. If, in turn, 
a firm leaves a sectoral agreement and becomes covered by a firm agreement, the 
effect is less pronounced in the first sub-period, at -0.4 %, and eventually reversed 
in the second sub-period, at +0.8 %.
The evidence from workers whose establishments have joined sectoral 
agreements is stronger than that found for sectoral agreement leavers, at +0.7 % 
and +1.1 % in 2000–2002 and 2008–2010, respectively, in the scenario where the 
initial state is of no coverage by any type of collective agreement. These gains 
are even larger if the transition is from firm-agreement coverage, at +1.0 % and 
+2.3 %, respectively. Note that the latter result seems to contradict the evidence 
found for sectoral agreement leavers in the second row, last column, in the sense 
that from the perspective of worker wages it looks equally possible to have higher 
wages either from switching from sectoral to firm agreements or the other way 
around. Our preferred explanation for this apparent contradiction is that two sets 
of estimates might not be extracted from strictly comparable samples (on which 
more below). 
The remaining four rows of the table examine the transitions between any 
type of coverage and firm agreements, on the one hand, and between any type of 
collective bargaining coverage and no coverage at all, on the other. Thus, in the 
fifth row, there is a reduction in wages for those workers whose establishments 
left a firm agreement to become ‘uncovered’, at -0.9 % and -0.7 % in the two 
selected intervals, respectively; while joining a firm agreement from no coverage, 
in the sixth row, is increasingly less favourable to worker wages, at 2.4 % in 
2000–2002, and 0.2 % (and statistically insignificant) in 2008–2010. Again, there 
seems to be no evidence of any close symmetry between leaving and joining firm 
agreements, which reiterates the possibility that the corresponding samples may 
not be strictly comparable. Alternatively put, although our results suggest that 
establishments under firm-level agreements are expected to generate lower worker 
wages if they switch to no coverage, and to generate higher wages if they switch 
from no coverage to firm agreements, the lack of symmetry in these estimated 
effects suggests again that, for example, the wages of workers in non-covered 
establishments will not be necessarily similar – all else constant – to the wage 
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of a worker in an establishment with a firm agreement had the establishment 
been covered by this type of agreement. This is of course an important caveat 
that reminds us that our approach is quasi-experimental in nature, not a truly 
experimental exercise.
The last two rows offer perhaps more clear-cut results. Here we compare 
the situation of no coverage with any type of collective bargaining coverage 
and the evidence strongly points to a negative effect on wages after leaving a 
sectoral or firm agreement and a positive effect of joining any type of collective 
agreement. The respective losses and gains average -0.6 % and +1.1 %, and with 
a clear decreasing tendency in both transitions. Again, there is no sign of a close 
symmetry in the effects of leaving and joining, but there is nevertheless a strong 
indication that it is better for workers to be associated with covered than non-
covered establishments.
Table 5.6 further exploits the possibility raised in Table 5.5 that we are not 
fully controlling for unobserved establishment heterogeneity. The presumption 
here is that a sectoral agreement joiner, say, may more closely resemble a 
sectoral agreement stayer than a sectoral agreement ‘never member’. Table 5.6 
thus compares, for the same sample, sectoral agreement joiners with sectoral 
agreement stayers. Although one may question this new approach – since it seems 
eminently reasonable to suppose that a sectoral agreement joiner and a sectoral 
agreement never member share the same beginning period collective agreement 
status for non-arbitrary reasons – the strategy is worthwhile pursuing as a form of 
robustness check on our findings. Table 5.6 thus changes the counterfactuals not 
only for sectoral agreement changers but for all other coverage transitions as well.
And indeed the results are quite striking. Thus, even if one admits, on the 
evidence provided in Table 5.5, that leaving a sectoral agreement has a negative 
impact on worker wages (taking therefore as a comparison group the subset of 
always covered), it can be seen from the first row of Table 5.6 that the wage 
development for workers whose establishments left a sectoral agreement is 
nevertheless comparatively more favourable than is the case where workers are in 
an establishment never covered by any type of agreement. Relative to the latter 
group, there is indeed an average gain of 1.0 % in favour of the former. 
The results in the second row of the table are more mixed, with the estimated 
effect for 2008–2010 indicating that whenever an establishment switches from 
a sectoral agreement to a firm-level agreement, worker wages go up at higher 
rate than the wages of those workers in establishments always covered by a firm 
agreement. This seems consistent with the evidence in Table 5.4 of a positive gap 
favourable to sectoral agreements relative to firm agreements. The condition 
for this interpretation is the assumption that sectoral agreements have a long-
IAB-Bibliothek 350112
Union decline and the coverage wage gap in Germany
lasting effect on wage developments, one that cannot be totally offset even after 
two years.
The results for sectoral agreement joiners in the third row follow the same 
script: whenever an establishment joins a sectoral agreement, wages presumably 
go up (based again on the evidence provided by Table 5.5) but by less than 
would have occurred had the workers been in an establishment that remained 
consistently covered by a sectoral agreement over the corresponding sample 
period. Indeed, the loss amounts to 1.1 %, on average.76 In turn, the results in 
the fifth row suggest that firm agreements have some long-lasting effects, too, 
as workers in establishments leaving firm agreements continue to receive higher 
wage increases than their counterparts in never covered plants. For its part, the 
evidence from the sixth row is more mixed, with a positive effect in the first sub-
period and a negative effect in the second.
Next, turning to the aggregate category (i.e. coverage by any type of collective 
agreement), the seventh row shows that although the evidence from Table 5.5 
would lead us to expect a fall in wages after an establishment leaves a collective 
agreement of either type, it remains the case that the wage change will still be 
comparatively more favourable than that obtained by workers in establishments 
never covered by a collective agreement. Indeed, an average wage gain of 0.9 % 
is anticipated as compared with the negative average value of -0.6 % recorded in 
Table 5.5. 
Conversely, while workers in an establishment joining a collective agreement 
are expected to have, say, a 1 % increase in their wage over a period of two years 
relatively to those in an establishment never covered by any form of collective 
agreement (see the last row of Table 5.5), the corresponding results with the 
different counterfactual in the last row of the Table 5.6 offer a more qualified story. 
They show that the wage increase for joining plants is comparatively smaller than 
the wage increases received by workers in those always covered establishments. 
And if anything there is an increasing gap in this regard, amounting to some 
-1.3 % by the end of our sample period in 2008–2010.
Finally, in the interests of completeness, we present in Table 5.9 in the Appendix 
the results from implementing the spell fixed-effects case (see footnote  74 above). 
The table provides detailed results for the same counterfactuals as in Table 5.5; 
that is, it compares joiners with never members and leavers with always members. 
Here, we propose only to offer a brief summary of these findings.
76 The results in the fourth row of the table suggest that joining a sectoral agreement from an initial state of having a 
firm agreement is more favourable to wage development than being always covered by a sectoral agreement. This 
finding contradicts the estimates in the fourth row of Table 5.5. The probable reason is sample size, which is quite 
different in the two experiments likely invalidating the comparison.
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Presumably, with Table 5.5 as our template, the estimated effects obtained in 
Table 5.9 in the Appendix should tend to be smaller in absolute value and perhaps 
even exhibit perverse signs given the essentially immediate or short-run effects 
captured by one-year changes. On the other hand, given that we are now using 
one-year differences, the number of observations is substantially larger because 
the number of establishments with two consecutive observations in the panel 
is much higher than the number of establishments with three observations in a 
row. The former sample is roughly five times bigger than the latter. Alternatively 
put, although we might expect the one-year effects to be somewhat messy, 
their statistical significance might not be that low. Even if one does not reject 
the hypothesis that the effects of, in this case, leaving an agreement should 
measurably increase through time the ‘instantaneous’ impact of the transition 
may yet be non-negligible.
And that does indeed seem to be the case. After one year, the effect of leaving 
either a sectoral agreement or a firm agreement or any collective agreement is 
negative, falling in the -0.4 % to -2.1 % range (see the first, second, fifth, and 
seventh rows of the Appendix table). In turn, the effects of joining (again either 
a sectoral, firm, or any type of collective agreement) are much less clear-cut, 
especially in the second sub-period, where the coefficients are negative or non-
significant in all four possible cases (see the third, fourth, sixth, and eighth rows). 
In the first sub-period the corresponding coefficients vary from 0.3 % to 1.2 %. 
These results might lead us to conclude that the effects of an establishment 
leaving a collective agreement on wages are more rapid than the effects of joining. 
However, the number of perverse signs for worker wage changes in establishments 
that join a collective agreement would seem to devalue the one-year difference/
spell fixed effects strategy. All things considered, then, we prefer to base our 
conclusions on the firmer ground of estimates derived from two-year differences.
5.7 Conclusions
That over the last two decades collective bargaining coverage has declined, and 
that the trend persists, seems to be beyond dispute. Much less clear-cut, however, 
is the impact of this decline on wage development. Indeed, the literature lacks a 
critical value: an updated estimate of the union/collective bargaining premium. 
This is provided in the present treatment which covers a period of a near standstill 
in German wages.
Whatever the reasons behind the erosion of collective bargaining coverage, 
we would not anticipate an elevated union wage premium, since unions should 
have become weaker rather than stronger. As a matter of fact, joining any type of 
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agreement from a position of non-coverage has proven decreasingly favourable 
to wages, while the reverse transition has become decreasingly unfavourable. On 
the other hand, and looking at the two types of collective agreements separately, 
leaving sectoral agreements to non-coverage does involve losses (albeit 
decreasing), while joining a sectoral agreement from non-coverage entails wage 
gains at a slightly increasing rate. The concatenation of these results obviously 
implies that workers in establishments that have switched to firm agreements 
from non-coverage are gradually losing the wage advantage. 
Our results are not directly comparable with those of previous studies because 
of differences in methodology. Nevertheless, they are consistent with the findings 
of studies seeking to tackle the causality issue in that the collective bargaining 
premium is smaller than more conventional estimates. More importantly of 
course, and unlike the former, the present study is able to chart movements in the 
collective bargaining premium over the course of the first decade of the 2000s. 
And in terms of broad movements into and out of collective bargaining, these 
changes are in the main consistent with the decline in union influence implied by 
diminishing coverage over that interval.
That being said, the transitions between firm and sectoral collective 
agreements do not seem to offer any clear-cut conclusions, with indications that 
establishments switching from firm to sectoral agreements tend increasingly 
to register wage gains, while at the same time switching from sectoral to firm 
agreements seems also to be increasingly beneficial. This apparent contradiction 
seems to be due to the lack of comparability in the selected estimation samples, 
which is not altogether surprising given the non-experimental nature of our 
exercise.
More interesting are the results generated by the reverse counterfactuals. 
Here, the most important finding is that although we generally expect workers 
to have higher wages after their establishments join a collective agreement, and 
lower wages after leaving, the gains – or losses – tend to be smaller (in absolute 
terms) if one compares the treated group (i.e. joiners or leavers) with never 
members or always members, rather than with the initially selected control groups 
of always members and never members. This finding confirms the presence of 
some persistence in the effects of collective bargaining coverage, an anticipated 
result given the rules governing the German industrial relations as described in 
section 5.2. Against this backdrop, we distinctly prefer our two-year estimates to 
any estimate based on a one-year spell fixed effects procedure.
115
Tables to chapter 5
Chapter 5
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Table 5.1: Longitudinal pattern of observed workers
Year of observation Number of workers Number of establishments
2000–2002
2000 2001 2002
Yes Yes Yes 721,321 6,279
Yes Yes No 327,829 6,687
Yes No Yes 48,503 4,210
Yes No No 549,528 9,192
No Yes Yes 127,890 5,207
No Yes No 142,360 5,972
No No Yes 491,841 7,236
Total = 2,409,272
2008–2010
2008 2009 2010
Yes Yes Yes 627,027 6,858
Yes Yes No 260,129 6,649
Yes No Yes 77,968 3,901
Yes No No 461,133 9,060
No Yes Yes 98,996 5,563
No Yes No 93,982 5,715
No No Yes 288,995 7,652
Total = 1,908,231
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. Workers necessarily populate one of the seven distinct patterns, but their 
establishments are not necessarily distinct.
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Table 5.2: Longitudinal pattern of workers observed at least twice over the observation window
Profile Year Number of workers Number of establishments
Workers with three consecutive observations
2000 2001 2002
1 A A A 716,844 5,222
2 A A B 2,168 1,441
3 A B B 2,282 1,679
4 A B C 26 68
2008 2009 2010
1 A A A 623,732 6,081
2 A A B 1,524 1,122
3 A B B 1,754 1,291
4 A B C 17 51
Workers with two consecutive observations
2000 2001 2002
5 A A 325,473 6,176
6 A B 2,356 1,735
7 A A 126,438 4,754
8 A B 1,451 1,207
2008 2009 2010
5 A A 258,711 6,282
6 A B 1,418 1,134
7 A A 98,133 5,233
8 A B 863 826
Workers with two non-consecutive observations
2000 2001 2002
9 A A 43,142 2,672
10 A B 3,695 1,869
2008 2009 2010
9 A A 74,832 2,799
10 A B 2,092 1,202
Notes: own calculations based on LIAB. A, B, and C are establishment identifiers.
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Table 5.3: Two- and one-year establishment collective bargaining transitions
One-year transitions
t  + 1 = 2001
t = 2000 Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1 Total
Anycb = 0 2,351 441 2,792
Anycb = 1 424 3,215 3,639
Total 2,775 3,656 6,431
t  + 1 = 2002
t = 2001 Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1 Total
Anycb = 0 2,046 270 2,316
Anycb = 1 405 2,548 2,953
Total 2,451 2,818 5,269
t  + 1 = 2009
t = 2008 Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1 Total
Anycb = 0 3,385 412 3,797
Anycb = 1 412 2,931 3,343
Total 3,797 3,343 7,140
t  + 1 = 2010
t = 2009 Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1 Total
Anycb = 0 3,340 106 3,446
Anycb = 1 323 2,555 2,878
Total 3,663 2,661 6,324
Two-year transitions
t  + 2 = 2002
t = 2000 Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1 Total
Anycb = 0 1,842 304 2,146
Anycb = 1 426 2,415 2,841
Total 2,268 2,719 4,987
t  + 2 = 2010
t = 2008 Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1 Total
Anycb = 0 2,836 230 3,066
Anycb = 1 461 2,280 2,741
Total 3,297 2,510 5,807
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. Anycb denotes the presence of any collective bargaining – either sectoral 
or firm-level bargaining.
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Table 5.4: OLS wage regressions
 Collective bargaining status
Dummy variable equal 
to 1 if worker is in an 
establishment covered by a 
sectoral agreement; 0 if the 
establishment is not covered by 
any type of agreement
Dummy variable equal 
to 1 if worker is in an 
establishment covered by a 
sectoral agreement; 0 if the 
establishment is covered by a 
firm-level agreement
Dummy variable equal  
to 1 if worker is in an 
establishment covered by any 
type of collective agreement;  
0 otherwise
2000–2002
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002
δ 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.063***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 769,988 593,733 637,147 756,738 596,214 688,990 867,881 680,347 787,919
2008–2010
2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
δ 0.091*** 0.115*** 0.140*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.102*** 0.125***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 656,425 485,264 467,885 677,988 472,299 427,984 818,831 587,493 540,864
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. For each cross-section the fitted model is given by yi = Zi β + δUj + ωi  
[see model (1) in the text]. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance level: *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5.5: Estimates of the collective bargaining premium, two-year differences, job stayers
Sample Period: 2000–2002 Period: 2008–2010
Experiment
Treatment 
and control 
groups
Collective bargaining 
status in δ N δ N
t – 2 t
Scb leavers
vs.
Scb stayers
Treated group 
(leavers)
Scb = 1 Anycb = 0
-0.007***
(0.002)
375,397
-0.004**
(0.002)
289,320
Control group 
(stayers)
Scb = 1 Scb = 1
Treated group 
(leavers)
Scb = 1 Fcb = 1
-0.004**
(0.001)
378,843
0.008***
(0.001)
295,414
Control group 
(stayers)
Scb = 1 Scb = 1
Scb joiners
vs.
Scb never 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Scb = 1
0.007***
(0.002)
46,000
0.011***
(0.002)
66,228Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Treated group 
(joiners)
Fcb = 1 Scb = 1
0.010***
(0.002)
57,847
0.023***
(0.002)
86,543Control group
(never 
members)
Fcb = 1 Fcb = 1
Fcb leavers
vs.
Fcb stayers
Treated group 
(leavers)
Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
-0.009***
(0.002)
54,849
-0.007**
(0.003)
83,443
Control group 
(stayers)
Fcb = 1 Fcb = 1
Fcb joiners
vs.
Fcb never 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Fcb = 1
0.024***
(0.002)
44,297
0.002
(0.002)
64,992Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Anycb leavers
vs.
Anycb stayers
Treated group 
(leavers)
Anycb = 1 Anycb = 0
-0.009***
(0.001)
447,074
-0.003**
(0.002)
393,166
Control group 
(stayers)
Anycb = 1 Anycb = 1
Anycb joiners
vs.
Anycb never 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1
0.014***
(0.001)
50,956
0.007***
(0.002)
69,194Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. The fitted model is given by model (3) in the text. Anycb is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by any type of collective agreement,  
0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by  
a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels:  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5.6:  Estimates of the collective bargaining premium, two-year differences, but with 
different counterfactuals, job stayers
Sample Period: 2000–2002 Period: 2008–2010
Experiment
Treatment 
and control 
groups
Collective bargaining 
status in δ N δ N
t – 2 t
Scb leavers
vs.
Scb never 
members
Treated group 
(leavers)
Scb = 1 Anycb = 0
0.009***
(0.002)
46,317
0.011***
(0.002)
69,656Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Treated group 
(leavers)
Scb = 1 Fcb = 1
-0.001
(0.001)
61,863
0.010***
(0.002)
93,590Control group
(never 
members)
Fcb = 1 Fcb = 1
Scb joiners
vs.
Scb always 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Scb = 1
-0.009***
(0.002)
375,080
-0.013***
(0.002)
285,892Control group
(always 
members)
Scb = 1 Scb = 1
Treated group 
(joiners)
Fcb = 1 Scb = 1
0.009***
(0.002)
374,827
0.021***
(0.002)
288,368Control group
(always 
members)
Scb = 1 Scb = 1
Fcb leavers
vs.
Anycb never 
members
Treated group 
(leavers)
Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
0.004*
(0.002)
42,749
0.007***
(0.002)
65,604Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Fcb joiners
vs.
Fcb always 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Fcb = 1
0.014***
(0.002)
56,397
-0.015***
(0.003)
82,830Control group
(always 
members)
Fcb = 1 Fcb = 1
Anycb leavers
vs.
Anycb never 
members
Treated group 
(leavers)
Anycb = 1 Anycb = 0
0.007***
(0.001)
49,725
0.010***
(0.001)
73,234Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Anycb joiner
vs.
Anycb always 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1
-0.002
(0.001)
448,305
-0.013***
(0.002)
389,124Control group
(always 
members)
Anycb = 1 Anycb = 1
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. The fitted model is given by model (3) in the text. Anycb is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by any type of collective agreement,  
0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by  
a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels:  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5.7: Two- and one-year establishment transitions by type of collective bargaining
Two-year transitions
t = 2002 Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
Scb = 1 Total
t = 2000 Scb = 0
Fcb = 1
Scb = 0
189 104 81 374
Anycb = 0 77 1,829 224 2,130
Scb = 1 88 318 2,057 2,463
Total 354 2,251 2,362 4,967
t = 2010 Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
Scb = 1 Total
t = 2008 Scb = 0
Fcb = 1
Scb = 0
244 96 69 409
Anycb = 0 51 2,776 172 2,999
Scb = 1 83 282 1,884 2,249
Total 378 3,154 2,125 5,657
One-year transitions
t = 2001 Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
Scb = 1 Total
t = 2000 Scb = 0
Fcb = 1
Scb = 0
249 110 95 454
Anycb = 0 99 2,334 331 2,764
Scb = 1 113 305 2,758 3,176
Total 461 2,749 3,184 6,394
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. Anycb is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment 
covered by any type of collective agreement, 0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
worker is in an establishment covered by a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 otherwise.
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Table 5.7 (cont.): Two- and one-year establishment transitions by type of collective bargaining
One-year transitions
t = 2002 Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
Scb = 1 Total
t = 2001 Scb = 0
Fcb = 1
Scb = 0
217 80 82 379
Anycb = 0 70 2,030 196 2,296
Scb = 1 69 319 2,180 2,568
Total 356 2,429 2,458 5,243
t = 2009 Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
Scb = 1 Total
t = 2008 Scb = 0
Fcb = 1
Scb = 0
330 95 97 522
Anycb = 0 95 3,368 307 3,770
Scb = 1 128 310 2,376 2,814
Total 553 3,773 2,780 7,106
t = 2010 Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
Scb = 1 Total
t = 2009 Scb = 0
Fcb = 1
Scb = 0
358 46 40 444
Anycb = 0 22 3,283 82 3,387
Scb = 1 27 180 2,130 2,337
Total 407 3,509 2,252 6,168
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. Anycb is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment 
covered by any type of collective agreement, 0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
worker is in an establishment covered by a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 otherwise.
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Table 5.8: Description of variables
Variable Definition
Individual characteristics
Log daily wage Log of the daily wage of a full-time employee 
which is top coded due to the contribution limit 
in the German social security system
Log imputed daily wage Log of the daily wage of a full-time employee; 
values above the contribution limit have been  
imputed using the procedure by Gartner (2005) 
(see data section for further information)
Female Dummy = 1 if female
Age Age in years
Age squared Age in years, squared
Foreign Dummy = 1 if foreign citizenship
Secondary/intermediate school leaving certificate 
without completed vocational training
Dummy = 1 if yes
Secondary/intermediate school leaving certificate 
with completed vocational training
Dummy = 1 if yes
Upper secondary school leaving certificate 
(general or subject-specific aptitude for higher 
education) without completed vocational training
Dummy = 1 if yes
Upper secondary school leaving certificate 
(general or subject-specific aptitude for higher 
education) with completed vocational training
Dummy = 1 if yes
Degree from specialized college of higher 
education
Dummy = 1 if yes
College or university degree Dummy = 1 if yes
Unskilled manual occupation Dummy = 1 if yes
Skilled manual occupation Dummy = 1 if yes
Technician Dummy = 1 if yes
Engineer Dummy = 1 if yes
Unskilled service occupation Dummy = 1 if yes
Skilled service occupation Dummy = 1 if yes
Semiprofessional Dummy = 1 if yes
Professional Dummy = 1 if yes
Unskilled commercial and administrative 
occupation
Dummy = 1 if yes
Skilled commercial and administrative occupation Dummy = 1 if yes
Manager Dummy = 1 if yes
Occupation unknown Dummy = 1 if yes
Tenure Tenure in years
Tenure squared Tenure in years, squared
Establishment characteristics
Establishment founded before 1990 Dummy = 1 if yes
Profit situation in last fiscal year „good“ or „very 
good“
Dummy = 1 if yes. This information is derived from 
the establishment‘s reply to the question „Please 
give your assessment of the profit situation 
of your business in the last fiscal year (2007)“. 
The five possible answers are: Profitability was 
„very good“; „good“; „satisfactory“; „sufficient“; 
„unsatisfactory“.
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Table 5.8 (cont.): Description of variables
Variable Definition
Technical state of plant and machinery „state of the 
art“ or „nearly state of the art“
Dummy = 1 if yes. This information is derived 
from the establishment‘s reply to the question 
„How do you assess the overall technical state 
of the plant and machinery, furniture and office 
equipment of this establishment compared to 
other establishments in the same industry?“ The 
five possible answers are: „state-of-the-art“; 
„nearly state-of-the-art“; „medium“; „nearly 
obsolete“; „obsolete“.
Share of foreign workers  
Share of high-skilled and skilled workers  
Share of fixed-term workers  
Share of female workers  
Median age of the workforce  
Establishment covered by any collective bargaining 
agreement
Dummy = 1 if yes
Establishment covered by a sector-level collective 
bargaining agreement
Dummy = 1 if yes
Establishment covered by a firm-level collective 
bargaining agreement
Dummy = 1 if yes
Existence of a works council Dummy = 1 if yes
Establishment size Number of employees
Establishment size squared Number of employees, squared
Industry (omitted category: machinery and 
equipment)
40 dummy variables
German federal state in which establishment is 
located (omitted category: North Rhine-Westphalia)
15 dummy variables
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Table 5.9:  Estimates of the collective bargaining premium, spell fixed-effects, annual data,  
job stayers
Sample Period: 2000–2002 Period: 2008–2010
Experiment
Treatment 
and control 
groups
Collective bargaining 
status in δ N δ N
t – 2 t
Scb leavers
vs.
Scb stayers
Treated group 
(leavers)
Scb = 1 Anycb = 0
-0.007***
(0.002)
1,341,088
-0.021***
(0.001)
1,022,416
Control group 
(stayers)
Scb = 1 Scb = 1
Treated group 
(leavers)
Scb = 1 Fcb = 1
-0.007***
(0.001)
1,348,578
-0.002
(0.001)
1,034,444
Control group 
(stayers)
Scb = 1 Scb = 1
Scb joiners
vs.
Scb never 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Scb = 1
0.003*
(0.002)
190,094
-0.011***
(0.002)
273,148Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Treated group 
(joiners)
Fcb = 1 Scb = 1
0.001
(0.001)
198,341
-0.011***
(0.002)
215,575Control group
(never 
members)
Fcb = 1 Fcb = 1
Fcb leavers
vs.
Fcb stayers
Treated group 
(leavers)
Fcb = 1 Anycb = 0
-0.014***
(0.002)
185,519
-0.004*
(0.002)
203,057
Control group 
(stayers)
Fcb = 1 Fcb = 1
Fcb joiners
vs.
Fcb never 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Fcb = 1
0.012***
(0.002)
181,618
0.001
(0.002)
270,964Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Anycb leavers
vs.
Anycb stayers
Treated group 
(leavers)
Anycb = 1 Anycb = 0
-0.010***
(0.001)
1,617,132
-0.018***
(0.001)
1,310,721
Control group 
(stayers)
Anycb = 1 Anycb = 1
Anycb joiners
vs.
Anycb never 
members
Treated group 
(joiners)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 1
0.008***
(0.001)
206,589
-0.005***
(0.001)
287,286Control group
(never 
members)
Anycb = 0 Anycb = 0
Notes:  own calculations based on LIAB. The fitted model in first differences is given by footnote 74 in the text. 
Anycb is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by any type of collective 
agreement, 0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment 
covered by a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 otherwise. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance 
levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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6 Summary and conclusive remarks
This dissertation provides empirical evidence on different aspects of wage 
dynamics in Germany over the last decade. A major part of the dissertation is 
dealing with the wage growth and the wage mobility of low-wage workers, while 
a smaller part is investigating the development of the union wage premium.
In chapter 2, I analyze the real wage growth and the career patterns of low-
wage workers by using multivariate regression models with endogenous selection. 
Inter alia, I find that a large part of those low-wage workers from 2000/2001 who 
had escaped low pay by 2004 were still higher-paid two years later. This indicates 
that the upward wage mobility of low-wage workers is not merely a transitory 
phenomenon but can lead to longer-lasting higher wage levels for these workers. 
Furthermore, I find that a significant part of the employer heterogeneity which is 
associated to the upward wage mobility of low-wage workers is not captured by 
the firm variables which are usually included in studies on low-pay mobility. The 
latter result has motivated the work on the following chapter of this dissertation. 
The impact of employer characteristics on the real wage growth of individual 
workers low-wage workers and higher-wage workers is investigated in chapter 3. 
By applying endogenous switching regression models, I find that compared to 
other firms, large firms and firms with high export shares or low proportions of 
fixed-term workers provide higher wage growth for low-wage workers. However, a 
number of other potential firm-level determinants are impacting only on the wage 
growth of higher-wage workers but not on the wage growth of low-wage workers. 
Two main insights can be derived from the analyses in this chapter. First, in order 
to identify further employer characteristics which are associated to the individual 
wage growth of low-wage workers, future research should turn to an in-depth 
analysis of firm heterogeneity. Second, the fact that the wage growth of low-
wage workers and higher-wage workers is influenced by different sets of employer 
characteristics indicates that policy measures aiming at increasing the wage 
growth of low-wage workers need to be specifically tailored for these workers. In 
addition, this also suggests that future research should analyze the determinants 
of individual wage growth at different quantiles of the wage distribution in order 
to shed further light on the economic forces underlying labour market polarization 
and rising wage inequality.
In chapter 4 I analyze the impact of Locus of Control and other non-cognitive 
skills on transitions of workers between higher pay, low pay and non-employment.77 
Dynamic multinomial logit regressions model with random effects indicate that 
77 This chapter is based on joint work with Daniel D. Schnitzlein.
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West German men which exhibit an internal Locus of Control have a significantly 
lower probability of being low paid compared to men which exhibit an external 
Locus of Control. In addition, men with an internal Locus of Control also have an 
higher probability of escaping low pay. In other words, men who strongly believe 
that they control the events in their life have a lower risk of being low-paid and 
better chances to escape low-wage employment. Therefore, having an internal 
Locus of control is an important non-cognitive skill for men in the context of 
low wages. This result is relevant for labour market policy in a twofold way. First, 
labour market policy makers need to take into account the possible differences in 
the individual extent of Locus of Control between individual low-wage workers, as 
these differences may impact on the reaction of these workers to labour market 
instruments. Second, early childhood intervention programs aimed at internalizing 
the individual Locus of Control of children from disadvantaged families may be a 
starting point for long-term labour market policy measures.
In contrast to the previous chapters of this dissertation, the focus of chapter 5 
is not on low-wage workers but on workers from all wage groups. In this chapter I 
provide an updated estimate of the union wage premium in Germany by using 
different fixed-effects regression models.78 I find that although union density 
and collective bargaining coverage continuously declined over the last decade, a 
small union wage gap still exists. Even though this result does not allow inference 
concerning the distribution of wages,79 it provides basic information for the 
further inquiry of the effects of the decline of unionism on wages in Germany. For 
example, it will be important to investigate the relative change of the magnitude 
of the union wage premium at different parts of the wage distribution, e.g., for 
low-wage workers and for higher-wage workers.
This dissertation provides several new insights on wage dynamics in Germany, 
with a special focus on the upward wage mobility of low-wage workers. 
Although less than one-fifth of the low-wage workers in Germany manage to 
escape low pay, a major part of the former low-wage workers is able to stay in 
higher-paid employment after moving up. This result from chapter 2 indicates 
that policy measures aiming at supporting low-wage workers to reach higher-
paid employment may have significant payoffs, because increasing the number of 
low-wage workers who move up may subsequently also increase the number of 
workers who remain in higher-wage employment after moving up. As suggested 
by Andersson et al. (2005), one possible way to help low-wage workers to reach 
higher-wage employment is to improve their access to firms which provide 
78 The study underlying this chapter has been co-authored with John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira, and Lutz Bellmann.
79 For example, this small average wage premium may be consistent with a large effect at the bottom of the wage 
distribution.
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better chances for wage growth. While the literature has already identified some 
establishment characteristics that increase the individual upward wage mobility 
of low-wage workers, the results of chapter 3 show that further research is 
necessary in order to identify a larger number of typical characteristics of such 
firms. Furthermore, chapter 3 also demonstrates that one cannot apply the 
existing theoretical and empirical knowledge about the factors that influence the 
wage growth of individual workers to the wage growth of individual low-wage 
workers. In addition, chapter 4 shows that non-cognitive skills may constitute a 
further starting point for policy measures aiming at supporting low-wage workers 
and increasing their upward wage mobility. 
The wage mobility of individual workers can reduce inequality over the 
working life and is an important component of a flexible and efficient labour 
market (Atkinson et al., 1992). In the context of low pay, policy measures aiming 
at increasing the upward wage mobility of individual workers can be seen as 
a possible means of partly compensating for the existence of a large low-
wage sector. While in times of high unemployment the major focus of labour 
market policy is on bringing more people into work, in times of comparatively 
low unemployment labour market policy may therefore focus on increasing the 
upward wage mobility of individual low-wage workers. This dissertation provides 
possible starting points for policy efforts aiming at increasing this wage mobility 
and presents avenues for further research. Because in international comparison 
Germany exhibits a relatively high incidence of low pay, a relatively high extent 
of wage inequality and a relatively low probability of low-wage workers escaping 
low pay (e.g., Salverda and Mayhew, 2009), it is likely that the topics covered in 
this dissertation will remain high on the agenda of researchers and policy-makers 
in the future. 
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Abstract
This book provides empirical evidence on different aspects of wage dynamics in 
Germany over the last decade. It consists of four independent essays. The first three 
essays are dealing with the wage growth and the wage mobility of low-wage workers. 
The fourth essay is investigating the development of the union wage premium.
In the first essay it is shown that the upward wage mobility of low-wage 
workers is not merely a transitory phenomenon but can lead to longer-lasting 
higher wage levels for these workers. Furthermore, a significant part of the employer 
heterogeneity which is associated to the upward wage mobility of low-wage workers 
is not captured by the firm variables which have been included in previous studies 
on low-pay mobility. The latter result has motivated the work on the second essay 
of this book.
The impact of employer characteristics on the real wage growth of individual 
workers low-wage workers and higher-wage workers is investigated in the second 
essay. The results indicate that the wage growth of low-wage workers and higher-
wage workers is influenced by different sets of employer characteristics. Therefore, 
policy measures aiming at increasing the wage growth of low-wage workers need 
to be specifically tailored for these workers. In addition, this also suggests that the 
analysis of the determinants of individual wage growth at different quantiles of the 
wage distribution may shed further light on the economic forces underlying labour 
market polarization and rising wage inequality.
The third essay deals with the impact of Locus of Control and other non-
cognitive skills on transitions of West German men between higher pay, low pay 
and non-employment. It is shown that men with an internal Locus of Control have 
an higher probability of escaping low pay. Labour market policy makers need to take 
into account the possible differences in the individual extent of Locus of Control 
between individual low-wage workers, as these differences may impact on the 
reaction of these workers to labour market instruments. In addition, early childhood 
intervention programs aimed at internalizing the individual Locus of Control of 
children from disadvantaged families may be a starting point for long-term labour 
market policy measures. 
In contrast to the previous essays of this book, the focus of the fourth essay 
is not on low-wage workers but on workers from all wage groups. An updated 
estimate of the union wage premium in Germany shows that although union density 
and collective bargaining coverage continuously declined over the last decade, a 
small union wage gap still exists. Even though this result does not allow inference 
concerning the distribution of wages, it provides basic information for the further 
inquiry of the effects of the decline of unionism on wages in Germany.
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Kurzfassung
Dieses Buch thematisiert verschiedene Aspekte der Lohndynamik in Deutschland. Es 
besteht aus vier voneinander unabhängigen Aufsätzen. Die ersten drei Aufsätze be-
schäftigen sich mit dem Lohnwachstum und der Aufstiegsmobilität von Geringverdie-
nern. Der vierte Aufsatz analysiert die Entwicklung der Lohneffekte der Tarifbindung.
Im ersten Aufsatz wird gezeigt, dass die Aufstiegsmobilität von Geringverdie-
nern kein lediglich temporäres Phänomen ist, sondern für diese Beschäftigten zu 
längerfristig höheren Lohnniveaus führen kann. Des Weiteren wird deutlich, dass 
ein signifikanter Teil jener betrieblichen Heterogenität, die die Lohnmobilität von 
Geringverdienern beeinflusst, nicht durch die von bisherigen Studien untersuchten 
Betriebsmerkmale erklärt werden kann. 
Die Ergebnisse des zweiten Aufsatzes deuten darauf hin, dass das Lohnwachs-
tum von Geringverdienern von anderen betrieblichen Einflussfaktoren abhängt als 
das Lohnwachstum von Besserverdienern. Maßnahmen, die auf die Erhöhung des 
Lohnwachstums von Geringverdienern abzielen, müssten daher speziell für diese 
Beschäftigten entworfen werden. Eine Untersuchung der Determinanten des indi-
viduellen Lohnwachstums an unterschiedlichen Stellen der Lohnverteilung könnte 
außerdem zum weitergehenden Verständnis der Polarisierung des Arbeitsmarktes 
und der wachsenden Lohnungleichheit beitragen.
Der dritte Aufsatz analysiert den Einfluss der Kontrollüberzeugung und ande-
rer Persönlichkeitseigenschaften auf die Übergänge von westdeutschen Männern 
zwischen besser bezahlter Beschäftigung, Niedriglohnbeschäftigung und Nicht-
beschäftigung. Es wird gezeigt, dass Geringverdiener mit einer internalen Kon-
trollüberzeugung bessere Aufstiegschancen haben als Geringverdiener mit einer 
externalen Kontrollüberzeugung. Dieses Ergebnis ist für die Arbeitsmarktpolitik 
in zweifacher Hinsicht von Bedeutung. Zum einen weist es darauf hin, dass die 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik etwaige Persönlichkeitsunterschiede von Geringverdienern 
berücksichtigen sollte, da diese Unterschiede auch unterschiedliche individuelle 
Reaktionen auf Arbeitsmarktmaßnahmen nach sich ziehen können. Zum anderen 
könnten Frühförderprogramme zur Erhöhung der internalen Kontrollüberzeugung 
von Kindern aus sozial schwachen Familien ein möglicher Ansatzpunkt langfristig 
ausgerichteter Arbeitsmarktpolitik sein.
Im Mittelpunkt des vierten Aufsatzes stehen nicht Geringverdiener, sondern 
Beschäftigte aus allen Lohngruppen. Eine aktualisierte Schätzung der Lohneffekte 
der Tarifbindung deutet darauf hin, dass trotz des kontinuierlichen Rückgangs des 
gewerkschaftlichen Organisationsgrads und der Tarifbindung im letzten Jahrzehnt 
weiterhin eine – wenn auch geringe – positive Lohnprämie der Tarifbindung exis-
tiert. Dieses Ergebnis liefert die Grundlage für eine tiefergehende Untersuchung der 
sinkenden Bedeutung des Gewerkschaftswesens für die Löhne in Deutschland im 
Rahmen zukünftiger Forschung.
Wage inequality in Germany has been rising significantly over the 
last decades. By now, about one fifth of all employees in Germany are 
working in the low-wage sector. At the same time, only a fraction of 
the low-wage workers manage to move up to better-paid jobs.
Jens Stephani investigates various research questions concerning the 
upward wage mobility of low-wage workers which have not been 
analysed previously: How big are the chances of low-wage workers to 
stay in higher-paid employment for a longer term after moving up? 
Which establishments provide above-average wage increases for low-
wage workers? How important are personality traits for the chances 
of low-wage workers moving up?
In a separate chapter, Stephani analyses the extent to which the wage 
levels in establishments that are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements are still higher than the wage levels in uncovered 
establishments, despite the decline in unionism in Germany over the 
last decade.
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